Sharplink, Inc. 10-Q

ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS You should carefully consider the risks described below before making an investment decision. The risks and uncertainties described in this section may not be the only ones we face. Additional risks and uncertainties that are not currently known to us, or that we currently deem immaterial, may also impair our business operations or financial condition. If any of the risks described below or any such additional risks actually occur, our business, financial condition, results of operations and the market price of our securities could be materially adversely affected. In particular, because we have adopted a treasury strategy centered on acquiring and holding ETH, and a substantial portion of our assets are concentrated in ETH and related digital intangible asset holdings, our financial results and the market price of our securities are subject to significant volatility and may be adversely impacted by events affecting the price, perception, regulation, or technological underpinnings of ETH. The following risk factors highlight the material risks associated with our ETH Treasury Management strategy and related exposures. Although the SEC and CFTC have issued joint interpretive guidance identifying ETH as a “digital commodity” rather than a “digital security,” that guidance is non-binding and could be modified or rejected by a court, and any determination that ETH is a “security” would subject us to additional regulation and could materially impact the operation of our business. On March 17, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), joined by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), issued a joint interpretation (the “Joint Interpretation”) clarifying the application of the federal securities laws to crypto assets and establishing a taxonomy of five categories: “digital commodities,” “digital collectibles,” “digital tools,” “stablecoins,” and “digital securities.” The Joint Interpretation expressly identifies ETH as an example of a digital commodity, and the SEC and CFTC have each stated that they will administer their respective statutes consistent with the Joint Interpretation. The Joint Interpretation is consistent with our long-held view, described below, that ETH is not a “security” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws and that registration of the Company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “Investment Company Act”), is therefore not required under the applicable securities laws. The Joint Interpretation is interpretive guidance rather than a rulemaking and does not itself have the force of law. It could be modified, withdrawn, or superseded by future SEC or CFTC leadership, narrowed or invalidated through judicial challenge, or rendered obsolete by subsequent legislation or rulemaking. Federal and state courts are not bound by the Joint Interpretation, and the ultimate legal question of whether any particular digital asset, or any particular transaction involving a digital asset, is a “security” remains subject to judicial determination under tests articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, including in the Howey and Reves cases. In addition, the Joint Interpretation acknowledges that a crypto asset that is not itself a security may nonetheless become subject to an “investment contract” depending on the manner in which it is offered or sold, so classification of ETH as a digital commodity does not foreclose the possibility that particular transactions involving ETH could be characterized as securities transactions. 53 We have adapted, and expect to continue to adapt, our process for analyzing the U.S. federal securities law status of ETH and other cryptocurrencies over time, as guidance, interpretive releases, and case law have evolved. As part of our U.S. federal securities law analytical process, we take into account a number of factors, including the various definitions of “security” under U.S. federal securities laws and federal court decisions interpreting the elements of these definitions, such as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the Howey and Reves cases, as well as court rulings, reports, orders, press releases, public statements, and speeches by the SEC Commissioners and SEC Staff — including, most recently, the Joint Interpretation — providing guidance on when a digital asset, or a transaction to which a digital asset may relate, may be a security for purposes of U.S. federal securities laws. Our position that ETH is not a “security” is premised, among other reasons, on our conclusion that ETH does not meet the elements of the Howey test. Among the reasons for our conclusion that ETH is not a security is that holders of ETH do not have a reasonable expectation of profits from our efforts in respect of their holding of ETH. Also, ETH ownership does not convey the right to receive any interest, rewards, or other returns. Notwithstanding the Joint Interpretation and our own conclusion, we acknowledge that a federal or state court, state securities regulator, future SEC or CFTC leadership, or private plaintiff could take a different view as to the status of ETH or any particular transaction involving ETH. State “blue sky” regulators are not formally bound by the Joint Interpretation, and private litigants are not bound by the views of any federal regulator. Application of securities laws to the specific facts and circumstances of digital assets is complex and subject to change. As such, we remain at risk of private litigation, state enforcement proceedings, and — in the event the Joint Interpretation is modified, withdrawn, or judicially rejected — federal enforcement proceedings, any of which could result in potential injunctions, cease-and-desist orders, fines, penalties, damages, or a requirement that we register as an investment company under the Investment Company Act, and any of which could adversely affect our business, results of operations, financial condition and prospects. If we were deemed to be an investment company under the Investment Company Act, applicable restrictions likely would make it impractical for us to continue segments of our business as currently contemplated. Under Sections 3(a)(1)(A) and (C) of the Investment Company Act, a company generally will be deemed to be an “investment company” if (i) it is, or holds itself out as being, engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities or (ii) it engages, or proposes to engage, in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities and it owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40% of the value of its total assets (exclusive of U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis. Rule 3a-1 under the Investment Company Act generally provides that notwithstanding the Section 3(a)(1)(C) test described in clause (ii) above, an entity will not be deemed to be an “investment company” for purposes of the Investment Company Act if no more than 45% of the value of its assets (exclusive of U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, and cash items) consists of, and no more than 45% of its net income after taxes (for the past four fiscal quarters combined) is derived from, securities other than U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, securities issued by employees’ securities companies, securities issued by qualifying majority owned subsidiaries of such entity, and securities issued by qualifying companies that are controlled primarily by such entity. We do not believe that we are an “investment company” as such term is defined in either Section 3(a)(1)(A) or Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Investment Company Act. Recently, we have begun focusing on pursuing opportunities to expand our portfolio into digital assets. With respect to Section 3(a)(1)(A), following the PIPE Offering, the proceeds of the PIPE Offering are expected to be used to acquire ETH, which will result in our ownership or holding of ETH in excess of 40% of our total assets. Since we believe ETH is not an investment security, we do not hold ourselves out as being engaged primarily, or propose to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities within the meaning of Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act. 54 With respect to Section 3(a)(1)(C), we believe we satisfy the elements of Rule 3a-1 and therefore are deemed not to be an investment company under, and we intend to conduct our operations such that we will not be deemed an investment company under, Section 3(a)(1)(C). We believe that we are not an investment company pursuant to Rule 3a-1 under the Investment Company Act because, on a consolidated basis with respect to wholly-owned subsidiaries but otherwise on an unconsolidated basis, no more than 45% of the value of the Company’s total assets (exclusive of U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, and cash items) consists of, and no more than 45% of the Company’s net income after taxes (for the last four fiscal quarters combined) is derived from, securities other than U.S. government securities, shares of registered money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, securities issued by employees’ securities companies, securities issued by qualifying majority owned subsidiaries of the Company, and securities issued by qualifying companies that are controlled primarily by the Company. ETH and other digital assets, as well as new business models and transactions enabled by blockchain technologies, present novel interpretive questions under the Investment Company Act. There is a risk that assets or arrangements that we have concluded are not securities could be deemed to be securities by the SEC or another authority for purposes of the Investment Company Act, which would increase the percentage of securities held by us for Investment Company Act purposes. The SEC has requested information from a number of participants in the digital assets’ ecosystem, regarding the potential application of the Investment Company Act to their businesses. For example, in an action unrelated to the Company, in February 2022, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order under the Investment Company Act to BlockFi Lending LLC, in which the SEC alleged that BlockFi was operating as an unregistered investment company because it issued securities and also held more than 40% of its total assets, excluding cash, in investment securities, including the loans of digital assets made by BlockFi to institutional borrowers. If we were deemed to be an investment company, Rule 3a-2 under the Investment Company Act is a safe harbor that provides a one-year grace period for transient investment companies that have a bona fide intent to be engaged primarily, as soon as is reasonably possible (in any event by the termination of such one-year period), in a business other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, with such intent evidenced by the company’s business activities and an appropriate resolution of its board of directors. The grace period is available not more than once every three years and runs from the earlier of (i) the date on which the issuer owns securities and/or cash having a value exceeding 50% of the issuer’s total assets on either a consolidated or unconsolidated basis or (ii) the date on which the issuer owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40% of the value of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of U.S. government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis. Accordingly, the grace period may not be available at the time that we seek to rely on Rule 3a-2; however, Rule 3a-2 is a safe harbor and we may rely on any exemption or exclusion from investment company status available to us under the Investment Company Act at any given time. Furthermore, reliance on Rule 3a-2, Section 3(a)(1) (C), or Rule 3a-1 could require us to take actions to dispose of securities, limit our ability to make certain investments or enter into joint ventures, or otherwise limit or change our service offerings and operations. If we were to be deemed an investment company in the future, restrictions imposed by the Investment Company Act — including limitations on our ability to issue different classes of stock and equity compensation to directors, officers and employees and restrictions on management, operations, and transactions with affiliated persons — likely would make it impractical for us to continue our business as contemplated, and could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition, and prospects. 55 Regulatory developments regarding the classification of digital assets as “commodities” or “digital commodities” by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), including recent joint SEC-CFTC interpretive guidance and pending legislation, could subject us to additional regulatory burdens and oversight by the CFTC and could adversely affect the market price of ETH and the market price of our listed securities. The CFTC has stated it believes, and judicial decisions involving CFTC enforcement actions have confirmed, that at least some digital assets fall within the definition of a “commodity” under the U.S. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936 (the “CEA”) and the rules promulgated by the CFTC thereunder (“CFTC Rules”). On March 17, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), joined by the CFTC, issued a joint interpretation (the “Joint Interpretation”) clarifying the application of the federal securities laws to crypto assets and establishing a token taxonomy distinguishing “digital commodities,” “digital collectibles,” “digital tools,” “stablecoins,” and “digital securities.” The Joint Interpretation expressly identifies ETH as an example of a digital commodity, and the CFTC has stated that it will administer the CEA consistent with the Joint Interpretation. While the CFTC has enforcement authority to police against fraud and manipulation in spot commodity markets (including the spot market for digital assets that are commodities), the CFTC continues to have regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction only with respect to “commodity interest” transactions, such as futures, options, and swaps on a commodity (including a digital asset commodity) and certain leveraged, margined, or financed transactions in commodities involving retail customers. The Joint Interpretation did not expand the CFTC’s statutory jurisdiction over spot digital asset activities. Accordingly, we are not currently regulated or supervised by the CFTC and are not subject to the legal and regulatory obligations that are applicable to CFTC-registered entities under the CEA and CFTC Rules. The Joint Interpretation is interpretive guidance rather than a rulemaking, and it does not itself have the force of law. It could be modified, withdrawn, or superseded by future SEC or CFTC leadership, narrowed or invalidated through judicial challenge, or rendered obsolete by subsequent legislation or rulemaking. No assurance can be given that ETH will continue to be treated as a digital commodity under this or any future guidance, or that the current allocation of jurisdiction between the SEC and CFTC with respect to ETH and other digital assets will remain unchanged. A change in ETH’s regulatory classification, or in the coordinated posture between the SEC and the CFTC, could materially increase our compliance burden, restrict our ability to hold or transact in ETH, and adversely affect the market price of ETH and the market price of our listed securities. The regulation of digital assets in the U.S. also remains subject to change through the enactment and adoption of new laws and regulations, and the Joint Interpretation is expressly intended to complement, rather than substitute for, Congressional market structure legislation. The proposed CLARITY Act passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, and other draft digital asset market structure and regulation bills, have proposed granting the CFTC additional regulatory and supervisory powers with respect to spot digital assets as “digital commodities.” While it is not possible to predict if and in what form such proposals will be adopted, if any, changes to or expansion of the jurisdiction of the CFTC with respect to activities in spot digital assets could result in the imposition of additional regulatory obligations and burdens, which could include registration, disclosure, reporting, and business conduct requirements. For example, it is possible that if the CLARITY Act were to become law as currently proposed, our ETH Treasury Management strategy could cause us to be deemed a “commodity pool” under the CEA such that our operators and advisors may need to register with the CFTC as commodity pool operators and comply with other CFTC regulations as well as the rules of the National Futures Association. Such additional regulatory burdens and oversight could materially increase the cost of our business, could adversely affect the market price of ETH, and in turn could adversely affect the market price of our listed securities. We may be subject to regulatory developments related to digital assets and digital asset markets, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations. As digital assets are relatively novel and the application of state and federal securities laws and other laws and regulations to digital assets is still evolving, it is possible that regulators in the United States or foreign countries may interpret or apply existing laws and regulations in a manner that adversely affects the price of digital assets. The U.S. federal government, states, regulatory agencies, and foreign countries may also enact new laws and regulations, or pursue regulatory, legislative, enforcement or judicial actions, that could materially impact the price of digital assets or the ability of individuals or institutions such as us to own or transfer digital assets. 56 On January 23, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology” (the “Executive Order”) aimed at supporting “the responsible growth and use of digital assets, blockchain technology, and related technologies across all sectors of the economy.” The Executive Order also established an interagency working group that is tasked with “proposing a Federal regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets” in the United States. Pursuant to this Executive Order, the working group released a report in July 2025 outlining the administration’s recommendations to Congress and various agencies reflecting the administration’s “pro-innovation mindset toward digital assets and blockchain technologies.” In particular, the report recommends that Congress enact legislation regarding self-custody of digital assets, clarifying the applicability of Bank Secrecy Act obligations with respect to digital asset service providers, granting the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) authority to regulate spot markets in non-security digital assets, prohibiting the adoption of a central bank digital currency (“CBDC”), and clarifying tax laws as relevant to digital assets. In addition, the report recommends that agencies reevaluate existing guidance on digital asset activities, use existing authorities to enable the trading of digital assets at the federal level, embrace DeFi, launch or relaunch digital asset innovation efforts, and promote U.S. private sector leadership in the responsible development of cross-border payments and financial markets technologies, among others. Consistent with the Executive Order and the July 2025 working group report, on March 17, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), joined by the CFTC, issued a joint interpretation (the “Joint Interpretation”) clarifying the application of the federal securities laws to crypto assets. The Joint Interpretation establishes a taxonomy of five categories — “digital commodities,” “digital collectibles,” “digital tools,” “stablecoins,” and “digital securities” — and expressly identifies ETH as an example of a digital commodity. The SEC and CFTC have each stated that they will administer their respective statutes consistent with the Joint Interpretation. While we believe the Joint Interpretation provides meaningful additional clarity regarding the regulatory status of ETH, it is interpretive guidance rather than a rulemaking, does not itself have the force of law, and is not binding on federal or state courts, state securities regulators, or private litigants. The Joint Interpretation could be modified, withdrawn, or superseded by future SEC or CFTC leadership, narrowed or invalidated through judicial challenge, or rendered obsolete by subsequent legislation or rulemaking, and it also acknowledges that a crypto asset that is not itself a security may nonetheless become subject to an “investment contract” depending on the manner in which it is offered or sold. There have also been several bills introduced in Congress that propose to establish additional regulation and oversight of the digital asset markets. For example, the CLARITY Act was passed by the House of Representatives in July 2025, which would, if enacted, regulate digital asset markets and digital asset trading platforms in the United States and provide statutory backing for the allocation of jurisdiction between the SEC and CFTC reflected in the Joint Interpretation. In addition, also in July 2025, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (the “GENIUS Act”) became the first federal law specifically regulating the issuance, custody and other stablecoin-related matters in the United States. It is difficult to predict whether, or when, the CLARITY Act or another bill that would regulate digital asset markets and digital asset trading platforms may become law or what any such bill may entail. It is difficult to predict whether, or when, as a result of these developments, Congress will grant additional authorities to the SEC, the CFTC, or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how additional legislation and/or regulatory oversight might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function, the willingness of financial and other institutions to continue to provide services to the digital assets industry, or how any new regulations, changes to existing regulations, or changes to or withdrawal of existing interpretive guidance might impact the value of digital assets generally and ETH held by the Company specifically. The consequences of these potential developments, including any narrowing, modification, or withdrawal of the Joint Interpretation, could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition, and prospects, as well as the market price of ETH, which in turn could adversely affect the market price of our listed securities. 57 Our Common Stock may not always trade at a premium to the value of the digital assets we hold, and may trade at a discount thereto. Although our common stock, par value $0.0001 per share has, and may in the future trade at a premium to the value of our holdings of Ether (“ETH”), to the extent investors view our Common Stock as providing exposure to ETH, it is possible that the price of our Common Stock may not always trade at such a premium, and may trade at a discount thereto. This may occur due to the rise in other traditional investment vehicles providing exposure to digital assets, including ETH, as well as the increase in the number of investors who may wish to purchase digital assets, including ETH, directly, among other reasons. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has recently provided guidance that will allow broker-dealers to custody digital assets on behalf of investors. The SEC has also rescinded Staff Accounting Bulletin 121 which, by forcing public companies to include on their balance sheets digital assets custodied on behalf of third parties, effectively prevented publicly traded banks from providing digital asset custodial services. Any movement of investor funds to such other sources, or a change in the market’s perception of digital asset treasury vehicles or in investor sentiment generally, could result in a decrease in price of our Common Stock and may impair our ability to engage in future financings. The concentration of our ETH holdings enhances the risks inherent in our ETH Treasury Management strategy. While ETH concentration is monitored as the total number of ETH units (including native-staked and liquid-staked ETH) held by us divided by 1,000 assumed diluted shares outstanding and is used to evaluate our capital allocation strategy and digital asset leverage on a per-share basis, significant swings in the price of ETH may lead to increased risks in our ETH Treasury Management strategy. ETH and other digital assets are novel assets, and are subject to significant legal, commercial, regulatory and technical uncertainty. ETH and other digital assets are relatively novel and are subject to significant uncertainty, which could adversely impact their price. The application of state and federal securities laws and other laws and regulations to digital assets is unclear in certain respects, and it is possible that regulators in the United States or foreign countries may interpret or apply existing laws and regulations in a manner that adversely affects the price of ETH or the ability of individuals or institutions such as us to own or transfer ETH. The U.S. federal government, states, regulatory agencies and foreign countries may also enact new laws and regulations, or pursue regulatory, legislative, enforcement or judicial actions, that could materially impact the price of ETH or the ability of individuals or institutions such as us to own or transfer ETH. It is not possible to predict whether, or when, new laws will be enacted that change the legal framework governing digital assets or provide additional authorities to the SEC or other regulators, or whether, or when, any other federal, state or foreign legislative bodies will take any similar actions. It is also not possible to predict the nature of any such additional laws or authorities, how additional legislation or regulatory oversight might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function, the willingness of financial and other institutions to continue to provide services to the digital assets industry, or how any new laws or regulations, or changes to existing laws or regulations, might impact the value of digital assets generally and ETH specifically. The consequences of any new law or regulation relating to digital assets and digital asset activities could adversely affect the market price of ETH, as well as our ability to hold or transact in ETH, and in turn adversely affect the market price of our listed securities. Moreover, the risks of engaging in an ETH Treasury Management strategy could create complications due to the lack of experience that third parties have with companies engaging in such a strategy, such as increased costs of director and officer liability insurance or the potential inability to obtain such coverage on acceptable terms in the future. The growth of the digital assets industry in general, and the use and acceptance of ETH in particular, may also impact the price of ETH and is subject to a high degree of uncertainty. The pace of worldwide growth in the adoption and use of ETH may depend, for instance, on public familiarity with digital assets, ease of buying, accessing or gaining exposure to ETH, institutional demand for ETH as an investment asset, the participation of traditional financial institutions in the digital assets industry, consumer demand for ETH as a store of value or means of payment, and the availability and popularity of alternatives to ETH. Even if growth in ETH adoption occurs in the near or medium-term, there is no assurance that ETH usage will continue to grow over the long-term. 58 Because ETH has no physical existence beyond the record of transactions on the Ethereum blockchain, a variety of technical factors related to the Ethereum blockchain could also impact the price of ETH. For example, malicious attacks, inadequate staking fees to incentivize validating of ETH transactions, and advances in digital computing, algebraic geometry, and quantum computing could undercut the integrity of the Ethereum blockchain and negatively affect the price of ETH. The liquidity of ETH may also be reduced and damage to the public perception of ETH may occur if financial institutions were to deny or limit banking services to businesses that hold ETH, provide ETH-related services or accept ETH as payment, which could also decrease the price of ETH. Our historical financial statements do not reflect the potential variability in earnings that we may experience in the future relating to our ETH holdings. Our historical financial statements do not reflect the potential variability in earnings that we may experience in the future from holding or selling significant amounts of ETH. The price of ETH has historically been subject to dramatic price fluctuations and is highly volatile. Because we intend to purchase additional ETH in future periods and increase our overall holdings of ETH, we expect that the proportion of our total assets represented by our ETH holdings will increase in the future. As a result, and in particular due to our adoption of ASU 2023-08, volatility in our earnings may be significantly more than what we experienced in prior periods. Our shift towards an ETH-focused treasury strategy requires substantial changes in our day-to-day operations and exposes us to significant operational risks. Our shift towards an ETH-focused treasury strategy, including staking, restaking, liquid staking, and other decentralized finance activities, exposes us to significant operational risks. Staking ETH involves holding a certain amount of ETH in a smart contract and running a piece of software known as a “validator node.” Validators are randomly selected to propose a new block of transactions to be added to the Ethereum blockchain. When an Ethereum participant attempts a transaction, that participant is required to pay a minimum “gas” fee. A participant can opt to pay an additional fee to ensure that its transaction is added to the blockchain more quickly. These fees are denominated in ETH. The validator chosen to propose a block will (when that block is successfully confirmed by the other validator nodes) receive the gas fees for all transactions in the block (known as “execution layer rewards”). In addition, the Ethereum blockchain automatically issues ETH as rewards to validators who successfully propose a block, known as “consensus layer rewards.” The Ethereum network also automatically imposes penalties on validators that experience downtime or that propose incorrect blocks. These penalties are known as “slashing” and will reduce the number of ETH that are “staked” to the validator node. Although we currently do not operate any validators, we may choose to operate our own validator services, or we may seek to continue to “delegate” our ETH to third party validation service providers. If we choose to use a third-party validation service, we will have to share our staking rewards with that third-party validator, but that third-party validator may have more sophisticated technology which would enable those rewards to be greater. In either case, staking increases the risk of loss of ETH, including through slashing penalties and through increasing vulnerabilities to hacking in the staking smart contracts. Validators also need to maintain uptime to maximize their rewards. Further, the ETH ecosystem rapidly evolves, with frequent upgrades and protocol changes that may require significant adjustments to our operational setup. The upgrades and protocol changes may require that we incur unanticipated costs, and it could cause temporary service disruptions. Technical failures or operational errors could impact our ability to obtain ETH rewards or gas fees, which could result in our failure to meet our financial projections. 59 Staked ETH is also subject to lock-up periods during which it cannot be withdrawn or sold. This lack of liquidity could limit our ability to respond to market changes or our financial needs. We may seek to mitigate this risk through so-called “liquid staking” arrangements, where we deposit ETH into a smart contract and receive in exchange a “liquid staking token” which would allow us, or any person to whom we transfer that liquid staking token, to later withdraw our ETH and associated rewards. The smart contract would then automatically delegate our ETH to a third-party staking service provider. We could engage in other DeFi activities with liquid staking tokens. While we anticipate that the price of liquid staking tokens will correlate to ETH itself, there is a possibility that prices will diverge. This could especially happen if the validators deployed by the liquid staking contract are subject to slashing penalties, in which case we may be able to withdraw fewer ETH than we originally deposited. Any of these operational risks could materially and adversely affect our ability to execute our ETH Treasury Management strategy and may prevent us from realizing positive returns and could severely hurt our financial condition. ETH is created and transmitted through the operations of the peer-to-peer Ethereum network, a decentralized network of computers running software following the Ethereum protocol. If the Ethereum network is disrupted or encounters any unanticipated difficulties, the value of Ethereum could be negatively impacted. If the Ethereum network is disrupted or encounters any unanticipated difficulties, then the processing of transactions on the Ethereum network may be disrupted, which in turn may prevent us from depositing or withdrawing ETH from our accounts with our custodian or otherwise effecting ETH transactions. Such disruptions could include, for example: the price volatility of ETH; the insolvency, business failure, interruption, default, failure to perform, security breach, or other problems of participants, custodians, or others; the closing of ETH trading platforms due to fraud, failures, security breaches, or otherwise; or network outages or congestion, power outages, or other problems or disruptions affecting the Ethereum network. In addition, although we do not currently intend to mine ETH, digital asset validating operations can consume significant amounts of electricity, which may have a negative environmental impact and give rise to public opinion against allowing, or government regulations restricting, the use of electricity for validating operations. Additionally, validators may be forced to cease operations during an electricity shortage or power outage. Our ETH Treasury Management strategy exposes us to various risks, including risks associated with ETH, which include the following: ETH is a highly volatile asset. ETH is a highly volatile asset that has traded below $1,500 per ETH and above $4,000 per ETH on the Coinbase exchange in the 12 months preceding the date of this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q. The trading price of ETH decreased following the launch of our ETH Treasury Management strategy to the end of this quarter, and such declines may occur again in the future. Our ETH holdings significantly impact our financial results and the market price of our listed securities. Our ETH holdings could significantly affect our financial results and if we continue to increase our overall holdings of ETH in the future, they will have an even greater impact on our financial results and the market price of our listed securities. Our assets are concentrated in ETH. The vast majority of our assets are concentrated in our ETH holdings or receipt tokens (i.e., LsETH) from liquid staking of ETH. The concentration of our assets in ETH limits our ability to mitigate risk that could otherwise be achieved by holding a more diversified portfolio of treasury assets. If there is a significant decrease in the price of ETH, we may experience a more pronounced impact on our financial condition than if we invested our cash in a more diverse portfolio of treasury assets. 60 We primarily purchase ETH using proceeds from equity financings. Our ability to achieve the growth objectives of our ETH Treasury Management strategy depends in significant part on our ability to continue raising capital to purchase ETH. If we are unable to obtain equity, equity-linked or debt financing on favorable terms or at all, we may not be able to successfully execute on our ETH Treasury Management strategy. Our ETH Treasury Management strategy has not been tested over an extended period of time or under different market conditions. We are continually examining the risks and rewards of our strategy to acquire and hold ETH and to stake such ETH to generate staking rewards. This strategy has not been tested over an extended period of time or under different market conditions. For example, although we believe ETH has the potential to serve as a hedge against inflation in the long term, the short-term price of ETH declined in recent periods during which the inflation rate increased. If ETH prices were to decrease or our ETH Treasury Management strategy otherwise proves unsuccessful, our financial condition, results of operations, and the market price of our listed securities would be materially adversely impacted. Our ETH staking activities could result in “slashing risks” and loss of staked ETH. ETH staking exposes us to slashing risks, defined as a punitive mechanism built into the Ethereum network, designed to penalize validators and their delegators for misbehavior or failing to follow network rules, which could result in the loss of our staked ETH. We are subject to provider and counterparty risks, including risks relating to our custodians. Although we have implemented various measures that are designed to mitigate our counterparty risks, including by storing substantially all of the ETH and LsETH we own in custody accounts at U.S.-based, institutional-grade custodians and negotiating contractual arrangements intended to establish that our property interest in custodially-held ETH and LsETH is not subject to claims of our custodians’ creditors, applicable insolvency law is not fully developed with respect to the holding of digital assets in custodial accounts. If our custodially-held ETH were nevertheless considered to be the property of our custodians’ estates in the event that any such custodians were to enter bankruptcy, receivership or similar insolvency proceedings, we could be treated as a general unsecured creditor of such custodians, inhibiting our ability to exercise ownership rights with respect to such ETH, or delaying or hindering our access to our ETH holdings or LsETH holdings, and this may ultimately result in the loss of the value related to some or all of such ETH and LsETH, which could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition as well as the market price of our listed securities. The broader digital assets industry is subject to counterparty risks, which could adversely impact the adoption rate, price, and use of ETH. A series of recent high-profile bankruptcies, closures, liquidations, regulatory enforcement actions and other events relating to companies operating in the digital asset industry have highlighted the counterparty risks applicable to owning and transacting in digital assets. Although these bankruptcies, closures, liquidations and other events have not resulted in any loss or misappropriation of our ETH or LsETH, nor have such events adversely impacted our access to our ETH or LsETH, they have, in the short-term, likely negatively impacted the adoption rate and use of ETH. Additional bankruptcies, closures, liquidations, regulatory enforcement actions or other events involving participants in the digital assets industry in the future may further negatively impact the adoption rate, price, and use of ETH, limit the availability to us of financing collateralized by ETH, or create or expose additional counterparty risks. Changes in the accounting treatment of our ETH holdings or LsETH holdings could have significant accounting impacts, including increasing the volatility of our results. We have adopted ASU 2023-08 as of January 1, 2025, which requires us to measure our ETH holdings at fair value in our statement of financial position, and to recognize gains and losses from changes in the fair value of our ETH in net income each reporting period beginning January 1, 2025. ASU 2023-08 also requires us to provide certain interim and annual disclosures with respect to our ETH holdings. Due in particular to the volatility in the price of ETH, we expect the measurement at fair value to have a material impact on our financial results in future periods, increase the volatility of our financial results, and affect the carrying value of our ETH on our balance sheet. ASU 2023-08 could also have adverse tax consequences. In addition, on September 30, 2025, the Treasury and the IRS issued interim guidance (the “Interim Guidance”) which, in relevant part, clarifies that a corporation may disregard unrealized gains and losses on its digital asset holdings when computing AFSI for purposes of determining whether it is subject to the 15% CAMT under the Inflation Reduction Act. The Treasury and IRS intend to issue revised proposed regulations similar to this Interim Guidance. These impacts could in turn have a material adverse effect on our financial results and the market price of our listed securities. Additionally, our LsETH holdings as of December 31, 2025 are accounted for at cost-less-impairment. Significant declines in the price of LsETH may result in material impairment within our financial results. 61 ETH is a highly volatile asset, and fluctuations in the price of ETH are likely to influence our financial results and the market price of our listed securities. ETH is a highly volatile asset, and fluctuations in the price of ETH are likely to influence our financial results and the market price of our listed securities. Our financial results and the market price of our listed securities would be adversely affected, and our business and financial condition would be negatively impacted, if the price of ETH decreased substantially (as it has in the past), including as a result of: ● decreased user and investor confidence in ETH, including due to the various factors described herein; ● investment and trading activities, such as (i) trading activities of highly active retail and institutional users, speculators, miners and investors; (ii) actual or expected significant dispositions of ETH by large holders, including the expected liquidation of digital assets associated with entities that have filed for bankruptcy protection and the transfer and sale of ETH associated with significant hacks, seizures, or forfeitures; and (iii) actual or perceived manipulation of the spot or derivative markets for ETH or spot ETH exchange-traded products (“ETPs”); ● negative publicity, media or social media coverage, or sentiment due to events in or relating to, or perception of, ETH or the broader digital assets industry, for example, (i) public perception that ETH can be used as a vehicle to circumvent sanctions, including sanctions imposed on Russia or certain regions related to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, or to fund criminal or terrorist activities, such as the purported use of digital assets by Hamas to fund its terrorist attack against Israel in October 2023; (ii) expected or pending civil, criminal, regulatory enforcement or other high profile actions against major participants in the ETH ecosystem; (iii) additional filings for bankruptcy protection or bankruptcy proceedings of major digital asset industry participants, such as the bankruptcy proceeding of FTX Trading and its affiliates; (iv) the actual or perceived environmental impact of ETH and related activities, including environmental concerns raised by private individuals, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and other actors related to the energy resources consumed in ETH related processes, and (v) changes in government regulations ; ● changes in consumer preferences and the perceived value or prospects of ETH; ● competition from other digital assets that exhibit better speed, security, scalability, or energy efficiency, that feature other more favored characteristics, that are backed by governments, including the U.S. government, or reserves of fiat currencies, or that represent ownership or security interests in physical assets; ● a decrease in the price of other digital assets, including stablecoins, or the crash or unavailability of stablecoins that are used as a medium of exchange for ETH purchase and sale transactions to the extent the decrease in the price of such other digital assets or the unavailability of such stablecoins may cause a decrease in the price of ETH or adversely affect investor confidence in digital assets generally; ● developments relating to the ETH protocol that may impact (i) its security, speed, scalability, usability, or value, (b) failures to upgrade the protocol to adapt to security, technological, legal or other challenges, and (iii) changes to the ETH protocol that introduce software bugs, security risks or other elements that adversely affect ETH; ● disruptions, failures, unavailability, or interruptions in service of trading venues for ETH; ● the filing for bankruptcy protection by, liquidation of, or market concerns about the financial viability of digital asset custodians, trading venues, lending platforms, investment funds, or other digital asset industry participants; ● regulatory, legislative, enforcement and judicial actions that adversely affect the price, ownership, transferability, trading volumes, legality or public perception of ETH, or that adversely affect the operations of or otherwise prevent digital asset custodians, trading venues, lending platforms or other digital assets industry participants from operating in a manner that allows them to continue to deliver services to the digital assets industry; ● reductions in staking rewards of ETH, or increases in the costs associated with ETH staking, including increases in electricity costs and hardware and software used in staking, or new or enhanced regulation or taxation of ETH staking, which could further increase the costs associated with ETH staking, any of which may cause a decline in support for the Ethereum protocol; ● transaction congestion and fees associated with processing transactions of ETH or lengthened periods to exit ETH staking or other delays to unstaking or withdrawing ETH from staking protocols; 62 ● ETH staking exposes us to slashing risks, defined as a punitive mechanism built into the Ethereum network, designed to penalize validators and their delegators for misbehavior or failing to follow network rules, which could result in the loss of our staked ETH; ● macroeconomic changes, such as changes in the level of interest rates and inflation, fiscal and monetary policies of governments, trade restrictions, and fiat currency devaluations; ● changes in national and international economic and political conditions, including, without limitation, federal government policies, trade tariffs and trade disputes, the adverse impacts attributable to the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the economic sanctions adopted in response to the conflict, and the broadening of the Israel-Hamas conflict to other countries in the Middle East; and ● developments in mathematics or technology, including in digital computing, algebraic geometry and quantum computing, that could result in the cryptography used by the ETH blockchain becoming insecure or ineffective The Ethereum network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can become a node by downloading the Ethereum Client and participating in the Ethereum network, and no permission of a central authority or body is needed to do so. In addition, anyone can propose a modification to the Ethereum network’s source code and then propose that the Ethereum network community support the modification. These proposed modifications to the Ethereum network’s source code, if adopted, can lead to forks. A “fork” in the Ethereum protocol could adversely affect the value of the Company’s shares. Forks in the Ethereum protocol may lead to disruptions, security risks or declines in ETH value and therefore the value of the Company’s common stock. A “fork” occurs when a change to the Ethereum network’s source code creates two incompatible versions of the blockchain, resulting in separate networks. Forks may be planned (e.g., upgrades to the Ethereum protocol like the Merge or Dencun) or unplanned (e.g., due to software bugs or validator disagreement). Planned forks are designed to improve performance or introduce new features, but they may introduce bugs, security vulnerabilities, or unexpected economic consequences. Unplanned forks can arise from client software inconsistencies or protocol failures, causing network instability or fragmentation. In either case, forks may result in operational outages, user confusion, replay attacks and reduced validator participation, all of which could undermine confidence in the Ethereum network and adversely affect the price of ETH. Our ETH holdings, staking activities and related treasury strategy could be materially negatively impacted in the event of such a fork. Our ETH holdings are less liquid than our existing cash and cash equivalents and may not be able to serve as a source of liquidity for us to the same extent as cash and cash equivalents. Historically, the ETH market has been characterized by significant volatility in price, limited liquidity and trading volumes compared to sovereign currencies markets, relative anonymity, a developing regulatory landscape, potential susceptibility to market abuse and manipulation, compliance and internal control failures at exchanges, and various other risks inherent in its entirely electronic, virtual form and decentralized network. During times of market instability, we may not be able to sell our ETH at favorable prices or at all. For example, a number of ETH trading venues temporarily halted deposits and withdrawals in 2022, although the Coinbase exchange (our principal market for ETH) has, to date, not done so. As a result, our ETH holdings may not be able to serve as a source of liquidity for us to the same extent as cash and cash equivalents. Further, ETH we hold with our custodians do not enjoy the same protections as are available to cash or securities deposited with or transacted by institutions subject to regulation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. Additionally, we may be unable to enter into term loans or other capital raising transactions collateralized by our unencumbered ETH or otherwise generate funds using our ETH holdings, including in particular during times of market instability or when the price of ETH has declined significantly. If we are unable to sell our ETH, enter into additional capital raising transactions, including capital raising transactions using ETH as collateral, or otherwise generate funds using our ETH holdings, or if we are forced to sell our ETH at a significant loss, in order to meet our working capital requirements, our business and financial condition could be negatively impacted. 63 We plan to purchase additional digital assets using primarily proceeds from equity and debt financings, but we may be unable to obtain such financings on favorable terms. Our ability to achieve the objectives of our digital asset acquisition strategy depends in significant part on our ability to obtain equity and debt financing. The terms of debt or equity securities that we issue may require us to make periodic payments to the holders of those securities. If we are unable to obtain equity or debt financing on favorable terms or at all, we may not be able to successfully execute on our digital asset acquisition strategy. Our ability to obtain equity or debt financing may in turn depend on, among other factors, the value of our digital asset holdings, investor sentiment and the public perception of ETH and other digital assets, our strategy and our value proposition. Accordingly, a significant decline in the market value of our digital asset holdings, our inability to monetize our ETH through staking, decentralized finance or other yield-generating activities, or a negative shift in these other factors may create liquidity and credit risks, as such a decline or such shifts may adversely impact our ability to secure sufficient equity or debt financing. ETH constitutes the vast bulk of assets on our balance sheet. If we are unable to secure equity or debt financing in a timely manner, on favorable terms, or at all, we may be required to sell ETH to satisfy our financial obligations, and we may be required to make such sales at prices below our cost basis or that are otherwise unfavorable. Any such sale of ETH may have a material adverse effect on our operating results and financial condition and could impair our ability to secure additional equity or debt financing in the future. Our inability to secure additional equity or debt financing in a timely manner, on favorable terms or at all, or to sell our ETH in amounts and at prices sufficient to satisfy our financial obligations, including any debt service and cash dividend obligations, could cause us to default under such obligations. Any default on our future indebtedness or any newly issued preferred stock could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition. Such actions could cause significant variation in our operating results in any quarter. There are also volatility risks related to stablecoins, which are designed to have a relatively stable price relative to an underlying physical asset, most commonly a fiat currency, such as U.S. dollars, or an exchange-traded commodity. The stability of a stablecoin results from the underlying assets backing the stablecoin that are held by the stablecoin’s issuer in reserve accounts, among other factors such as the ability of a holder to redeem the stablecoin from its issuer at par. The issuers of certain stablecoins currently retain broad discretion to determine the composition and amounts of assets held in the issuers’ accounts backing those stablecoins, and to substitute assets other than the fiat currency that is initially deposited. The composition of backing assets varies considerably across popular stablecoins, with some stablecoins backed entirely by off-chain assets including cash or short-term, highly liquid assets, and others backed by assets significantly less liquid than cash or cash equivalents. For example, Circle, which issues USDC, reports that it holds cash and short-term cash equivalents to back its USDC stablecoins. We regularly transact in and hold stablecoins; as of December 31, 2025, USDC is the only stablecoin that we held. A lack of applicable law and regulation has afforded discretion to certain stablecoin issuers to determine the composition and amounts of assets backing those stablecoins. There is a risk that an issuer may be unable to liquidate enough backing assets if it were to face mass redemptions of its stablecoin, which could cause the price of the stablecoin to deviate from the price of the underlying fiat currency or other asset with which the stablecoin is designed to align in price. In extreme cases, such as a request to immediately redeem all or substantially all of a particular stablecoin in circulation, even stablecoins backed by reserves comprised primarily of cash and cash equivalents may be subject to instability or an inability of the stablecoin issuer to meet all redemption requests, as the market for short-dated U.S. government obligations might not be sufficiently price stable. Market participants have increasingly shown concern about the actual underlying liquidity and reserves for dollar stablecoins such as USDC. For example, according to reports, Circle had more than $3 billion of its USDC reserve funds on deposit at SVB which became temporarily inaccessible when SVB was placed into FDIC receivership in March 2023. Although these funds were ultimately made available, concerns related to Circle’s access to these funds caused USDC to temporarily fall below its $1.00 peg, and the total market capitalization of USDC decreased following this temporary depegging. If a stablecoin issuer were to fail to honor its redemption obligations, this could undermine public confidence in stablecoins and in digital assets more broadly, which could have a widespread impact on the crypto economy, causing the prices of other stablecoins and digital assets to become more volatile. 64 Volatility in stablecoins, operational issues with stablecoins (for example, technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns about the sufficiency of any reserves that support stablecoins, or regulatory concerns about stablecoin issuers or intermediaries , such as crypto asset spot markets, that support stablecoins, could have a significant impact on the global crypto market and may adversely affect our business. Because stablecoins purport to be backed by underlying reserve assets, a fundamental issue in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the issuer of a given stablecoin is which party possesses beneficial ownership of the underlying reserve assets: the holder of the stablecoin, or the issuer. If a particular stablecoin were structured in a manner that entitles its holder only to a contractual right to payment from the issuer (even if such payments are to be derived from the underlying assets), then the assets underlying the stablecoins may be considered to be the property of the issuer’s bankruptcy estate, such that all of the issuer’s creditors would be entitled to their pro rata share of such assets, with the stablecoin holder being treated as an unsecured creditor of the issuer. In such an event, if the issuer were to have insufficient funds or assets to satisfy the claims of its creditors, then the holder of a stablecoin would likely receive only a partial recovery, and not the full purported value of its stablecoin holdings. Conversely, if a particular stablecoin were structured in a manner that entitles its holder to absolute beneficial ownership of the underlying reserve assets, whereby the issuer holds bare legal title to the underlying assets but has no beneficial interest or property rights in such assets, then the holders would likely have a stronger claim on the underlying assets in the event of a bankruptcy or insolvency of the issuer. However, due to the novelty of stablecoins, courts have not yet considered the treatment of underlying reserve assets in the context of a bankruptcy or insolvency of a stablecoin issuer, and there can be no certainty as to a court’s determination in such circumstances. Blockchain technology may expose us to sanctioned or blocked persons or may result in unintentional or inadvertent violations of economic sanctions and anti-money laundering laws and regulations. We are subject to the rules enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“ OFAC ”), including prohibitions on conducting direct or indirect business with persons named on, or owned by persons named on, OFAC’s various sanctions lists, including the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (“ SDN List ”). We are also prohibited from direct or indirect dealings with persons located, organized, or resident in jurisdictions subject to comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions (as of today, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic, and the Crimea region of Ukraine), and may be prohibited from dealing with persons in other jurisdictions subject to targeted U.S. sanctions such as Venezuela, Russia, and Belarus. U.S. sanctions compliance obligations apply to all U.S. persons and cover transactions in digital assets. U.S. sanctions authorities and law enforcement have, in recent years, directed significant attention to sanctions compliance among the digital assets industry. For example, OFAC has issued updated advisories regarding the use of virtual currencies, added a number of digital asset exchanges and service providers to the SDN List, and engaged in several enforcement actions, including a series of enforcement actions that have either shut down or significantly curtailed the operations of several smaller digital asset exchanges associated with Russian and/or North Korean nationals. Because of the pseudonymous nature of blockchain transactions and decentralized applications, we may inadvertently and without knowledge, directly or indirectly engage in transactions with or for the benefit of prohibited persons under U.S. sanctions regulations, especially when engaging in DeFi activities where it may be impossible for us to determine the identity of our counterparties. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a “strict liability” basis, meaning we may be held responsible for transacting with prohibited parties even if we have no knowledge that a particular counterparty is a prohibited person under U.S. sanctions regulations. In addition, we may be subject to non-U.S. economic sanctions laws and regulations to the extent we conduct activity within the jurisdiction of other sanctions regimes, including those of the European Union and United Kingdom. 65 OFAC and other governmental authorities have significant discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions laws and regulations. Moreover, economic sanctions laws and regulations continue to evolve, often with little or no notice, which could raise operational or compliance challenges. If it is determined that we have transacted with prohibited persons under U.S. sanctions regulations, even inadvertently, this could result in substantial reputational harm, fines or penalties, and costs associated with governmental inquiries and investigations. Despite our compliance efforts and activities we cannot assure compliance by our employees or representatives for which we may be held responsible, and any or all of the foregoing could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, operations or financial condition. In addition, there has been increasing focus on the extent to which digital assets can be used to launder the proceeds of illegal activities or fund criminal or terrorist activities. This misuse, or the perception of such misuse, could lead to greater regulatory oversight of ETH and ETH platforms, and there is the possibility that law enforcement agencies could close or blacklist ETH platforms or other ETH-related infrastructure with little or no notice and prevent users from accessing or retrieving ETH held via such platforms or infrastructure. We have recently implemented policies and procedures reasonably designed to promote compliance with applicable anti-money laundering laws and regulations and take care to only acquire our ETH through entities subject to anti-money laundering regulation and related compliance rules in the United States, if we are found to have purchased any of our ETH from bad actors that have used ETH to launder money or otherwise engage in illicit financial activity, we may be subject to regulatory proceedings and further transactions or dealings in ETH may be restricted or prohibited. The launch of central bank digital currencies (“CBDCs”) may adversely impact our business. The introduction of a government-issued digital currency could eliminate or reduce the need or demand for private-sector issued crypto currencies, or significantly limit their utility. National governments around the world could introduce CBDCs, which could in turn limit the size of the market opportunity for cryptocurrencies, including ETH. Changes in regulatory interpretations could require us to register as a money services business or money transmitter, leading to increased compliance costs or operational shutdowns. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a division of the U.S. Treasury Department (“FinCEN”) regulates providers of certain services with respect to “convertible virtual currency,” including ETH. Businesses engaged in the transfer of convertible virtual currencies are subject to registration and licensure requirements at the U.S. federal level and also under U.S. state laws. While FinCEN has issued guidance that cryptocurrency mining, without engagement in other activities, does not require registration and licensure with FinCEN, FinCEN has not made similar pronouncements with respect to the operation of Ethereum validators. In addition, our engaging in decentralized finance activities could expose us to further risk in this regard. If regulatory changes or interpretations require us to register as a money services business with FinCEN under the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act, or as a money transmitter under state laws, we may be subject to extensive regulatory requirements—including those that would mandate us to implement anti-money laundering programs meeting certain requirements, make certain reports to FinCEN or state regulators, and maintain certain records—resulting in significant compliance costs and operational burdens. 66 We may incur extraordinary expenses to meet these requirements or, alternatively, may determine that continued operations are not viable. Further, we may not be capable of complying with certain federal or state regulatory obligations applicable to “money services businesses” and “money transmitters,” such as monitoring transactions and blocking transactions, because of the nature of the Ethereum blockchain. If we are deemed to be subject to and determine not to comply with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, we may act to dissolve and liquidate. If we decide to cease certain operations in response to new regulatory obligations, such actions could occur at a time that is unfavorable to investors. We may engage in decentralized finance transactions and deploy ETH using liquid staking and liquid restaking protocols, which present additional risk as opposed to simply holding our digital assets. We intend to invest and deploy ETH using one or more decentralized finance protocols. All trading and investment activity involves risk, which is heightened in the case of decentralized finance due to the irrevocable nature of blockchain transactions and the possibility of errors in smart contracts. Decentralized finance protocols also attract hackers and persons looking to exploit flaws in or the ability to misuse smart contracts. We also may incur losses in connection with our decentralized finance activity due to human error or our inability to predict future price movements. Any losses we sustain in connection with decentralized finance activities could cause an adverse impact on our financial condition, results of operations, and the market price of our Common Stock. Decentralized finance protocols also pose heightened regulatory concerns even beyond those that face digital asset networks and digital assets generally. The U.S. financial system is extensively regulated at both the federal and state level with a particular focus on intermediaries such as banks, broker-dealers, futures commission merchants, investment funds, investment advisers, financial asset exchanges, trading platforms, clearinghouses and custodians. U.S. laws and regulations impose specific obligations on financial services intermediaries both for the protection of their customers and for the protection of the U.S. financial system as a whole. These include, among others, capital requirements, activities restrictions, reporting and disclosure requirements and obligations to monitor the activities of their customers and to ensure that the intermediaries’ activities and the activities of their customers are conducted in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Non-U.S. laws and regulatory requirements may impose similar obligations. By seeking to eliminate or substantially limit the role of traditional financial services intermediaries in lending, brokering, advisory, trading, clearing, custody and other financial services activities, DeFi protocols pose numerous challenges to the longstanding oversight framework developed under U.S. law and used by U.S. and other regulators. Legislative bodies and regulators may be required to adapt their regulatory models to accommodate decentralized financial activities, or take novel steps to supervise, limit or even prohibit decentralized financial activities. It is not possible to predict how or when these challenges will be resolved or what the impact on specific decentralized finance protocols will be, and it is likely that the decentralized finance industry will face a prolonged period of regulatory uncertainty. It is possible that some decentralized finance protocols will be subjected to costly and burdensome compliance regimes or even prohibited outright. We have also deployed ETH using liquid staking and liquid restaking protocols, including by staking ETH through Liquid Collective in exchange for LsETH and through ether.fi in exchange for weETH, the wrapped, non-rebasing form of eETH. Liquid staking protocols are even newer than many decentralized finance protocols and are a novel and evolving technology, and liquid restaking protocols — which layer additional restaking and validation arrangements on top of liquid staking and use the underlying ETH (or its receipt tokens) to provide cryptoeconomic security to other protocols and services — are even more novel and have an even more limited operating history. Although the staff of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance has provided a statement that the staff does not generally believe liquid staking services are securities offerings, and that it does not believe receipt tokens obtained through such liquid staking services are generally securities, there is no guarantee that courts agree. That staff statement is, by its terms, addressed to liquid staking and does not directly address liquid restaking arrangements or the receipt tokens obtained from liquid restaking protocols, such as weETH; the regulatory treatment of liquid restaking arrangements under the federal securities laws therefore remains uncertain. It is also possible that the liquid staking or liquid restaking protocols we use, or specific features of those protocols, do not fit within the scope of the staff statement. If it is determined that the liquid staking or liquid restaking protocols we use, or the receipt tokens we receive (including LsETH and weETH), are securities offerings, the providers of those protocols may be required to pay fines or be subject to other third-party claims, and the ETH we have deposited with them may be available to their creditors to fulfill those claims. See “ Our shift towards an ETH-focused treasury strategy requires substantial changes in our day-to-day operations and exposes us to significant operational risks ” and “ We face risks relating to the custody of our digital assets, including the loss or destruction of private keys required to access our digital assets and cyberattacks or other data loss relating to our digital assets and insolvency of our custodians. ” There is also ongoing uncertainty as to the regulatory treatment of liquid staking and liquid restaking services from other regulators and agencies. 67 Liquid restaking activities also involve risks beyond those associated with native staking or liquid staking. In a liquid restaking arrangement, the underlying ETH (or its receipt token) is used to provide cryptoeconomic security not only to the Ethereum proof-of-stake protocol but also to additional services, such as the EigenCloud Autonomous Verifiable Services (“AVSs”) that we secure through ether.fi. This exposes our underlying ETH to potential slashing, forfeiture or other penalties arising from issues outside of the Ethereum staking protocol itself, including operational failures, validator or operator misconduct, or technical problems with the AVSs being secured. The AVSs and other services secured through restaking are themselves new, with limited operating history, and there can be no assurance that they will function as designed. We have deployed a portion of our ETH treasury into weETH issued by ether.fi, and any losses sustained in connection with that deployment — whether from slashing, smart contract exploits, protocol failure or otherwise — could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition, results of operations and the market price of our Common Stock. In addition, we have bridged weETH from the Ethereum mainnet to Linea, a zkEVM Layer 2 network, using ether.fi’s weETH OFT bridge powered by LayerZero v2. Cross-chain bridges have historically been a frequent target of exploits in decentralized finance, and any failure, vulnerability or exploit affecting the bridge, the messaging layer or the destination network — or any disruption to or change in the Linea sequencer, prover, governance or future upgrades — could result in delays in accessing, or partial or total loss of, the weETH we have bridged. Both decentralized finance protocols and liquid staking and liquid restaking protocols typically rely on the use of smart contracts. Smart contracts are computer programs that run on a digital asset network or related protocol that execute automatically when certain conditions are met. Because smart contract functions typically cannot be stopped or reversed, vulnerabilities in or unforeseen consequences of their programming can have damaging effects for the underlying digital asset network or protocol and the value of digital assets that use or interact with such smart contracts. For example, in June 2016, a vulnerability in the smart contracts underlying a protocol that was deployed on the Ethereum network, The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization for venture capital funding, allowed an attack by a hacker to syphon approximately $60 million worth of ETH from The DAO into a separate account. In the aftermath of the theft, certain developers of and core contributors to the Ethereum network pursued a “hard fork” of the Ethereum network in order to erase any record of the theft. Despite these efforts, the price of ETH dropped approximately 35% in the aftermath of the attack and subsequent hard fork. In addition, in July 2017, a vulnerability in a smart contract for a multi-signature wallet software developed by Parity led to a $30 million theft of ETH, and in November 2017, a new vulnerability in Parity’s wallet software led to roughly $160 million worth of ETH being indefinitely frozen in an account. Other smart contracts, such as bridges between separate digital asset networks, have also been manipulated, exploited or used in ways that were not intended or envisioned by their creators. Initial and continued problems with the development, design and deployment of smart contracts may have an adverse effect on the value of protocols, including liquid staking, liquid restaking and decentralized finance protocols, built on smart contract platforms or other digital assets that rely on smart contract technology, including any liquid staking or liquid restaking tokens such as LsETH and weETH. Liquid restaking tokens such as weETH are exposed not only to risks at the liquid staking protocol layer but also to risks at the additional restaking and AVS layers and, where bridged to other networks, to risks of the cross-chain bridge and the destination network. If any of the smart contracts with which we interact — whether decentralized finance, liquid staking, liquid restaking, cross-chain bridging or otherwise — suffer from such manipulation or exploit, or otherwise do not function as intended or as we anticipate, our ETH and any LsETH, weETH or similar tokens we hold may be exposed. 68 If the digital asset award or transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expanding validating power or demand high transaction fees, which could negatively impact the value of Ether and the value of our Common Stock. In 2021, the Ethereum Network implemented the EIP-1559 upgrade. EIP-1559 changed the methodology used to calculate transaction fees paid to Ether validators (then called “miners”) in such a manner that reduced the total net issuance of Ether fees paid to miners. If the digital asset awards for validating blocks or the transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, validators may cease validating blocks and confirmations of transactions on the Ethereum Network could be slowed. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of our Common Stock: ● If the profit margins of digital asset validating operations are not sufficiently high, digital asset validators are more likely to immediately sell digital assets earned by validating, resulting in an increase in liquid supply of that digital asset, which would generally tend to reduce that digital asset’s market price. ● A reduction in digital assets staked by validators on the Ethereum Network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor or botnet obtaining control. See “ -If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 33% of the validating power on the Ethereum Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Ethereum Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Ethereum Network to adversely affect the value of our Common Stock .” ● Validators have historically accepted relatively low transaction confirmation fees on most digital asset networks. If validators demand higher transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network or a software upgrade automatically charges fees for all transactions on the Ethereum Network, the cost of using ETH may increase and the demand for ETH may correspondingly decrease. Alternatively, validators could collude in an anti-competitive manner to reject low transaction fees on the Ethereum Network and force users to pay higher fees, thus reducing the attractiveness of the Ethereum Network. Higher transaction confirmation fees resulting through collusion or otherwise may adversely affect the attractiveness of the Ethereum Network, the value of ETH and the value of our Common Stock. ● To the extent that any validators cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in validated blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Ethereum blockchain until a block is validated by a validator who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in the Ethereum Network. ● During the course of ordering transactions and validating blocks, validators may be able to prioritize certain transactions in return for increased transaction fees, an incentive system known as “Maximal Extractable Value” or MEV. For example, in blockchain networks that facilitate DeFi protocols in particular, such as the Ethereum Network, users may attempt to gain an advantage over other users by increasing offered transaction fees. Certain software solutions have been developed which facilitate validators in capturing MEV produced by these increased fees. The MEV incentive system may lead to an increase in transaction fees on the Ethereum Network, which may diminish its use. Users or other stakeholders on the Ethereum Network could also view the existence of MEV as unfair manipulation of decentralized digital asset networks, and refrain from using DeFi protocols or the Ethereum Network generally. In addition, it’s possible regulators or legislators could enact rules which restrict the use of MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum Network among users and validators. Any of these or other outcomes related to MEV may adversely affect the value of Ether and the value of our Common Stock. Our Custodians’ digital asset insurance may not be sufficient to make us whole in the event of any loss of ETH. As of the date of this filing, the insurance that covers losses of our ETH holdings may cover none or only a small fraction of the value of the entirety of our ETH holdings, and there can be no guarantee that such insurance will be maintained as part of the custodial services we have or that such coverage will cover losses with respect to our ETH. The insurance policies maintained by our custodians are shared among all of such custodian’s customers and are not specific to us and may not be available or sufficient to protect us as a result. Moreover, our use of custodians exposes us to the risk that the ETH our custodians hold on our behalf could be subject to insolvency proceedings and we could be treated as a general unsecured creditor of the custodian, inhibiting our ability to exercise ownership rights with respect to such ETH. Any loss associated with such insolvency proceedings is unlikely to be covered by any insurance coverage we maintain related to our ETH. The legal framework governing digital asset ownership and rights in custodial or insolvency contexts remains uncertain and continues to evolve, which could result in unexpected losses, protracted recovery processes or adverse treatment in insolvency proceedings. 69 Digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges and efforts to increase the volume and speed of transactions may not be successful. Many digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges due to the fact that public, permissionless blockchains generally face a tradeoff between security and scalability. One means through which digital asset networks that utilize public, permissionless blockchains achieve security is decentralization, meaning that no intermediary is responsible for securing and maintaining these systems. For example, a greater degree of decentralization of a public, permissionless blockchain generally means a given digital asset network is less susceptible to manipulation or capture. In practice, this typically means that every single node on a given digital asset network is responsible for securing the system by processing every transaction and maintaining a copy of the entire state of the network. As a result, a digital asset network that utilizes a public, permissionless blockchain may be limited in the number of transactions it can process by the computing capabilities of each single fully participating node. As of March 31, 2025, the Ethereum Network handled approximately 18 transactions per second. In an effort to increase the volume of transactions that can be processed on a given digital asset network, many digital assets are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. Many developers are actively researching and testing scalability solutions for public blockchains that do not necessarily result in lower levels of security or decentralization, such as off-chain payment channels and Layer 2 networks. Off-chain payment channels would allow parties to transact without requiring the full processing power of a blockchain. Layer 2 networks can increase the scalability of a blockchain by allowing users to transact on a second blockchain deployed on top of a “Layer 1” network. However, such off-chain channels and Layer 2 networks only periodically use the Ethereum Network, reducing the demand for ETH as gas fees. As corresponding increases in throughput lag behind growth in the use of digital asset networks, average transaction fees and settlement times may increase considerably. For example, the Ethereum Network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to transaction fees as high as $200.27 per transaction, on May 1, 2022. Transaction fees in 2024 have ranged from a high of $12.11 on January 19 to below $1.00 throughout much of the year. Increased transaction fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for Ether (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ETH, which could adversely impact the value of our Common Stock. However, reduced gas fees could signal lower demand for ETH. There is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the scale of settlement or throughput of Ethereum Network transactions will be effective, or how long these mechanisms will take to become effective, which could adversely impact the value of our Common Stock. The AI industry is subject to developing and evolving regulatory frameworks globally, which are expected to become increasingly complex as AI continues to evolve, and our efforts to, or our failure or inability to comply with, these regulations or regulatory action against us could adversely affect our results of operations, financial condition or business. The rapid pace of innovation in the field of AI has led to developing and evolving regulatory frameworks globally, which are expected to become increasingly complex. U.S. and regulators and lawmakers have started proposing and adopting, or are currently considering, regulations and guidance specifically on the use of AI. In the U.S., there is ongoing tension between the states and the federal government over how best to regulate the use of AI. Colorado passed a Consumer Protections for Artificial Intelligence bill introducing state-level oversight of “high-risk” AI systems. It is possible that new laws and regulations will be adopted in the U.S. and in non-U.S. jurisdictions, or that existing laws and regulations may be interpreted, in ways that would affect our operations. We may be unable to anticipate or respond to these changes, and may need to expend additional resources to adjust our offerings where legal frameworks diverge. Further, the cost to comply with such laws or regulations could be significant and would increase our operating expenses, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations. 70 Cybersecurity incidents and other issues related to our information systems, technology and data may affect us materially and adversely Cybersecurity incidents and cyberattacks have been occurring globally at a more frequent and severe level and will likely continue to increase in frequency in the future. The digital asset industry are a particular target for cybersecurity incidents, which may occur through intentional or unintentional acts by individuals or groups having authorized or unauthorized access to our systems or our clients’ or counterparties’ information, which may include confidential information. These individuals or groups include employees, vendors and customers, as well as hackers. The information and technology systems used by us and our service providers, and other third parties, are vulnerable to damage or interruption from, among other things: hacking, ransomware, malware and other computer viruses; denial of service attacks; network failures; computer and telecommunication failures; phishing attacks; infiltration by unauthorized persons; security breaches; usage errors by their respective professionals; power outages; terrorism; and catastrophic events such as fires, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. It is difficult or impossible to defend against every risk being posed by changing technologies, as well as criminals’ intent to commit cybercrime, and these efforts may not be successful in anticipating, preventing, detecting or stopping attacks, or reacting in a timely manner. The increasing sophistication and resources of cybercriminals and other non-state threat actors and increased actions by nation-state actors make it difficult to keep up with new threats and could result in a breach of security. Such threats may see their frequency increased, and effectiveness enhanced, by the use of artificial intelligence. Further, cybersecurity risks may be heightened as a result of ongoing global conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict or the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. Additionally, we cannot guarantee that our insurance coverage would be sufficient to cover any such losses. To the extent the operation of our systems relies on our third-party service providers, through either a connection to, or an integration with, third parties’ systems, the risk of cybersecurity attacks and loss, corruption, or unauthorized access to or publication of our information or the confidential information and personal data of customers and employees may increase. Third-party risks may include insufficient security measures, data location uncertainty, and the possibility of data storage in inappropriate jurisdictions where laws, security measures or other controls may be inadequate or in which there are uncertainties regarding governmental intervention and use of such data, and our ability to monitor our third-party service providers’ data security practices are limited. Although we generally have agreements relating to cybersecurity and data privacy in place with our third-party service providers, they are limited in nature and we cannot guarantee that such agreements will prevent the accidental or unauthorized access to or disclosure, loss, destruction, disablement or encryption of, use or misuse of or modification of data (including personal data) or enable us to obtain adequate or any reimbursement from our third-party service providers in the event we should suffer any such incidents. Due to applicable laws and regulations or contractual obligations, we may be held responsible for any information security failure or cybersecurity attack attributed to our vendors as they relate to the information we share with them. A vulnerability in or related to a third-party service provider’s software or systems, a failure of our third-party service providers’ safeguards, policies or procedures, or a breach of a third-party service provider’s software or systems could result in the compromise of the confidentiality, integrity or availability of our systems or the data housed in our third-party solutions. The security of the information and technology systems used by us and our service providers may continue to be subjected to cybersecurity threats that could result in material failures or disruptions in our business. If these systems are compromised, become inoperable for extended periods of time or cease to function properly, we or a service provider may have to make a significant investment to fix or replace them. The failure of these systems or of disaster recovery plans for any reason could cause significant interruptions in operations and result in a failure to maintain the security, confidentiality or privacy of sensitive data, including personal information relating to stockholders (and the beneficial owners of stockholders). Such a failure could harm our reputation, subject us to legal claims and otherwise materially and adversely affect our investment and trading strategies and our value. 71 If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 33% of the validating power on the Ethereum Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Ethereum Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Ethereum Network to adversely affect the value of our Common Stock. All networked systems are vulnerable to various types of attacks. As with any computer network, the Ethereum Network could be attacked. For example, following the “Merge” to transition the Ethereum Network from a proof-of-work consensus mechanism to a proof-of-stake consensus mechanism and the switch to proof-of-stake validation, the Ethereum Network is currently vulnerable to several types of attacks, including: ● “>33% attack” where, if a malicious actor, validator, botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 33% of the total staked Ether on the Ethereum Network, a malicious actor could temporarily impede or delay block confirmation or even cause a temporary fork in the blockchain. This is designed to be a temporary risk, as the Ethereum Network’s inactivity leak would be expected to eventually penalize the attacker enough for the chain to finalize again (i.e., the honest majority would be expected to reclaim 2/3rd stake as the attacker’s stake is penalized). Moreover, it is not believed that a 33% attack would allow a malicious actor to engage in double-spending or fraudulent block propagation. Even without 33% control, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the Ethereum Network. ● “>50% attack” where, if a malicious actor, validator, botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 50% of the total staked Ether on the Ethereum Network, a malicious actor would be able to manipulate transactions on the blockchain, including censoring transactions, double-spending and fraudulent block propagation, potentially for an extended period or even permanently. In theory, the minority non-attackers might reach social consensus to reject blocks proposed by the malicious majority attacker, reducing the attacker’s ability to engage in malicious activity, but there can be no assurance this would happen or that non-attackers would be able to coordinate effectively. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the validating power on the Ethereum Network or the Ethereum community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the blockchain may not be possible. ● “>66% attack” where, if a malicious actor, validator, botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 66% of the total staked Ether on the Ethereum Network, a malicious actor could permanently and irreversibly manipulate the blockchain, including censorship, double-spending and fraudulent block propagation. Although the malicious actor or botnet may not be able to generate new tokens or transactions using such control, it could “double-spend” its own tokens (i.e., spend the same tokens in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintained control (over 50%). The attacker could finalize their preferred chain without any consideration for the votes of other stakers and could also revert finalized blocks. In an example from another network, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic Network, a proof-of-work network, was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic Network. The attacks resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic Blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of over $5.0 million and $1.0 million. In addition, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network, a proof-of-work network, experienced a >50% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur may negatively impact perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Although the two attacks described above took place on proof-of-work-based networks, it is possible that a similar attack may occur on the Ethereum Network, which could negatively impact the value of Ether and the value of our Common Stock. Although there are no known reports of malicious control of the Ethereum Network, if groups of coordinating or connected Ether holders that together have more than 33% of outstanding Ether were to stake that Ether and run validators, they could exert authority over the validation of Ether transactions. This risk is heightened if a substantial amount of the validating power on the network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority and is significantly heightened if over 66% falls within such a jurisdiction. If network participants, including the core developers and the administrators of validating pools, do not act to ensure greater decentralization of Ethereum Network validators, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the validating power on the Ethereum Network will increase, which may adversely affect the value of our Common Stock. 72 A malicious actor may also obtain control over the Ethereum Network through its influence over core developers by gaining direct control over a core developer or an otherwise influential programmer. The less that the Ethereum ecosystem grows, the greater the possibility that a malicious actor may be able to maliciously influence the Ethereum Network in this manner. Moreover, it is possible that a group of Ether holders that together control more than a substantial amount of outstanding Ether are in fact part of the initial or current core developer group, or are otherwise influential members of the Ethereum community. To the extent that the initial or current core developer groups also control higher than a threshold of outstanding Ether necessary for an attack, as some believe, the risk of this particular group of users causing the Ethereum Network to adopt updates to the core protocol that this particular group wants to be implemented will be even greater, and should this materialize, it may adversely affect the value of our Common Stock. Digital asset networks are developed by a diverse set of contributors and the perception that certain high-profile contributors will no longer contribute to the network could have an adverse effect on the market price of the related digital asset. Digital asset networks and related protocols are often developed by a diverse set of contributors, but are also often developed by identifiable and high-profile contributors. The perception that certain high-profile contributors may no longer contribute to the applicable digital asset network or protocol may have an adverse effect on the market price of any related digital assets. For example, in June 2017, an unfounded rumor circulated that Ethereum protocol developer Vitalik Buterin had died. Following the rumor, the price of Ether decreased approximately 20% before recovering after Buterin himself dispelled the rumor. Some have speculated that the rumor led to the decrease in the price of Ether. In the event a high-profile contributor to the Ethereum Network, such as Vitalik Buterin, is perceived as no longer contributing to the Ethereum Network due to death, retirement, withdrawal, incapacity, or otherwise, whether or not such perception is valid, it could negatively affect the price of Ether, which could adversely impact the value of our Common Stock. The availability of spot ETPs for ETH and other digital assets may adversely affect the market price of our listed securities. Although ETH and other digital assets have experienced a surge of investor attention since ETH was invented in 2015, until recently investors in the United States had limited means to gain direct exposure to ETH through traditional investment channels, and instead generally were only able to hold ETH through “hosted” wallets provided by digital asset service providers or through “unhosted” wallets that expose the investor to risks associated with loss or hacking of their private keys. Given the relative novelty of digital assets, general lack of familiarity with the processes needed to hold ETH directly, as well as the potential reluctance of financial planners and advisers to recommend direct ETH holdings to their retail customers because of the manner in which such holdings are custodied, some investors have sought exposure to ETH through investment vehicles that hold ETH and issue shares representing fractional undivided interests in their underlying ETH holdings. These vehicles, which were previously offered only to “accredited investors” on a private placement basis, have in the past traded at substantial premiums to net asset value, possibly due to the relative scarcity of traditional investment vehicles providing investment exposure to ETH. Although we are an operating company, and we believe we offer a different value proposition than a ETH investment vehicle such as a spot ETH ETP, investors may nevertheless view our common stock as an alternative to an investment in an ETP, and choose to purchase shares of a spot ETP instead of our common stock. They may do so for a variety of reasons, including if they believe that ETPs offer a “pure play” exposure to ETH that is generally not subject to federal income tax at the entity level as we are, or the other risk factors applicable to an operating business, such as ours. 73 As a result of the foregoing factors, availability of spot ETPs for ETH and other digital assets could have a material adverse effect on the market price of our listed securities. The emergence or growth of other digital assets, including those with significant private or public sector backing, could have a negative impact on the price of ETH and adversely affect our business. As a result of our ETH Treasury Management strategy, our assets are concentrated in our ETH holdings. Accordingly, the emergence or growth of digital assets other than ETH may have a material adverse effect on our financial condition. There are numerous alternative digital assets and many entities, including consortiums and financial institutions, are researching and investing resources into private or permissioned blockchain platforms or digital assets. Additionally, the Ethereum network has completed multiple major upgrades since then and may undertake additional upgrades in the future. If the mechanisms for validating transactions in other alternative digital assets are perceived as superior to the Ethereum network, those digital assets could gain market share relative to ETH. Other alternative digital assets that compete with ETH in certain ways include “stablecoins,” which are designed to maintain a constant price because of, for instance, their issuers’ promise to hold high-quality liquid assets (such as U.S. dollar deposits and short-term U.S. treasury securities) equal to the total value of stablecoins in circulation. Stablecoins have grown rapidly as an alternative to ETH and other digital assets as a medium of exchange and store of value, particularly on digital asset trading platforms. Additionally, central banks in some countries have started to introduce digital forms of legal tender. For example, China’s CBDC project was made available to consumers in January 2022, and governments including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Israel have been discussing the potential creation of new CBDCs. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could also compete with, or replace, ETH and other digital assets as a medium of exchange or store of value. As a result, the emergence or growth of these or other digital assets could cause the market price of ETH to decrease, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, financial condition, and operating results. If we or our third-party service providers experience a security breach or cyberattack and unauthorized parties obtain access to our ETH, or if our private keys are lost or destroyed, or other similar circumstances or events occur, we may lose some or all of our ETH and our financial condition and results of operations could be materially adversely affected. Substantially all of the ETH and LsETH we own is held in custody accounts at institutional-grade digital asset custodians. Security breaches and cyberattacks are of particular concern with respect to our ETH. ETH and other blockchain-based cryptocurrencies and the entities that provide services to participants in the ETH ecosystem have been, and may in the future be, subject to security breaches, cyberattacks, or other malicious activities. A successful security breach or cyberattack could result in: ● a partial or total loss of our ETH in a manner that may not be covered by insurance or the liability provisions of the custody agreements with the custodians who hold our ETH; ● harm to our reputation and brand; ● improper disclosure of data and violations of applicable data privacy and other laws; or ● significant regulatory scrutiny, investigations, fines, penalties, and other legal, regulatory, contractual and financial exposure. Further, any actual or perceived data security breach or cybersecurity attack directed at other companies with digital assets or companies that operate digital asset networks, regardless of whether we are directly impacted, could lead to a general loss of confidence in the broader blockchain ecosystem or in the use of the Ethereum network to conduct financial transactions, which could negatively impact us. 74 Attacks upon systems across a variety of industries, including industries related to ETH, are increasing in frequency, persistence, and sophistication, and, in many cases, are being conducted by sophisticated, well-funded and organized groups and individuals, including state actors. The techniques used to obtain unauthorized, improper or illegal access to systems and information (including personal data and digital assets), disable or degrade services, or sabotage systems are constantly evolving, may be difficult to detect quickly, and often are not recognized or detected until after they have been launched against a target. These attacks may occur on our systems or those of our third-party service providers or partners. We may experience breaches of our security measures due to human error, malfeasance, insider threats, system errors or vulnerabilities or other irregularities. Threats can come from a variety of sources, including criminal hackers, hacktivists, state-sponsored intrusions, industrial espionage, and insiders. In addition, certain types of attacks could harm us even if our systems are left undisturbed. For example, certain threats are designed to remain dormant or undetectable, sometimes for extended periods of time, or until launched against a target and we may not be able to implement adequate preventative measures. The risk of cyberattacks could also be increased by cyberwarfare in connection with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts, or other future conflicts, including potential proliferation of malware into systems unrelated to such conflicts. Any future breach of our operations or those of others in the ETH industry, including third-party services on which we rely, could materially and adversely affect our business. We face risks relating to the custody of our ETH, including the loss or destruction of private keys required to access our ETH and cyberattacks or other data loss relating to our ETH. We hold our ETH with regulated custodians that have duties to safeguard our private keys. Our custodial services contracts do not restrict our ability to reallocate our ETH among our custodians, and our ETH holdings may be concentrated with a single custodian from time to time. In light of the significant amount of ETH we hold, we will seek to engage additional custodians to achieve a greater degree of diversification in the custody of our ETH as the extent of potential risk of loss is dependent, in part, on the degree of diversification. If there is a decrease in the availability of digital asset custodians that we believe can safely custody our ETH, for example, due to regulatory developments or enforcement actions that cause custodians to discontinue or limit their services in the United States, we may need to enter into agreements that are less favorable than our current agreements or take other measures to custody our ETH, and our ability to seek a greater degree of diversification in the use of custodial services would be materially adversely affected. ETH is controllable only by the possessor of both the unique public key and private key(s) relating to the local or online digital wallet in which the ETH is held. While the ETH blockchain ledger requires a public key relating to a digital wallet to be published when used in a transaction, private keys must be safeguarded and kept private in order to prevent a third party from accessing the ETH held in such wallet. To the extent the private key(s) for a digital wallet are lost, destroyed, or otherwise compromised and no backup of the private key(s) is accessible, neither we nor our custodians will be able to access the ETH held in the related digital wallet. Furthermore, we cannot provide assurance that our digital wallets, nor the digital wallets of our custodians held on our behalf, will not be compromised as a result of a cyberattack. ETH, as well as other digital assets and blockchain technologies, have been, and may in the future be, subject to security breaches, cyberattacks, or other malicious activities. As of the date of this filing, the insurance that covers losses of our Ether holdings may cover none or only a small fraction of the value of the entirety of our Ether holdings, and there can be no guarantee that such insurance will be maintained as part of the custodial services we have or that such coverage will cover losses with respect to our Ether. Moreover, our use of custodians exposes us to the risk that the Ether our custodians hold on our behalf could be subject to insolvency proceedings and we could be treated as a general unsecured creditor of the custodian, inhibiting our ability to exercise ownership rights with respect to such Ether. Any loss associated with such insolvency proceedings is unlikely to be covered by any insurance coverage we maintain related to our Ether. The legal framework governing digital asset ownership and rights in custodial or insolvency contexts remains uncertain and continues to evolve, which could result in unexpected losses, protracted recovery processes or adverse treatment in insolvency proceedings. 75 As part of our treasury management strategy, we may engage in staking, restaking, or other permitted activities that involve the use of “smart contracts” or decentralized applications. The use of smart contracts or decentralized applications entails certain risks including risks stemming from the existence of an “admin key” or coding flaws that could be exploited, potentially allowing a bad actor to issue or otherwise compromise the smart contract or decentralized application, potentially leading to a loss of our Ether. Like all software code, smart contracts are exposed to risk that the code contains a bug or other security vulnerability, which can lead to loss of assets that are held on or transacted through the contract or decentralized application. Smart contracts and decentralized applications may contain bugs, security vulnerabilities or poorly designed permission structures that could result in the irreversible loss of Ether or other digital assets. Exploits, including those stemming from admin key misuse, admin key compromise, or protocol flaws, have occurred in the past and may occur in the future. We are not subject to legal and regulatory obligations that apply to investment companies such as mutual funds and exchange-traded funds, or to obligations applicable to investment advisers. Mutual funds, ETFs and their directors and management are subject to extensive regulation as “investment companies” and “investment advisers” under U.S. federal and state law; this regulation is intended for the benefit and protection of investors. We are not subject to, and do not otherwise voluntarily comply with, these laws and regulations. This means, among other things, that the execution of or changes to our ETH Treasury Management strategy, the manner in which our ETH is custodied, our ability to engage in transactions with affiliated parties and our operating and investment activities generally are not subject to the extensive legal and regulatory requirements and prohibitions that apply to investment companies and investment advisers. Our board of directors has broad discretion over the investment, leverage and cash management policies it authorizes, whether in respect of our ETH holdings or other activities we may pursue, and has the power to change our current policies, including our strategy of acquiring and holding ETH. Due to the unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of many ETH trading venues, ETH trading venues may experience greater fraud, security failures or regulatory or operational problems than trading venues for more established asset classes, which may result in a loss of confidence in ETH trading venues and adversely affect the value of our ETH. ETH trading venues are relatively new and, in many cases, unregulated. Furthermore, there are many ETH trading venues which do not provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management teams, corporate practices and regulatory compliance. As a result, the marketplace may lose confidence in ETH trading venues, including prominent exchanges that handle a significant volume of ETH trading and/or are subject to regulatory oversight, in the event one or more ETH trading venues cease or pause for a prolonged period the trading of ETH or other digital assets, or experience fraud, significant volumes of withdrawal, security failures or operational problems. Our ETH Treasury Management strategy exposes us to risk of non-performance by providers and counterparties. Our ETH Treasury Management strategy exposes us to the risk of non-performance by providers and counterparties, whether contractual or otherwise. Risk of non-performance includes inability or refusal of a provider or counterparty to perform because of a deterioration in the counterparty’s financial condition and liquidity or for any other reason. For example, our execution partners, custodians, or other counterparties might fail to perform in accordance with the terms of our agreements with them, which could result in a loss of ETH, a loss of the opportunity to generate funds, or other losses. Our primary provider risk with respect to our ETH is custodian performance obligations under the various custody arrangements we have entered into. In particular, Sharplink is reliant on our custodial relationships and agreements with Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. and its affiliates, as well as Coinbase Inc. and its affiliates. Any failures of our custodians to perform could have an impact on our business, prospects, financial condition and operating results. In addition, in the event of a termination of one or more of our custody agreements, the Company would be required to contract with an alternative custodian at terms and conditions that may not be as favorable as our current custody agreements. A series of recent high-profile bankruptcies, closures, liquidations, regulatory enforcement actions and other events relating to companies operating in the digital asset industry have highlighted the perceived and actual counterparty and provider risk applicable to digital asset ownership and trading. Although these bankruptcies, closures and liquidations have not resulted in any loss or misappropriation of our ETH, nor have such events adversely impacted our access to our ETH, legal precedent created in these bankruptcy and other proceedings may increase the risk of future rulings adverse to our interests in the event one or more of our custodians becomes a debtor in a bankruptcy case or is the subject of other liquidation, insolvency or similar proceedings. While all of our custodians are subject to regulatory regimes intended to protect customers in the event of a custodial bankruptcy, receivership or similar insolvency proceeding, no assurance can be provided that our custodially-held ETH and LsETH will not become part of the custodian’s insolvency estate if one or more of our custodians enters bankruptcy, receivership or similar insolvency proceedings. Additionally, if we pursue any strategies to create income streams or otherwise generate funds using our ETH holdings, we would become subject to additional counterparty risks. Any significant non-performance by providers and counterparties, including in particular the custodians with which we custody substantially all of our ETH, could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, financial condition and operating results. 76