VanEck Ethereum ETF 10-K

Item 1A. Risk Factors. Risks Associated with ETH and the Ethereum Network The trading prices of many digital assets, including ETH, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ETH, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. The trading prices of many digital assets, including ETH, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. For instance, there were steep increases in the value of certain digital assets, including ETH, over the course of 2021, and multiple market observers asserted that digital assets were experiencing a “bubble.” These increases were followed by steep drawdowns throughout 2022 in digital asset trading prices, including for ETH. These episodes of rapid price appreciation followed by steep drawdowns have occurred multiple times throughout ETH’s history, including in 2017-2018 and in 2021-2022. Over the course of 2023, 2024, and the first quarter of 2025, ETH prices continued to exhibit extreme volatility. Extreme volatility may persist and the value of the Shares may significantly decline in the future without recovery. The digital asset markets may be experiencing a bubble or may experience a bubble again in the future. For example, in the first half of 2022, each of Celsius Network, Voyager Digital Ltd., and Three Arrows Capital declared bankruptcy, resulting in a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem and negative publicity surrounding digital assets more broadly. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset exchanges by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. In addition, several other entities in the digital asset industry filed for bankruptcy following FTX’s bankruptcy filing, such as BlockFi Inc. and Genesis Global Capital, LLC (“Genesis”). In response to these events (collectively, the “2022 Events”), the digital asset markets have experienced extreme price volatility and other entities in the digital asset industry have been, and may continue to be, negatively affected, further undermining confidence in the digital asset markets. These events have also negatively impacted the liquidity of the digital asset markets as certain entities affiliated with FTX engaged in significant trading activity. If the liquidity of the digital asset markets continues to be negatively impacted by these events, digital asset prices, including ethereum, may continue to experience significant volatility or price declines and confidence in the digital asset markets may be further undermined. In addition, regulatory and enforcement scrutiny has increased, including from, among others, the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress, as well as state regulators and authorities. These events are continuing to develop and the full facts are continuing to emerge. It is not possible to predict at this time all of the risks that they may pose to the Trust, its service providers or to the digital asset industry as a whole. The prices for some digital assets including ETH have risen following the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Some expect the new administration to adopt a more constructive attitude toward the digital assets industry than prior administrations were perceived to have done and work toward providing greater regulatory clarity and certainty for emerging technologies including blockchain technology and digital assets, thereby fostering their development. Certain members of Congress have also expressed similar sentiments. To the extent market expectations about future activity by the administration or Congress lead digital assets prices and valuations to increase, there can be no assurance such expectations will be fulfilled, or that digital asset prices will rise or maintain their current levels. Some commentators have referred to this as a bubble. There can be no assurance that such a bubble does not currently exist. The failure of the administration and Congress to provide greater regulatory clarity and certainty for blockchain technology and digital assets, such as through promulgating a regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets that lives up to industry expectations, could lead to a decline in prices for digital assets including ETH, which could cause declines in the value of the Shares and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. Moreover, there can be no assurance that political winds or market perceptions of them will not shift over time. 22 Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ETH, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. Furthermore, negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the digital asset economy may reduce confidence in the digital asset economy and may result in greater volatility in the price of ETH and other digital assets, including a depreciation in value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any actions to take advantage, or mitigate the impacts, of volatility in the price of ETH. 23 The value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the fundamental investment characteristics of ETH as a digital asset, including the fact that digital assets are bearer instruments and loss, theft, destruction, or compromise of the associated private keys could result in permanent loss of the asset, and the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies such as the ethereum blockchain. Digital assets such as ETH were only introduced within the past 15 years, and the value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors over time relating to the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies, such as the recentness of their development, their dependence on the internet and other technologies, their dependence on the role played by users, developers and validators and the potential for malicious activity. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares: digital asset networks, including the Ethereum peer-to-peer network and associated blockchain ledger (such blockchain, the “Ethereum Blockchain” and together with the peer-to-peer network, the “Ethereum network” or “Layer 1 Ethereum network”), and the software used to operate them are in the early stages of development. Given the recentness of the development of digital asset networks, digital assets may not function as intended and parties may be unwilling to use digital assets, which would dampen the growth, if any, of digital asset networks. Because ETH is a digital asset, the value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the fundamental investment characteristics of digital assets, including the fact that digital assets are bearer instruments and loss, theft, compromise, or destruction of the associated private keys could result in permanent loss of the asset. The Ethereum network, including the cryptographic and algorithmic protocols associated with the operation of the Ethereum Blockchain, has only been in existence since 2015, and ETH markets have a limited performance record, making them part of a new and rapidly evolving industry that is subject to a variety of factors that are difficult to evaluate. For example, the following are some of the risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares: ● Digital assets, including ETH, are controllable only by the possessor of both the unique public key and private key or keys relating to the Ethereum network address, or “wallet,” at which the digital asset is held. Private keys must be safeguarded and kept private in order to prevent a third party from accessing the digital asset held in such wallet. The loss, theft, compromise or destruction of a private key required to access a digital asset may be irreversible. If a private key is lost, stolen, destroyed or otherwise compromised and no backup of the private key is accessible, the owner would be unable to access the digital asset corresponding to that private key and the private key will not be capable of being restored by the digital asset network resulting in the total loss of the value of the digital asset linked to the private key. ● Digital asset networks are dependent upon the internet. A disruption of the internet or a digital asset network, such as the Ethereum network, would affect the ability to transfer digital assets, including ETH, and, consequently, their value. ● Governance of the Ethereum network is by voluntary consensus and open competition. As a result, there may be a lack of consensus or clarity on the governance of the Ethereum network, which may stymie the Ethereum network’s utility and ability to grow and face challenges. In particular, it may be difficult to find solutions or martial sufficient effort to overcome any future problems on the Ethereum network, especially long-term problems. ● The foregoing notwithstanding, the Ethereum network’s protocol is informally overseen by a collective of core developers who, along with members of the Ethereum community, can introduce proposals, known as Ethereum Improvement Proposals (“EIPs”), for updating the Ethereum network. The core developers evolve over time, largely based on self-determined participation. The core developers may not agree among themselves about the direction of the network. If disagreement among the core developers causes some of them to abandon or cease participation in the development of the Ethereum Blockchain, whether for other blockchain or digital asset networks or protocols or to pursue other activities, the value of ethereum could be negatively affected. ● An “Ethereum Client” is a software application that implements the Ethereum network specification and communicates with the Ethereum network. Following the Merge, an Ethereum Client consists of two software programs, an Execution Client and a Consensus Client. Becoming a validator requires downloading additional software in addition to the Execution Client and Consensus Client. Each node must download the Ethereum Client and then connects to other computers also running the Ethereum Client software, together forming the Ethereum network. To the extent that node operators update their individual Ethereum Client to new specifications, the Ethereum network could be subject to new changes that may adversely affect the value of ethereum. In addition, if a digital asset network has high-profile contributors, a perception that such contributors will no longer contribute to the network could have an adverse effect on the market price of the related digital asset. 24 ● To the extent that any validators cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in solved blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Ethereum Blockchain until a block is validated by a validator who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in a digital asset network. ● As the Ethereum network continues to develop and grow, certain technical issues might be uncovered and the trouble shooting and resolution of such issues requires the attention and efforts of ethereum’s global development community. Like all software, the Ethereum network is at risk of vulnerabilities and bugs that can potentially be exploited by malicious actors. For example, in July 2016, the Ethereum network underwent a hard fork to reverse the effects of a hack in which an unknown attacker drained funds from one account into an account controlled by the hacker. This hard fork resulted in the creation of a new digital asset network called Ethereum Classic. This hard fork was contentious, and as a result some users of the Ethereum Classic network may harbor ill will toward the Ethereum network. These users may attempt to negatively impact the use or adoption of the Ethereum network, as could constituencies adversely impacted by any contentious hard forks that take place in the future. ● Many digital asset networks, including the Ethereum network, face significant scaling challenges and are being upgraded with various features designed to increase the speed of digital asset transactions and the number of transactions that can processed in a given period (known as “throughput”). These attempts to increase the volume of transactions may not be effective, and such upgrades may fail, resulting in potentially irreparable damage to the Ethereum network and the value of ethereum. ● Moreover, in the past, bugs, defects and flaws in the source code for digital assets have been exposed and exploited, including flaws that disrupted normal Ethereum network, Ethereum Client, or DApp and smart contract operations or disabled related functionality for users, exposed users’ personal information and/or resulted in the theft of users’ digital assets. For example, in May 2023, the main Ethereum network itself reportedly suffered outages or bugs that for a short time prevented transactions from finalizing and being recorded in blocks twice in two days. Major Ethereum Clients which nodes use to access the Ethereum network, such as Geth, Besu and Nethermind, have in the past suffered outages or disruptions due to bugs. For more on an unplanned fork involving Geth clients, see “—A temporary or permanent “fork” could adversely affect the value of the Shares.” The cryptography underlying the Ethereum network or ethereum as an asset could prove to be flawed or ineffective, or developments in mathematics and/or technology, including advances in digital computing, algebraic geometry and quantum computing, could result in such cryptography becoming ineffective. In any of these circumstances, a malicious actor may be able to compromise the security of the Ethereum network or take the Trust’s ETH, which would adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, normal operations and functionality of the Ethereum network may be negatively affected Such losses of functionality could lead to the Ethereum network losing attractiveness to users, nodes, validators, or other stakeholders, thereby dampening demand for ethereum. Even if another digital asset other than ethereum were affected by similar circumstances, any reduction in confidence in the source code or cryptography underlying digital assets generally could negatively affect the demand for digital assets and therefore adversely affect the value of the Shares. ● In December 2020, the Ethereum network launched a validator registry, referred to as the Beacon Chain, to commence an upgrade called Ethereum 2.0. Ethereum 2.0 was intended to be a new iteration of the Ethereum network that would change the Ethereum network’s consensus mechanism from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake and incorporate the use of sharding. The launch of Beacon Chain was intended to allow nodes to conduct staking transactions to test the new consensus mechanism. Upon its launch, Beacon Chain co-existed in parallel, but separately from, the main Ethereum network at the time (or “mainnet”), which was based on proof-of-work. On September 15, 2022, the proof-of-work-based Ethereum mainnet merged into the Beacon Chain and its proof-of-stake-based consensus system, integrating and unifying both networks into a single proof-of-stake-based Ethereum network (known also as the “Merge”). This upgraded network is referred to as Ethereum rather than Ethereum 2.0. A blockchain protocol’s consensus mechanism is a critical feature of its source code, and any failure to achieve the expected benefits or widespread adoption of the major structural changes to the core consensus mechanism of the Ethereum network contemplated as part of Ethereum 2.0 could have a material adverse effect on the value of ethereum and the value of the Shares. ● The Ethereum network is still in the process of developing and making significant decisions that will affect policies that govern the supply and issuance of ethereum as well as other Ethereum network protocols. For example, the Ethereum network has on several occasions reduced the quantity of new ETH rewarded per block or altered the outstanding supply of ethereum (such as by introducing burning of base fees paid to the protocol) and may make additional changes in the future. The open-source nature of many digital asset network protocols, such as the protocol for the Ethereum network, means that developers and other contributors are generally not directly 25 compensated for their contributions in maintaining and developing such protocols. As a result, the developers and other contributors of a particular digital asset may lack a financial incentive to maintain or develop the network, or may lack the resources to adequately address emerging issues. Alternatively, some developers may be funded by companies whose interests are at odds with other participants in a particular digital asset network. If the Ethereum network does not successfully develop its policies on supply and issuance, and other major design decisions or does so in a manner that is not attractive to network participants it could lead to a decline in adoption of the Ethereum network and price of ETH. ● Software applications running on top of the Ethereum network (often referred to as “decentralized applications” or “DApps”, whether or not decentralized in fact) and smart contract developers depend on being able to obtain ethereum to be able to run their programs and operate their businesses. In particular, decentralized applications and smart contracts require ETH in order to pay the gas fees needed to power such applications and smart contracts and execute transactions. As such, they represent a significant source of demand for ETH. ETH’s price volatility (particularly where ETH prices increase), or the Ethereum network’s wider inability to meet the demands of decentralized applications and smart contracts in terms of inexpensive, reliable, and prompt transaction execution (including during congested periods), or to solve its scaling challenges or increase its throughput, may discourage such decentralized application and smart contract developers from using the Ethereum network as the foundational infrastructure layer for building their applications and smart contracts. If decentralized application and smart contract developers abandon the Ethereum Blockchain for other blockchain or digital asset networks or protocols for whatever reason, the value of ethereum could be negatively affected. ● As of the date of this Report, the largest 100 ETH wallets held a substantial amount of the outstanding supply of ETH and it is possible that some of these wallets are controlled by the same person or entity. Moreover, it is possible that other persons or entities control multiple wallets that collectively hold a significant number of ETH, even if each wallet individually only holds a small amount. As a result of this concentration of ownership, large sales by such holders could have an adverse effect on the market price of ETH. Moreover, because digital assets, including ETH, have been in existence for a short period of time and are continuing to develop, there may be additional risks in the future that are impossible to predict as of the date of this Report. Due to the nature of private keys, ethereum transactions are irrevocable and stolen or incorrectly transferred Ethereum may be irretrievable. As a result, any incorrectly executed ethereum transactions could adversely affect an investment in the Trust. Ethereum transactions are not reversible. Once a transaction has been signed with private keys, verified and recorded in a block that is added to the Ethereum Blockchain, an incorrect transfer of cryptocurrency, such as ethereum, or a theft of ethereum generally will not be reversible and the Trust may not be capable of seeking compensation for any such transfer or theft. To the extent that the Trust is unable to successfully seek redress for such error or theft, such loss could adversely affect an investment in the Trust. The custody of the Trust’s ethereum is handled by the Ethereum Custodian and the Additional Ethereum Custodian, and the transfer of ethereum to and from Liquidity Providers normally takes place through the Ethereum Custodian’s Clearing Services and is directed by the Administrator and the Transfer Agent. The Sponsor has evaluated the procedures and internal controls of the Trust’s Ethereum Custodian and Additional Ethereum Custodian to safeguard the Trust’s ethereum holdings, as well as the procedures and internal controls of the Trust’s Administrator. However, it is possible that, through computer or human error, or through theft or criminal action, the Trust’s ethereum could be transferred from the Trust’s Ethereum Account or Clearing Account at the Ethereum Custodian or the Additional Ethereum Account at the Additional Ethereum Custodian in incorrect amounts or to unauthorized third parties, or to incorrect destination addresses on the Ethereum Blockchain. Alternatively, if the Ethereum Custodian’s and the Additional Ethereum Custodian’s internal procedures and controls are inadequate to safeguard the Trust’s ethereum holdings, and the Trust’s private key(s) is (are) lost, destroyed or otherwise compromised and no backup of the private key(s) is (are) accessible, the Trust will be unable to access its ethereum, which could adversely affect an investment in the Shares of the Trust. In addition, if the Trust’s private key(s) is (are) misappropriated and the Trust’s ethereum holdings are stolen, including from or by the Ethereum Custodian or the Additional Ethereum Custodian, the Trust could lose some or all of its ethereum holdings, which could adversely impact an investment in the Shares of the Trust. Such events have occurred in connection with digital assets in the past. For example, in September 2014, the Chinese digital asset exchange Huobi announced that it had sent approximately 900 ether and 8,000 Litecoins (worth approximately $400,000 at the prevailing market prices at the time) to the wrong customers. The Federal Bureau of Investigation published an announcement that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) was responsible for the theft of approximately $1.5 billion USD in virtual assets from cryptocurrency exchange, Bybit, on or about February 21, 2025. 26 A disruption of the internet may affect ethereum operations, which may adversely affect the ethereum industry and an investment in the Trust. The Ethereum network relies on the Internet. A significant disruption of Internet connectivity (i.e., one that affects large numbers of users or geographic regions) could disrupt the Ethereum network’s functionality and operations until the disruption in the Internet is resolved. A disruption in the Internet could adversely affect an investment in the Trust or the ability of the Trust to operate. The Ethereum network’s decentralized governance structure may negatively affect its ability to grow and respond to challenges. The governance of decentralized networks, such as the Ethereum network, is by voluntary consensus and open competition. In other words, the Ethereum network has no central decision-making body or clear manner in which participants can come to an agreement other than through voluntary, widespread consensus. As a result, a lack of widespread consensus in the governance of the Ethereum network may adversely affect the network’s utility and ability to adapt and face challenges, including technical and scaling challenges. Historically the development of the source code of the Ethereum network has been overseen by the core developers. However, the Ethereum network would cease to operate successfully without both validators and users, and the core developers cannot formally compel them to adopt the changes to the source code desired by core developers, or to continue to render services or participate in the Ethereum network. As a general matter, the governance of the Ethereum network generally depends on most of members of the Ethereum community ultimately reaching some form of voluntary agreement on significant changes. The decentralized governance of the Ethereum network may make it difficult to find or implement solutions or marshal sufficient effort to overcome existing or future problems, especially protracted ones requiring substantial directed effort and resource commitment over a long period of time, such as scaling challenges. Deeply-held differences of opinion have led to forks in the past, such as between Ethereum and Ethereum Classic, and could lead to additional forks in the future, with potentially divisive effects. The Ethereum network’s failure to overcome governance challenges could exacerbate problems experienced by the network or cause the network to fail to meet the needs of its users, and could cause users, 27 miners, and developer talent to abandon the Ethereum network or to choose competing blockchain protocols, or lead to a drop in speculative interest, which could cause the value of ethereum to decline. If the Ethereum community is unable to reach consensus in the future, it could have adverse consequences for the network or lead to a fork, which could affect the value of ethereum. The scheduled creation of newly minted ETH and their subsequent sale may cause the price of ETH to decline, which could negatively affect an investment in the Trust. In accordance with the Ethereum 2.0 upgrades, newly created or minted ETH are generated through a process referred to as “staking” which involves the collection of a staking reward of new ETH. To operate a node, a validator must acquire and lock 32 ETH by sending a special transaction to the staking contract, which transaction associates the staked ETH with a withdrawal address (to unlock the ETH and receive any staking rewards) and a validator address (to designate the validator node performing transaction verification). When the recipient makes newly minted ETH available for sale, there can be downward pressure on the price of ethereum as the new supply is introduced into the Ethereum market. There is no cap on ETH supply. The rate at which new ETH are issued and put into circulation is expected to vary. The Ethereum network has no formal cap on the total supply of ETH and the supply could theoretically be unlimited, which could put downward pressure on the price of ETH. The open-source structure of the ethereum network protocol means that the core developers and other contributors are generally not directly compensated for their contributions in maintaining and developing the ethereum network protocol. A failure to properly monitor and upgrade the ethereum network protocol could damage the ethereum network and an investment in the trust. The Ethereum network operates based on an open-source protocol maintained by the core developers and other contributors, largely on the GitHub resource section dedicated to ethereum development. As new ethereum are rewarded solely for validator activity (other than the 2014 pre-mine) and are not sold on an ongoing basis to generate revenue to support development activity, and the Ethereum network protocol itself is made available for free rather than sold or made available subject to licensing or subscription fees and its use does not generate revenues for its development team, the core developers are generally not compensated for maintaining and updating the source code for the Ethereum network protocol. Consequently, there is a lack of financial incentive for developers to maintain or develop the Ethereum network and the core developers may lack the resources to adequately address emerging issues with the Ethereum network protocol. Although the Ethereum network is currently supported by the core developers, there can be no guarantee that such support will continue or be sufficient in the future. The perception that high-profile contributors may no longer contribute to the network may have an adverse effect on the market price of any related digital assets. For example, in June 2017, an unfounded rumor circulated that Ethereum core developer Vitalik Buterin had died. Following the rumor, the price of ETH decreased approximately 20% before recovering after Buterin himself dispelled the rumor. Some have speculated that the rumor led to the decrease in the price of ethereum. In the event a high-profile contributor to the Ethereum network, such as Vitalik Buterin, is perceived as no longer able to contribute to the Ethereum network due to death, retirement, withdrawal, incapacity, or otherwise, whether or not such perception is valid, it could negatively affect the price of ETH, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares. Alternatively, some developers may be funded by entities whose interests are at odds with other participants in the Ethereum network. In addition, a bad actor could also attempt to interfere with the operation of the Ethereum network by attempting to exercise a malign influence over a core developer. To the extent that material issues arise with the Ethereum network protocol and the core developers and open-source contributors are unable to address the issues adequately or in a timely manner, the Ethereum network and an investment in the Trust may be adversely affected. A temporary or permanent “fork” of the ethereum blockchain could adversely affect an investment in the Trust. Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks or airdrops. Ethereum software is open source. Any user can download the software and participate in the Ethereum network, and no permission of a central authority or body is needed to do so. In addition, anyone can propose a modification to the Ethereum network’s source code and then propose that the Ethereum network community adopt the modification. These proposed modifications to the Ethereum network’s source code, if adopted, can lead to forks (referred to as “volitional forksˮ because they take place through a formal process). 28 In the case of volitional forks, the core developers, including those associated with or funded by the Ethereum Foundation, are able to access and alter the Ethereum network source code and, as a result, they are typically responsible for proposing quasi-official or widely publicized releases of updates and other changes to the Ethereum network’s source code called EIPs. Any user can propose an idea for modifying the Ethereum network’s source code, and the core developers are responsible for merging the proposed idea into the EIP repository on GitHub, where it formally becomes an EIP. However, core developers are not monolithic. At the protocol level, certain core developers may support a given change while others oppose it. Developers of certain Ethereum Clients may support the change and incorporate the change into an update to their particular Ethereum Consensus Client or Execution Client, while developers of other Ethereum Clients may not do so. In addition, the release of proposed updates to the Ethereum network’s source code by core developers does not guarantee that the updates will be automatically adopted. The developers of each Ethereum Client must agree to implement the EIP’s changes to the Ethereum network in the source individual for their respective client software, nodes must accept the changes made available by the developers of the Ethereum Client software they use by choosing to individually download the modified Ethereum Client software, which they will likely not do unless a critical mass of validators and users – such as DApp and smart contract developers, as well as end users of DApps and smart contracts, and anyone else who transacts on the Ethereum Blockchain or Ethereum network – support the shift as well. If no such critical mass emerges, node operators will not download the change, and the upgrades will lack adoption. Modifications are typically introduced by core developers in the form of EIPs, and are often followed by a robust debate within the Ethereum community as to the advisability of the proposed change. Assuming the core developers at the protocol level and the developers of individual Ethereum Clients reach a broad consensus among themselves in favor of introducing the change into the respective source code they are responsible for developing and maintaining, the source code modification will be introduced and made available to download. Typically, after a modification is introduced and a substantial majority of users and validators express support, leading to node operators consenting to the modification by choosing to download it, the change is implemented at a specific block number on the Ethereum network and the network continues to operate uninterrupted on a single blockchain. However, if less than a substantial majority of core developers (whether at the protocol level or the individual Ethereum Client level), users, validators and node operators consent to the proposed modification, but the modification is nonetheless implemented by some core developers, Ethereum Clients, node operators, users and validators, and the modification is not compatible with the software prior to its modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “fork” (i.e., split) of the Ethereum network (and the Ethereum Blockchain), with one version (employed by those core developers, Ethereum Clients, node operators, validators and users who rejected the change) running the pre-modified software and the other (employed by core developers, Ethereum Clients, node operators, validators and users who chose to adopt the change) running the modified software. The effect of such a fork would be the existence of two (or more) versions of the Ethereum network running in parallel, but with each version’s ethereum lacking interchangeability, and with different blockchains, transaction histories, and ownership ledgers associated with each. For example, in July 2016, Ethereum “forked” into Ethereum and a new digital asset, Ethereum Classic, as a result of the Ethereum network community’s response to a significant security breach in which an anonymous hacker exploited a smart contract running on the Ethereum network to syphon approximately $60 million of ethereum held by The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization, into a segregated account. In response to the hack, most participants in the Ethereum community elected to adopt a “fork” that effectively reversed the hack. However, a minority of users, developers, and validators continued to develop and use the original blockchain, now referred to as “Ethereum Classic” with the digital asset on that blockchain now referred to as Ether Classic, or ETC. In practice, the two networks would compete with each other for users, developers, validators, and adoption, potentially to their mutual detriment (for example, if the number of validators on each network is too small leading to security concerns, as discussed below, or if the number of users on each is reduced compared to the number of users of the single pre-fork blockchain network). Debates relating to hard forks can be contentious and hard fought among network participants, and can lead to ill will. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of validating power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual validator or validating pool’s validating power to exceed relevant thresholds of the total on either network, thereby making them both more susceptible to attack. If such a contentious hard fork were to occur on the Ethereum Blockchain in the future, it could cause the Ethereum network to lose users, validators and developers, and could cause ethereum to lose value, adversely affecting the price of the Shares. The pre-fork and post-fork blockchains could compete against each other for users, validators and developer talent, to their mutual detriment. Such a fork in the Ethereum Blockchain typically would be addressed by community-led efforts to merge the forked Ethereum Blockchains, and several prior forks have been so merged. Since the Ethereum network’s inception, modifications to the Ethereum network have generally been accepted by the majority of users, developers, and validators ensuring that the Ethereum network remains a coherent economic system and the focal point of the majority of developer activity. There is no assurance, however, that this will continue to be the case, and if it is not, then the price of ethereum could be negatively affected. The original blockchain and the forked blockchain could potentially compete with each other for users, developers, and validators leading to a loss of these for the original blockchain. A fork of any kind could 29 adversely affect an investment in the Trust or the ability of the Trust to operate and the Trust’s procedures may be inadequate to address the effects of a fork. A future fork in the Ethereum network could adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate. As with any change to software code, software upgrades and other changes to the source code or protocols of the Ethereum network in connection with a hard fork could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ethereum. A hard fork could also adversely affect the price of ethereum at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. If a hard fork caused operational problems for either post-fork network or blockchain, the digital assets associated with the affected network could lose some or all of their value, or cause users and validators to abandon the Ethereum network in favor of other competing digital asset networks and blockchains. Furthermore, while the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which network is generally accepted as the Ethereum network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the network and the associated digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork. Any of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares. On March 13, 2024, the Ethereum network underwent a volitional fork called “Dencunˮ implementing a series of EIPs. For example, EIP 4844 is intended to improve the economics of Layer 2s by reducing transaction fees for Layer 2s who batch transactions executed on the Layer 2s and upload them as a batch (or as a single proof) onto the main Layer 1 Ethereum network. Proponents hope it will achieve this objective by, among other things, providing Layer 2 scaling solutions a designated storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, called Binary Large Objects (“blobsˮ), which attach large data chunks to transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network and are recorded on the Layer 1 Ethereum network’s blockchain. The data in blobs become inaccessible on the Layer 1 Ethereum network after a temporary period of time, thereby reducing demands for storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, unlike the previous method of storing batched data from Layer 2s, which caused the data to remain permanently on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. This is expected by proponents of Dencun to reduce the cost of storing the data on the Ethereum Layer 1 network permanently, making Layer 2s more cost-efficient to operate and potentially more effective as a scaling solution. Immediately following the upgrade, some Layer 2s reportedly experienced reduced transaction fees when batching transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network, which in turn lowered the transaction costs for executing transactions on such Layer 2s, but this also is believed to have resulted in ethereum prices (as the native asset of the Layer 1 Ethereum network) dropping as well due, in part, to the reduced demand for ethereum to pay the transaction costs of recording data on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Decreased ethereum prices could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Additionally, some Layer 2s, such as Blast, reportedly experienced outages and other disruptions in the aftermath of the Dencun upgrade, which in the case of Blast halted block production on the Blast Layer 2 blockchain for a period of time, though it was reportedly restored shortly thereafter. As with any change to software code, volitional forks such as Dencun or other such forks could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ETH, and therefore the Shares. In September 2022, the Ethereum network transitioned to a proof-of-stake consensus model, in an upgrade referred to as the “Merge.” Following the Merge, a hard fork of the Ethereum network occurred, as a small number of Ethereum validators and network participants planned to maintain the proof-of-work consensus mechanism that was removed as part of the Merge. This version of the network, which is not backwards-compatible with the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain, is considered a forked branch and was rebranded as “Ethereum Proof-of-Work.” Unlike proof-of-work, in which validators expend computational resources to compete to validate transactions and are rewarded ethereum in proportion to the amount of computational resources expended, in proof-of-stake, miners (also called validators) risk or “stake” ethereum to compete to be randomly selected to validate transactions and are rewarded ETH in accordance with an algorithm calibrated according to the number of validators who have staked ETH. Any malicious activity by a miner, such as mining multiple blocks, disagreeing with the eventual consensus or otherwise violating protocol rules, results in the forfeiture or slashing (as defined below) of a portion of the staked ETH. Proof-of-stake is viewed as more energy efficient and scalable than proof-of-work. There can be no assurance that these or other benefits will be realized, and failure to achieve these intended benefits could cause ethereum to lose some or all of its value, and could adversely affect the price of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate. Furthermore, a hard fork can lead to new security concerns. For example, when the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued digital assets exchanges through at least October 2016. A digital assets exchange announced 30 in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ether Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018. In November 2016, the Ethereum network underwent a hard fork, Spurious Dragon, that was intended to provide some protection against replay attacks. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of mining power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual validator or validator pool’s hashing power to exceed the relevant threshold of the processing power of the network that retained or attracted less mining power, thereby making digital assets that rely on that network, which could include ethereum, more susceptible to attack. Any of these events could cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to potential users, including smart contract and decentralized application developers, or cause a decline in speculative interest, and thereby cause ethereum to decline in value, causing a corresponding decrease in the price of the Shares. In addition to a volitional hard fork, a fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of otherwise compatible software that users run. Recently, such an accidental fork reportedly occurred in the Go-Ethereum (“Geth”) client, which is a popular Ethereum Client that many nodes use to access the Ethereum network. In November 2020, a bug was discovered in Geth (but not the other Ethereum Clients at the time), and a patch was released that all users of the Geth Client were supposed to download and apply simultaneously. However, not all users of Geth did so, resulting with the non-patched Geth users temporarily running a different version of the Ethereum Blockchain than the patched Geth users and users of other Ethereum Clients. This temporarily created two conflicting versions of the Ethereum Blockchain, causing the non-patched Geth users to be unable to reach consensus with the rest of the users of the Ethereum Blockchain, interrupting their access to the Ethereum network. Ultimately, the problem was reportedly fixed by releasing a new upgraded version of Geth that all users of the Geth client were to promptly download. This reportedly harmonized the conflicting versions and restored synchronization among Geth users, fixing the problem and restoring access to the Ethereum network. In the future, if an accidental or unintentional fork similar to what happened within the Geth client in November 2020 were to reoccur within Geth (or any other major Ethereum Client), or were to happen to the Ethereum network as a whole (instead of being limited to a single Ethereum Client, in this case Geth), such a fork could lead to users and validators losing confidence in the Ethereum network and abandoning it in favor of other blockchain protocols. Furthermore, it is possible that, in a future accidental or unintentional fork, a substantial number of users and validators could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains, resulting in a permanent fork. Moreover, unlike Bitcoin, which has a single widely-accepted reference implementation in Bitcoin Core, after the Merge, nodes on the Ethereum network must run both an Execution Client and a Consensus Client paired together, with the implementations selected at the discretion of the node operator. There are multiple groups independently developing and implementing their respective Execution Clients and Consensus Clients; while some individual Execution Clients or Consensus Clients are more popular or widely adopted than others, there remains heterogeneity among Ethereum Clients. Each Execution Client and Consensus Client needs to interoperate seamlessly with each other Execution Client and Consensus Client. Although this diversity of Ethereum Clients is perceived by some to promote decentralization of the Ethereum network, it comes at a potential cost: if there are any unanticipated or undiscovered flaws, bugs, software defects, or interoperability failures causing any individual Execution Client to fail to interoperate seamlessly with any other individual Execution Client or any Consensus Client, the Ethereum network as a whole could suffer an unexpected hard fork, major disruption, catastrophic outage, system failure, loss of confidence or adoption among users or validators, or a variety of other problems. Any of these events could cause ethereum to decline in value, adversely affecting the price of Shares. The Ethereum network regularly implements volitional hard forks in order to achieve its development roadmap, advance the scalability process, and to improve the network generally. For example, in connection with the Ethereum development roadmap, the Ethereum network executed volitional hard forks to transition from the initial Frontier development stage into the Homestead development stage in 2016; to transition from the Homestead development stage to the first sub-stage, Byzantium, of the Metropolis development stage in 2017; to transition from the Byzantium sub-stage to the St. Petersburg sub-stage in early 2019; and to transition from the St. Petersburg sub-stage to the Istanbul sub-phase, in late 2019. In April 2021, Ethereum underwent the Berlin and Altair hard forks, among others. In 2022, Ethereum underwent the Bellatrix and Paris hard forks (collectively constituting the Merge). In 2023, Ethereum underwent the Capella and Shanghai hard forks (collectively, “Shapella”), which enabled withdrawals of staked assets to the Layer 1 Ethereum network’s blockchain for the first time (they had previously been locked on the Beacon Chain following the Merge). The next Ethereum hard fork is the expected to be the Prague and Electra (collectively, “Pectra”), hard forks, which may or may not be completed in 2024 (or ever). Any of these or future hard forks could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ETH. Alternatively, 31 such hard forks could be contentious, leading to a split and fracture in the Ethereum community to its collective detriment, as discussed above. Any such outcomes could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Shareholders may not receive the benefits of any forks or “airdrops.” We refer to the right to receive any benefits arising from a fork, airdrop (defined below), or similar event as an “Incidental Right” and any such virtual currency acquired through an Incidental Right as “IR Virtual Currency.” The only crypto asset to be held by the Trust will be ETH. The Trust has adopted the following procedures to address situations involving any fork, airdrop or similar event that results in the issuance of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency that the Trust may receive. The Trust Agreement stipulates that if a fork occurs, the Sponsor shall determine which asset constitutes ETH and which network constitutes the Ethereum network, and the Sponsor will as soon as possible cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Because the Trust will abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency, the Trust would not receive any direct or indirect consideration for the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and thus the value of the Shares will not reflect the value of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Such Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency will not be taken into account for purposes of determining NAV. In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency that is not ETH in-kind to the Sponsor, as agent for the Shareholders, and the Sponsor would arrange to sell or otherwise dispose of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and for the proceeds (if any) to be distributed to the Shareholders. There can be no assurance as to whether or when the Sponsor would make such a decision, or when the Exchange will seek or obtain this approval, if at all. In addition to forks, a digital asset may become subject to a similar occurrence known as an “airdrop.” In an airdrop, the promotors of a new digital asset announce to holders of another digital asset that such holders will be entitled to claim a certain amount of the new digital asset for free, based on the fact that they hold such other digital asset. Neither the Trust nor the Sponsor shall be under any obligation to claim or attempt to secure or realize any economic benefit from “airdropped” assets, and the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably and permanently abandon, for no consideration, such Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency associated with the airdropped assets in-kind to the Sponsor, as agent for the Shareholders, and the Sponsor would arrange to sell or otherwise dispose of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and for the proceeds (if any) to be distributed to the Shareholders. With respect to any fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency associated with such event. As such, Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks, and the Trust is not able to participate in any airdrop. In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to change this policy. Even if required regulatory approval is sought and obtained, Shareholders may not receive the benefits of any forks, airdrops, or similar events, the Trust may not choose, or be able, to participate in an airdrop, and the timing of receiving any benefits from a fork, airdrop or similar event is uncertain. Any inability to recognize the economic benefit of a hard fork or airdrop could adversely affect the value of the Shares. In the event of a hard fork of the Ethereum network, the Sponsor will, if permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine which network should be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and in doing so may adversely affect the value of the Shares. In the event of a hard fork of the Ethereum network, the Sponsor will, if permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine, in good faith, which peer-to-peer network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Ethereum network, is generally accepted as the Ethereum network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes. The Sponsor will base its determination on a variety of then relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the Sponsor’s beliefs regarding expectations of the core developers of ethereum, users, service providers, businesses, miners and other constituencies, as well as the actual continued acceptance of, mining power on, and community engagement with, the Ethereum network. There is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork, and the Sponsor’s decision may adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result. The Sponsor may also disagree with Shareholders, security vendors and MarketVector on what is generally accepted as ethereum and should therefore be considered “ethereum” for the Trust’s purposes, which may also adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result. 32 The Ethereum Blockchain could be vulnerable to a “51% attack,” which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust or the ability of the Trust to operate. Following the Merge and the switch to proof-of-stake validation, the Ethereum network is currently vulnerable to several types of attacks, including: ● “>33% attack” where, if a validator or group of validators were to gain control of more than 33% of the total staked ethereum on the Ethereum network, a malicious actor could temporarily impede or delay block confirmation or even cause a temporary fork in the blockchain. ● “>50% attack” where, if a validator or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 50% of the total staked ethereum on the Ethereum network, a malicious actor would be able to gain full control of the Ethereum network and the ability to manipulate the blockchain on a forward-looking basis, including censoring transactions following the achievement of threshold, double-spending and fraudulent block propagation, while the attacker maintains the threshold. In theory, the minority non-attackers might reach social consensus to reject blocks proposed by the malicious majority attacker, reducing the attacker’s ability to engage in malicious activity, but there can be no assurance this would happen or that non-attackers would be able to coordinate effectively. ● “>66% attack” where, if a validator or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 66% of the total staked ethereum on the Ethereum network, a malicious actor could permanently and irreversibly manipulate the blockchain, including censorship, double-spending and fraudulent block propagation, both on a forward- and backward-looking basis. The attacker could unilaterally finalize their preferred chain without the votes of any other stakers, and could also reverse past finalized blocks. If a malicious actor, group or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains certain percentages of the validating power dedicated to validation on the Ethereum network is controlled by a bad actor (often referred to as a “51% attack”, though the numerical thresholds vary in the post-Merge proof-of-stake consensus mechanism of the Ethereum network), it may be able to alter the Ethereum Blockchain on which the Ethereum network and ethereum transactions rely. The Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus mechanism requires a 2/3 supermajority of validators who have staked ethereum to vote in favor in order to finalize transactions and add blocks to the Ethereum Blockchain. If the bad actor were to obtain 2/3 of the total ethereum staked in validation processes, it is widely believed that the bad actor could construct fraudulent blocks, “double-spend” its own ethereum (i.e., spend the same ethereum in more than one transaction), or censor other users’ transactions by preventing them from being confirmed while continuing to validate and confirm its own transactions and earn the associated block reward, thereby enriching itself while also entrenching its own control of the Ethereum Blockchain. If the bad actor were to obtain 1/3 of the total ETH staked in validation processes, the bad actor could prevent certain transactions from completing in a timely manner, or at all, and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions, though this would likely be temporary (since it would likely be penalized for inactivity leakage, resulting in the bad actor’s staked ETH being slashed, as defined below) and it likely could not double spend or propagate fraudulent blocks without the 66% supermajority of staked assets. With control of the respective threshold of total staked assets on the Ethereum network, it could be possible for the malicious actor to control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions on the Ethereum Blockchain and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions, while continuing to mine new ethereum and confirm its own blocks, for so long as it maintained control. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the validating power on the Ethereum network or the Ethereum community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious or to the extent that such bad actor did not yield its control of processing power, reversing any changes made to the Ethereum Blockchain may be difficult or impossible. Further, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the Ethereum network. For example, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic network was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic network. The attacks resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of $5.0 million and $1.0 million. Any similar attacks on the Ethereum network could negatively impact the value of ethereum and the value of the Shares. In addition, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network experienced a 51% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur may negatively impact perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Although the two attacks described above took place on 33 proof-of-work-based networks, it is possible that a similar attack may occur on the Ethereum network, which could negatively impact the value of ethereum and the value of the Shares. Although the Sponsor is unaware of any reports of malicious control of mining or validation processes of the Ethereum network at the protocol level leading to double-spending or similar malicious attacks since its early days, it is believed that certain validation pools already currently exceed the 33% threshold on the Ethereum network. See “Risk Factors—Liquid Staking Applications pose centralization concerns.” In the future, it is theoretically possible that certain validation pools could potentially exceed the 33% needed to interfere with transaction confirmation and potentially control even larger amounts of the Ethereum network’s total staked assets, such as the 51% majority to propagate fraudulent future blocks or 2/3 supermajority needed for total unilateral control and the ability to revert past finalized blocks. The possible crossing or near-crossing of the 33% threshold indicates a greater risk that a single validation or staking pool could exert authority over the validation of Ethereum network transactions, and there can be no assurance other thresholds would not be crossed. Also, if validators experience financial or other difficulties on a large scale and are unable to participate in validation activities, whether due to a downturn in the ETH market or other factors, the risks of the Ethereum network becoming more centralized could increase. Any such events could cause the price of ethereum, and thus the value of the Shares, to decrease. See also “—Liquid staking applications pose centralization concerns” below. A malicious actor may also obtain control over the Ethereum network through its influence over core developers by gaining direct control over a core developer or an otherwise influential programmer. To the extent that users and miners accept amendments to the source code proposed by the controlled core developer, other core developers do not counter such amendments, and such amendments enable the malicious exploitation of the Ethereum network, the risk that a malicious actor may be able to obtain control of the Ethereum network in this manner exists. Moreover, it is possible that a group of ethereum holders that together control more than 50% of outstanding ethereum are in fact part of the initial or core developer group, or are otherwise influential members of the Ethereum community. To the extent that the initial or existing core developer groups also control more than the relevant thresholds of outstanding ethereum, as some believe, the risk of and arising from this particular group of users obtaining control of the validating power on the Ethereum network will be even greater, and should this materialize, it may adversely affect the value of the Shares. Liquid staking applications pose centralization concerns. Validators must deposit 32 ETH to activate a unique validator key pair that is used to sign block proposals and attestations on behalf of its stake (i.e., vote on its view of the chain). For every 32 ETH deposit that is staked, a unique validator key pair is generated. This validator key pair is only used in validation processes (block proposal and attestation, and the staking associated therewith), and is separate from the public-private key pair generated in respect of the blockchain address on the Ethereum network which is used to hold the ethereum. An application built on the Ethereum network, or a single node operator, can manage many validator key pairs. For example, Lido, an application that provides a so-called “liquid staking” solution which permits holders of ethereum to deposit them with Lido, which stakes the ethereum while issuing the holder a transferrable token, is reported by some sources to have or have had up to 275,000 validator key pairs (each representing 32 staked ETH) divided across over 30 node operators. At times, Lido has reportedly controlled around or in excess of 33% of the total staked ethereum on the Ethereum network. While it is widely believed that Lido has little incentive to attempt to interfere with transaction finality or block confirmations using its reported 33% stake, since doing so would likely cause its entire stake to be slashed (as defined below) and thus lost (assuming good actors unaffiliated with Lido controlled the remainder), and also because Lido is believed to not control most of the third party node operators where its ethereum is staked, and finally since the occurrence of such manipulation of the Ethereum network’s consensus process by Lido or any other actor would likely cause ethereum to lose substantial value (which would obviously hurt Lido economically), it nevertheless poses centralization concerns. If Lido, or a bad actor with a similar sized stake, were to attempt to interfere with transaction finality or block confirmations, it could negatively affect the use and adoption of the Ethereum network, the value of ethereum, and thus the value of the Shares. If validators exit the ethereum network, it could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor obtaining control. Validators exiting the network could make the Ethereum network more vulnerable to a malicious actor obtaining control of a large percentage of staked ethereum, which might enable them to manipulate the Ethereum Blockchain by censoring or manipulating specific transactions, as discussed previously. If the Ethereum Blockchain suffers such an attack, the price of ethereum could be negatively affected, and a loss of confidence in the Ethereum network could result. Any reduction in confidence in the transaction confirmation process or staking power of the Ethereum network may adversely affect an investment in the Trust. Blockchain technologies are based on theoretical conjectures as to the impossibility of solving certain cryptographical puzzles quickly. These premises may be incorrect or may become incorrect due to technological advances. 34 Blockchain technologies are premised on theoretical conjectures as to the impossibility, in practice, of solving certain mathematical problems quickly. Those conjectures remain unproven, however, and mathematical or technological advances could conceivably prove them to be incorrect. Blockchain technology companies may also be negatively affected by cryptography or other technological or mathematical advances, such as the development of quantum computers with significantly more power than computers presently available, that undermine or vitiate the cryptographic consensus mechanism underpinning the Ethereum Blockchain and other distributed ledger protocols. If either of these events were to happen, markets that rely on blockchain technologies, such as the Ethereum network, could quickly collapse, and an investment in the Trust may be adversely affected. The price of ETH on the ETH market has exhibited periods of extreme volatility, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Trust. The price of ETH as determined by the ETH market has experienced periods of extreme volatility and may be influenced by a wide variety of factors. Speculators and investors who seek to profit from trading and holding ETH generate a significant portion of ETH demand. Such speculation regarding the potential future appreciation in the value of ETH may cause the price of ETH to increase. Conversely, a decrease in demand for or speculative interest regarding ETH may cause the price to decline. The volatility of the price of ETH, particularly arising from speculative activity, may have a negative impact on the performance of the Trust. MarketVector has analyzed ETH trading platform data and developed insights that have informed MarketVector’s understanding of the ETH market and the design of the Trust. If such data or insights are inaccurate or incorrect, the value of an investment in the Trust may be adversely affected. MarketVector has relied upon ETH market data in developing its analysis of the ETH market. This analysis has informed MarketVector’s understanding of the ETH market, the design of the Trust and the design of the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. The continued viability of the Trust relies upon access to accurate data, and MarketVector’s continued ability to effectively analyze such data. If data is inaccurate or becomes unavailable, or if MarketVector’s analysis of such data is incorrect, the value of an investment in the Trust may be adversely affected. Smart contracts, including those relating to DeFi applications, are a new technology and their ongoing development and operation may result in problems, which could reduce the demand for ETH or cause a wider loss of confidence in the Ethereum network, either of which could have an adverse impact on the value of ETH. Smart contracts are programs that run on the Ethereum Blockchain that execute automatically when certain conditions are met. Since smart contracts typically cannot be stopped or reversed, vulnerabilities in their programming can have damaging effects. For example, in June 2016, a vulnerability in the smart contracts underlying The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization for venture capital funding, allowed an attack by a hacker to syphon approximately $60 million worth of ETH from The DAO’s accounts into a segregated account. In the aftermath of the theft, certain core developers and contributors pursued a “hard fork” of the Ethereum Network in order to erase any record of the theft. Despite these efforts, the price of ETH reportedly dropped approximately 35% in the aftermath of the attack and subsequent hard fork. In addition, in July 2017, a vulnerability in a smart contract for a multi-signature wallet software developed by Parity led to a reportedly $30 million theft of ETH, and in November 2017, a new vulnerability in Parity’s wallet software reportedly led to roughly $160 million worth of ETH being indefinitely frozen in an account. Furthermore, in April 2018, a batch overflow bug was found in many Ethereum-based ERC20-compatible smart contract tokens that allows hackers to create a large number of smart contract tokens, causing multiple crypto asset platforms worldwide to shut down ERC20-compatible token trading. Similarly, in March 2020, a design flaw in the MakerDAO smart contract caused forced liquidations of crypto assets at significantly discounted prices, resulting in millions of dollars of losses to users who had deposited crypto assets into the smart contract. Other smart contracts, such as bridges between blockchain networks and decentralized finance (“DeFi”) protocols have also been manipulated, exploited or used in ways that were not intended or envisioned by their creators such that attackers syphoned over $3.8 billion worth of digital assets from smart contracts in 2022. Problems with the development, deployment, and operation of smart contracts may have an adverse effect on the value of ETH. In some cases, smart contracts can be controlled by one or more “admin keys” or users with special privileges, or “super users”. These users may have the ability to unilaterally make changes to the smart contract, enable or disable features on the smart contract, change how the smart contract receives external inputs and data, and make other changes to the smart contract. Furthermore, in some cases inadequate public information may be available about certain smart contracts or applications, and information asymmetries may exist, even with respect to open-source smart contracts or applications; certain participants may have hidden informational or technological advantages, making for an uneven playing field. There may be opportunities for bad actors to perpetrate fraudulent schemes and engage in illicit activities and other misconduct, such as exit scams and rug pulls (orchestrated by developers and/or influencers who promote a smart contract or application and, ultimately, escape with the money at an agreed time), or Ponzi or similar fraud schemes. 35 Many DeFi applications are currently deployed on the Ethereum network, and smart contracts relating to DeFi applications currently represent a significant source of demand for ETH. DeFi applications may achieve their investment purposes through self-executing smart contracts that may allow users to invest digital assets in a pool from which other users can borrow without requiring an intermediate party to facilitate these transactions. These investments may earn interest to the investor based on the rates at which borrowers repay the loan, and can generally be withdrawn by the investor. For smart contracts that hold a pool of digital asset reserves, smart contract super users or admin key holders may be able to extract funds from the pool, liquidate assets held in the pool, or take other actions that decrease the value of the digital assets held by the smart contract in reserves. Even for digital assets that have adopted a decentralized governance mechanism, such as smart contracts that are governed by the holders of a governance token, such governance tokens can be concentrated in the hands of a small group of core community members, who would be able to make similar changes unilaterally to the smart contract. If any such super user or group of core members unilaterally make adverse changes to a smart contract, the design, functionality, features and value of the smart contract, its related digital assets may be harmed. In addition, assets held by the smart contract in reserves may be stolen, misused, burnt, locked up or otherwise become unusable and irrecoverable. Super users can also become targets of hackers and malicious attackers. If an attacker is able to access or obtain the super user privileges of a smart contract, or if a smart contract’s super users or core community members take actions that adversely affect the smart contract, users who transact with the smart contract may experience decreased functionality of the smart contract or may suffer a partial or total loss of any digital assets they have used to transact with the smart contract. Furthermore, the underlying smart contracts may be insecure, contain bugs or other vulnerabilities, or otherwise may not work as intended. Any of the foregoing could cause users of the DeFi application to be negatively affected, or could cause the DeFi application to be the subject of negative publicity. Because DeFi applications may be built on the Ethereum network and represent a significant source of demand for ethereum, public confidence in the Ethereum network itself could be negatively affected, such sources of demand could diminish and the value of ethereum could decrease. Similar risks apply to any smart contract or decentralized application, not just DeFi applications. Validators may suffer losses due to staking, or staking may prove unattractive to validators, which could make the Ethereum network less attractive. Validation on the Ethereum network requires ethereum to be transferred into smart contracts on the underlying blockchain networks not under the Trust’s or anyone else’s control. If the Ethereum network source code or protocol fail to behave as expected, suffer cybersecurity attacks or hacks, experience security issues, or encounter other problems, such assets may be irretrievably lost. In addition, the Ethereum networks dictate requirements for participation in validation activity, and may impose penalties, if the relevant activities are not performed correctly. The Ethereum network imposes three types of sanctions for validator misbehavior or inactivity, which would result in a portion of their staked ETH being destroyed or “burned”: penalties, slashing and inactivity leaks. A validator may face penalties if it fails to take certain actions, such as providing a timely attestation to a block proposed by another validator. Under this scenario, a validator’s staked ETH could be burned in an amount equal to the reward to which it would have been entitled for performing the actions. A more severe sanction (i.e., “slashing”) is imposed if a validator commits malicious acts related to the proposal or attestation of blocks with invalid transactions. Slashing can result in the validator having a portion of its staked ETH immediately burned. After this initial slashing, the validator is queued for forceful removal from the Ethereum network’s validator “pool,” and more of the validator’s stake is burned over a period of approximately 36 days (with the exact amount of ethereum burned and time period determined by the protocol) regardless of whether the validator makes any further slashable errors, at which point the validator is automatically removed from the validator pool. Staked ETH may also be burned through a process known as an “inactivity leak,” which is triggered if the Ethereum network has gone too long without finalizing a new block. For a new block to be successfully added to the blockchain, validators that account for at least two-thirds of all staked ETH must agree on the validity of a proposed block. This means that if validators representing more than one-third of the total staked ETH are offline, no new blocks can be finalized. To prevent this, an inactivity leak causes the ethereum staked by the inactive validators to gradually “bleed away” until these inactive validators represent less than one-third of the total stake, thereby allowing the remaining active validators to finalize proposed blocks. This provides a further incentive for validators to remain online and continue performing validation activities. Within the post-Merge Ethereum network, as part of the “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking, staked ETH will be inaccessible for a variable period of time determined by a range of factors, including network congestion, resulting in potential inaccessibility during those periods. “Activation” is the funding of a validator to be included in the active set, thereby allowing the validator to participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. “Exit” is the request to exit from the active set and no longer participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. As part of these “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking on the Ethereum network, any staked ethereum will be inaccessible for a period of time. The duration of activating and exiting periods are dependent on a range of factors, including network conditions. However, depending on demand, un-staking can take between hours, days or weeks to complete. 36 If validators’ staked ETH are slashed or otherwise subject to sanctions by the Ethereum network, their assets may be confiscated, withdrawn, or burnt by the network, resulting in losses to them. Furthermore, the Ethereum network requires the payment of base fees and the practice of paying tips is common, and such fees can become significant as the amount and complexity of the transaction grows, depending on the degree of network congestion and the price of ETH. Any cybersecurity attacks, security issues, hacks, penalties, slashing events, or other problems could damage validators’ willingness to participate in validation, discourage existing and future validators from serving as such, and adversely impact the Ethereum network’s adoption or the price of ethereum. Any disruption of validation on the Ethereum network could interfere with network operations and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ETH to decrease. The limited liquidity during the “activation” or “exiting” processes could dissuade potential validators from participating, which could interfere with network operations or security and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ETH to decrease. Proof-of-stake blockchains are a relatively recent innovation, and have not been subject to as widespread use or adoption over as long of a period of time as traditional proof-of-work blockchains. Certain digital assets, such as bitcoin, use a “proof-of-work” consensus algorithm. The genesis block on the Bitcoin blockchain was mined in 2009, and Bitcoin’s blockchain has been in operation since then. Many newer blockchains enabling smart contract functionality, including the current Ethereum network following the completion of the Merge in 2022, use a newer consensus algorithm known as “proof-of-stake.” While their proponents believe that they may have certain advantages, the “proof-of-stake” consensus mechanisms and governance systems underlying many newer blockchain protocols, including the Ethereum network following the Merge, and their associated digital assets – including the ETH held by the Trust – have not been tested at scale over as long of a period of time or subject to as widespread use or adoption as, for example, Bitcoin’s proof-of-work consensus mechanism has. This could lead to these blockchains, and their associated digital assets, having undetected vulnerabilities, structural design flaws, suboptimal incentive structures for network participants (e.g., validators), technical disruptions, or a wide variety of other problems, any of which could cause these blockchains not to function as intended, lead to outright failure to function entirely causing a total outage or disruption of network activity, or to suffer other operational problems or reputational damage, leading to a loss of users or adoption or a loss in value of the associated digital assets, including the Trust’s assets. Over the long term, there can be no assurance that the proof-of-stake blockchain on which the Trust’s assets rely will achieve widespread scale or adoption or perform successfully; any failure to do so could negatively impact the value of the Trust’s assets. Operational cost may exceed the award for validating transaction, and increased transaction fees may adversely affect the usage of the Ethereum network. If transaction confirmation fees become too high, the marketplace may be reluctant to use the Ethereum network. This may result in decreased usage and limit expansion of the Ethereum network in the retail, commercial and payments space, adversely impacting investment in the Trust. Conversely, if the reward for validators or the value of the transaction fees is insufficient to motivate validators, they may cease to validate transactions. Ultimately, if the awards of new ETH costs of validating transactions grow disproportionately, miners may operate at a loss, transition to other networks, or cease operations altogether. Each of these outcomes could, in turn, slow transaction validation and usage, which could have a negative impact on the Ethereum network and could adversely affect the value of the ETH held by the Trust. As a result of ETH’s fee burning mechanism, the incentives for validators to validate transactions with higher gas fees are reduced, since those validators would not receive those gas fees. An acute cessation of validator operations would reduce the collective processing power on the Ethereum network, which would adversely affect the transaction verification process by temporarily decreasing the speed at which blocks are added to the blockchain and make the blockchain more vulnerable to a malicious actor obtaining control in excess of the relevant threshold of the processing power on the blockchain. Reductions in processing power could result in material, though temporary, delays in transaction confirmation time. Any reduction in confidence in the transaction verification process or may adversely impact the value of Shares of the Trust or the ability of the Sponsor to operate. Risks Associated with the Digital Asset Markets The value of the Shares relates directly to the value of ETH, the value of which may be highly volatile and subject to fluctuations due to a number of factors. 37 The value of the Shares relates directly to the value of the ETH held by the Trust and fluctuations in the price of ETH could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The market price of ETH may be highly volatile, and subject to a number of factors, including: ● an increase in the global ETH supply or a decrease in global ETH demand; ● market conditions of, and overall sentiment towards, the digital assets and blockchain technology industry; ● trading activity on digital asset trading platforms, which, in many cases, may be unregulated, may be subject to regulation in a relevant jurisdiction, but may not be complying, or may be subject to manipulation; ● the adoption of ETH as a medium of exchange, store-of-value or other consumptive asset and the maintenance and development of the open-source software protocol of the Ethereum network, and their ability to meet user demands; ● the needs of decentralized applications, smart contracts, their users, and users of the Ethereum network generally for ETH to pay gas fees to execute transactions; ● forks in the Ethereum network, particularly where changes to the Ethereum network source code are either not well-received by key constituencies within the Ethereum community or are not successfully executed or implemented and fail to achieve the functionality such changes were intended to bring about; ● governmental or regulatory actions by, or investigations or litigation in, countries around the world targeting well-known decentralized applications or smart contracts that are built on the Ethereum network, or other developments or problems, and associated publicity, involving or affecting such decentralized applications or smart contracts; ● Increased competition from other forms of digital assets or payment services, including digital currencies constituting legal tender that may be issued in the future by central banks, or digital assets meant to serve as a medium of exchange by major private companies or other institutions; ● increased competition from other blockchain networks combining smart contracts, programmable scripting languages, and an associated runtime environment, with blockchain-based recordkeeping, particularly where such other blockchain networks are able to offer users access to a larger consumer user base, greater efficiency, reliability, or processing speed, or more economical transaction processing fees than the Ethereum network; ● investors’ expectations with respect to interest rates, the rates of inflation of fiat currencies or ethereum, and digital asset exchange rates; ● consumer and user preferences and perceptions of ETH specifically and digital assets generally, the Ethereum network relative to competing blockchain protocols, and ETH relative to competing digital assets; 38 ● negative events, publicity, and social media coverage relating to the digital assets and blockchain technology industry; ● fiat currency withdrawal and deposit policies on digital asset trading platforms; ● the liquidity of digital asset markets and any increase or decrease in trading volume or market making on digital asset markets; ● business failures, bankruptcies, hacking, fraud, crime, government investigations, or other negative developments affecting digital asset businesses, including digital asset trading platforms, or banks or other financial institutions and service providers which provide services to the digital assets industry; ● the use of leverage in digital asset markets, including the unwinding of positions, “margin calls,” collateral liquidations and similar events; ● investment and trading activities of large or active consumer and institutional users, speculators, miners, and investors in ETH; ● a “short squeeze” resulting from speculation on the price of ETH, if aggregate short exposure exceeds the number of shares available for purchase; ● an active derivatives market for ETH or for digital assets generally; ● monetary policies of governments, legislation or regulation, trade restrictions, currency devaluations and revaluations and regulatory measures or enforcement actions, if any, that restrict the use of ETH as a form of payment or the purchase of ETH on the digital asset markets; ● global or regional political, economic or financial conditions, events and situations, such as the novel coronavirus outbreak; ● fees associated with processing an ETH transaction and the speed at which ETH transactions are settled; ● the maintenance, troubleshooting, and development of (or lack thereof) the Ethereum network including by miners and developers worldwide; ● the ability for the Ethereum network to attract and retain validators to secure and confirm transactions accurately and efficiently; ● the ability of the Ethereum network to attract and retain core developers to maintain and propose amendments to the source code of the Ethereum network; ● the ability of the Ethereum network to attract and retain users (including application developers and end users of those applications) and increase adoption; ● ongoing technological viability and security of the Ethereum network and ETH transactions, including vulnerabilities against hacks and scalability; ● financial strength of market participants; ● the availability and cost of funding and capital; ● the liquidity and credit risk of digital asset trading platforms; ● interruptions in service from or closures or failures of major digital asset trading platforms or their banking partners, or outages or system failures affecting the Ethereum network; ● decreased confidence in digital assets and digital assets trading platforms; ● poor risk management or fraud by entities in the digital assets ecosystem; ● increased competition from other forms of digital assets or payment services; and ● the Trust’s own acquisitions or dispositions of ETH, since there is no limit on the number of ETH that the Trust may acquire. 39 Although returns from investing in ETH have at times diverged from those associated with other asset classes to a greater or lesser extent, there can be no assurance that there will be any such divergence in the future, either generally or with respect to any particular asset class, or that price movements will not be correlated. In addition, there is no assurance that ETH will maintain its value in the long, intermediate, short, or any other term. In the event that the price of ETH declines, the Sponsor expects the value of the Shares to decline proportionately. The value of the Shares of the Trust are represented by the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate that may also be subject to momentum pricing due to speculation regarding future appreciation in value of ETH, leading to greater volatility that could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Momentum pricing typically is associated with growth stocks and other assets whose valuation, as determined by the investing public, accounts for future appreciation in value, if any. The Sponsor believes that momentum pricing of ETH has resulted, and may continue to result, in speculation regarding future appreciation in the value of ETH, inflating and making the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate more volatile. As a result, ETH may be more likely to fluctuate in value due to changing investor confidence, which could impact future appreciation or depreciation in the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate and could adversely affect the value of the Trust. The Trust is not actively managed and does not and will not have any strategy relating to the development of the Ethereum network, nor will the Trust seek to avoid or mitigate losses from declines in the ETH price. Furthermore, the impact of the expansion of the Trust’s ETH holdings on the digital asset industry and the Ethereum network is uncertain. A decline in the popularity or acceptance of the Ethereum network, or the value of ETH, would harm the value of the Trust. Digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges and efforts to increase the volume of transactions may not be successful. Many digital asset networks, including the Ethereum network, face significant scaling challenges due to the fact that public blockchains generally face a tradeoff between security and scalability. One means through which public blockchains achieve security is decentralization, meaning that no intermediary is responsible for securing and maintaining these systems. For example, a greater degree of decentralization generally means a given digital asset network is less susceptible to manipulation or capture. Achieving decentralization may mean that every single node on a given digital asset network is responsible for securing the system by processing every transaction and every single full node is responsible for maintaining a copy of the entire state of the network. However, this may involve tradeoffs from an efficiency perspective, and impose constraints on transaction processing speed (“throughput”). A digital asset network may be limited in the number of transactions it can process by the fact that all validators participate in validating in each block and the capabilities of each single fully participating node. As of June 30, 2024, the Ethereum network could handle approximately 13 transactions per second. In an effort to increase the volume of transactions that can be processed on a given digital asset network, many digital assets are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. In December 2020, the Ethereum network began the first of several stages of the upgrade called Ethereum 2.0, which was intended to transition Ethereum’s core consensus mechanism to proof-of-stake and to encompass additional new features over time, such as sharding. On September 15, 2022, the Ethereum 2.0 upgrade was completed and the network became a single proof-of-stake-based Ethereum network. However, this upgrade may fail to achieve the expected benefits or widespread adoption. An increasing number of wallets and digital asset intermediaries, such as exchanges, have begun supporting the proof-of-stake-based Ethereum network. If increases in throughput on the Ethereum network lag behind growth in usage of ETH, average fees and settlement times may increase considerably. The Ethereum network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees and decreased settlement speeds. In December 2017, the popularity of the blockchain-based game Cryptokitties led to significant network congestion on the Ethereum network. The game, which allows players to trade and create virtual kitties, represented by non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”), was reported by some sources to have accounted for more than 10% of the entire Ethereum network traffic at the time causing increases in transaction fees and delays in transaction processing times, and driving Ethereum network traffic to a reported then-all time high. Since April 30, 2023, ETH transaction fees have decreased from $9.52 per ETH transaction, on average, to a high of $3.83 per transaction, on average, on April 20, 2024. As of May 20, 2024, ETH transaction fees were $2.82 per transaction, on average. Increased fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for ETH (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ETH, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares. As of January 31, 2026, ETH transaction fees were averaging $0.84476 per transaction. 40 In the second half of 2020, the Ethereum network began the first of several stages of an upgrade culminating in the Merge. The Merge amended the Ethereum network’s consensus mechanism to a process known as proof-of-stake, and was intended to address the perceived shortcomings of the proof-of-work consensus mechanism in terms of labor intensity and duplicative computational effort expended by validators (known under proof-of-work as “miners”) who did not win the race, under proof of work, to be the first in time to solve the cryptographic puzzle that would allow them to be the only validator permitted to validate the block and receive the resulting block reward (which was only given to the first validator to successfully solve the puzzle and hash a given block, and not to others). Instead, under proof-of-stake, a single validator is randomly selected to solve the cryptographic puzzle needed to validate a block, which it proposes to a committee of other validators, who vote for whether to include the block (or not), which reduces the computational work performed – and energy expended – to validate each block compared to proof-of-work. Following the Merge, core development of the Ethereum source code has increasingly focused on modifications of the Ethereum protocol to increase speed, throughput and scalability and also improve existing or next generation uses. Future upgrades to the Ethereum protocol and Ethereum Blockchain to address scaling issues – such as network congestion, slow throughput and periods of high transaction fees owing to spikes in network demand – have been discussed by network participants, such as sharding. The purpose of sharding is to increase scalability of the Ethereum Blockchain by splitting the blockchain into subsections, called shards, and dividing validation responsibility so that a defined subset of validators would be responsible for each shard, rather than all validators being responsible for the entire blockchain, allowing for parallel processing and validation of transactions. However, there appears to be uncertainty and a lack of existing widespread consensus among network participants about how to solve the scaling challenges faced by the Ethereum network. The rapid development of other competing scalability solutions, such as those which would rely on handling the bulk of computational work relating to transactions or smart contracts and DApps outside of the main Ethereum network and Ethereum Blockchain, has caused alternatives to sharding to emerge. “Layer 2” is a collective term for solutions which are designed to help increase throughput and reduce transaction fees by handling or validating transactions off the main Ethereum network (known as “Layer 1”) and then attempting to take advantage of the perceived security and integrity advantages of the Layer 1 Ethereum network by uploading the transactions validated on the Layer 2 protocol back to the Layer 1 Ethereum network. The details of how this is done vary significantly between different Layer 2 technologies and implementations. For example, “rollups” perform transaction execution outside the Layer 1 Ethereum network and then post the data, typically in batches, back to the Layer 1 Ethereum network where consensus is reached. “Zero knowledge rollups” are generally designed to run the computation needed to validate the transactions off-chain, on the Layer 2 protocol, and submit a proof of validity of a batch of transactions (not the entire transactions themselves) that is recorded on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. By contrast, “optimistic rollups” assume transactions are valid by default and only run computation, via a fraud proof, in the event of a challenge. Other proposed Layer 2 scaling solutions include, among others, “state channels”, which are designed to allow participants to run a large number of transactions on the Layer 2 side channel protocol and only submit two transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network (the transaction opening the state channel, and the transaction closing the channel), “side chains”, in which an entire Layer 2 blockchain network with similar capabilities to the existing Layer 1 Ethereum network runs in parallel with the existing Layer 1 Ethereum network and allows smart contracts and DApps to run on the Layer 2 side chain without burdening the main Layer 1 network, and others. To date, the Ethereum network community has not coalesced overwhelmingly around any particular Layer 2 solution, though this could change. Many developers are actively researching and testing scalability solutions for public blockchains. However, there is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing speed and throughput of settlement of the Ethereum network transactions will be effective, which could cause the Ethereum network to not adequately resolve scaling challenges and adversely impact the adoption of ethereum and the Ethereum network and the value of the Shares. Core developers could fail to agree among themselves which of the different scaling paths is preferable. There is no guarantee that any potential scaling solution, whether a change to the Layer 1 Ethereum network like sharding or the introduction of a Layer 2 solution like rollups, state channels or side chains, will achieve widespread adoption. It is possible that proposed changes to the Layer 1 Ethereum network could divide the community, potentially even causing a hard fork, or that the decentralized governance of the Ethereum network causes network participants to fail to coalesce overwhelmingly around any particular solution, causing the Ethereum network to suffer reduced adoption or causing users or validators to migrate to other blockchain networks. It is also possible that scaling solutions could fail to work as intended, could suffer from centralization concerns, or could introduce bugs, coding defects or flaws, security risks, or other problems that could cause them to suffer operational disruptions. For example, in April 2024, Starknet, a Layer 2 built on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, suffered an outage reportedly caused by a rounding error bug that halted production of new blocks on Starknet’s Layer 2 blockchain network. Similar outages, bugs, defects, or other problems could affect Layer 2s in the future. Similarly, in multiple instances throughout 2022 and 2023, the Arbitrum Layer 2 network experienced outages due to failures in its primary node responsible for submitting transactions to the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Although the Layer 1 Ethereum network is believed not to have been affected by those outages, 41 problems on Layer 2s in the future could conceivably affect or cause issues for the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Alternatively, if a widely-used Layer 2 network were to fail, it could reduce demand for ethereum because it would eliminate a source of demand for using ethereum to record transactions from the Layer 2 onto the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Any of the foregoing could adversely affect the price of ethereum or the value of the Shares of the Trust. If the digital asset award or transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expanding validating power or demand high transaction fees, which could negatively impact the value of ETH and the value of the Shares. In 2021, the Ethereum network implemented the EIP-1559 upgrade. EIP-1559 changed the methodology used to calculate transaction fees paid to ethereum validators in such a manner that reduced the total net issuance of ethereum fees paid to validators. If the digital asset awards for validating blocks or the transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expending validating power to validate blocks and confirmations of transactions on the Ethereum Blockchain could be slowed. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares: ● A reduction in the processing power expended by validators on the Ethereum network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtaining control. See “—The Ethereum Blockchain could be vulnerable to attacks on transaction finality and consensus processes, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust or the ability of the Trust to operate.” ● Validators have historically accepted relatively low transaction confirmation fees on most digital asset networks. If validators demand higher transaction fees for recording transactions in the Ethereum Blockchain or a software upgrade automatically charges fees for all transactions on the Ethereum network, the cost of using ethereum may increase and the marketplace may be reluctant to accept ethereum as a means of payment. Alternatively, validators could collude in an anti-competitive manner to reject low transaction fees on the Ethereum network and force users to pay higher fees, thus reducing the attractiveness of the Ethereum network. Higher transaction confirmation fees resulting through collusion or otherwise may adversely affect the attractiveness of the Ethereum network, the value of ETH and the value of the Shares. ● To the extent that any validators cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Ethereum Blockchain until a block is validated by a validator who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays or disruptions in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in the Ethereum network and could prevent the Trust from completing transactions associated with the day-to-day operations of the Trust, including creations and redemptions of the Shares in exchange for ETH with Authorized Participants. ● During the course of the block validation processes, validators exercise the discretion to select which transactions to include within a block and in what order to include these transactions. Beyond the standard block reward and transaction fees, validators have the ability to extract what is known as Maximal Extractable Value (“MEV”) by strategically choosing, reordering, or excluding certain transactions during block production in return for increased transaction fees or other forms of profit for such validators. In blockchain networks that facilitate DeFi protocols in particular, such as the Ethereum network, users may attempt to gain an advantage over other users by offering additional fees to validators for effecting the order or inclusions of transactions within a block. Certain software solutions, such as MEV Boost by Flashbots, have been developed which facilitate validators and other parties in the ecosystem in capturing MEV. The presence of MEV may incentivize associated practices such as sandwich attacks or front running that can have negative repercussions on DeFi users. A “sandwich attack” is executed by placing two transactions around a large, detected transaction to capitalize on the expected price impact. For instance, a market participant might identify a sizable transaction within the mempool that will significantly alter an asset’s price on a decentralized exchange. The participant could then for example orchestrate a transaction bundle: one transaction to acquire the asset prior to the detected transaction, followed by the large transaction itself, and a final transaction to sell the asset after the market price has increased due to the large transaction’s execution. Such transaction bundles can be submitted to validators through mechanisms like MEV-Boost, with validators receiving a share of the profits as an incentive to include the specific transaction bundle in the block. In the context of MEV, “front running” is said to occur when a user spots a transaction in the publicly visible so-called memory pool (“mempool”) of pending but unexecuted transactions awaiting validation, and then pays a high transaction fee to a validator to have their transaction executed on a priority basis in a manner designed to profit 42 from the pending but unexecuted transaction that is still in the mempool. MEV may also compromise the predictability of transaction execution, which may deter usage of the network as a whole. Although based on widely available information given that transactions in the mempool are publicly visible, any potential perception of MEV as unfair manipulation may also discourage users and other stakeholders from engaging with DeFi protocols or the Ethereum network in general. In addition, it is possible regulators or legislators could enact rules which restrict practices associated with MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum network among users and validators. Any of these or other outcomes related to MEV may adversely affect the value of ETH and the value of the Shares. Due to the unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of ETH trading platforms, which may be subject to regulation in a relevant jurisdiction, but may not be complying, they may experience fraud, manipulation, security failures or operational problems, which may adversely affect the value of ETH and, consequently, the value of the Shares. Digital asset trading platforms are relatively new and, in some cases, unregulated. Many operate outside the United States. Furthermore, while many prominent digital asset trading platforms provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management teams, corporate practices and regulatory compliance, many digital asset trading platforms do not provide this information. Digital asset trading platforms may not be subject to, or may not comply with, regulation in a similar manner as other regulated trading platforms, such as national securities exchanges or designated contract markets. As a result, the marketplace may lose confidence in digital asset trading platforms, including prominent trading platforms that handle a significant volume of ETH trading. Many digital asset trading platforms are unlicensed, may be unregulated, may be subject to regulation in a relevant jurisdiction, but may not be complying, may operate without extensive supervision by governmental authorities, and do not provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management team, corporate practices, cybersecurity, and regulatory compliance. In particular, those located outside the United States may be subject to significantly less stringent regulatory and compliance requirements in their local jurisdictions, and may take the position that they are not subject to laws and regulations that would apply to a national securities exchange or designated contract market in the United States, or may, as a practical matter, be beyond the ambit of U.S. regulators. As a result, trading activity on or reported by these digital asset trading platforms is generally significantly less regulated than trading in regulated U.S. securities and commodities markets, and may reflect behavior that would be prohibited in regulated U.S. trading venues. The ETH market globally and in the United States is not subject to comparable regulatory guardrails as exist in regulated securities markets. Furthermore, many ETH trading venues lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers. As a result, the prices of ETH on trading venues may be subject to larger and/or more frequent sudden declines than assets traded on more traditional exchanges. Tools to detect and deter fraudulent or manipulative trading activities such as market manipulation, front-running of trades, and wash-trading may not be available to or employed by digital asset trading platforms, or may not exist at all. ETH trading platforms may be exposed to fraud and manipulation. The SEC has identified possible sources of fraud and manipulation in the ETH market generally, including, among others (1) “wash trading”; (2) persons with a dominant position in ETH manipulating ETH pricing; (3) hacking of the ethereum network and trading platforms; (4) malicious control of the Ethereum network; (5) trading based on material, non-public information (for example, plans of market participants to significantly increase or decrease their holdings in ETH, new sources of demand for ETH) or based on the dissemination of false and misleading information; (6) manipulative activity involving purported “stablecoins,” including Tether (for more information, “—Prices of ETH may be affected due to stablecoins (including Tether and US Dollar Coin (“USDC”)), the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment”); and (7) fraud and manipulation at ETH trading platforms. The effect of potential market manipulation, front-running, wash-trading, and other fraudulent or manipulative trading practices may inflate the volumes actually present in crypto market and/or cause distortions in price, which could adversely affect the Trust or cause losses to Shareholders. Over the past several years, some digital asset trading platforms have been closed due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such digital asset trading platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such digital asset trading platforms. While, generally speaking, smaller digital asset trading platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger digital asset trading platforms more stable, larger digital asset trading platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and their shortcomings or ultimate failures are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem, and may be more likely to be targets of regulatory 43 enforcement action. For example, the collapse of Mt. Gox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan in late February 2014, demonstrated that even the largest digital asset trading platforms could be subject to abrupt failure with consequences for both users of digital asset exchanges and the digital asset industry as a whole. In particular, in the two weeks that followed the February 7, 2014 halt of bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one bitcoin fell on other trading platforms from around $795 on February 6, 2014 to $578 on February 20, 2014. Additionally, in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets. Further, in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex. The value of bitcoin and other digital assets immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex. In July 2017, FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct digital asset trading platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based cryptocurrency trading platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. Following the hack, Youbit users were allowed to withdraw approximately 75% of the digital assets in their platform accounts, with any potential further distributions to be made following Yapian’s pending bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in January 2018, the Japanese digital asset trading platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in February 2018, the Italian digital asset trading platform, Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest digital asset trading platform, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. In November 2022, FTX, one of the largest digital asset trading platform by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe. The U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. Around the same time, there were reports that approximately $300-600 million of digital assets were removed from FTX and the full facts remain unknown, including whether such removal was the result of a hack, theft, insider activity, or other improper behavior. The potential consequences of a digital asset trading platform failure or failure to prevent market manipulation could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Manipulative trading or market abuse could create artificial or distorted prices, cause a loss of investor confidence in ethereum, adversely impact pricing trends in ETH markets broadly, and cause losses from an investment in Shares of the Trust. In addition, negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the digital asset markets and the closure or temporary shutdown of digital asset trading platforms due to fraud, business failure, security breaches or government mandated regulation, and associated losses by customers, may reduce confidence in the Ethereum network and result in greater volatility or decreases in the prices of ETH. Furthermore, the closure or temporary shutdown of a digital asset exchange used in calculating the Index may result in a loss of confidence in the Trust’s ability to determine its NAV on a daily basis. The potential consequences of a digital asset exchange’s failure could adversely affect the value of the Shares. ETH trading platforms may be exposed to front-running. ETH trading platforms on which ETH trades may be susceptible to “front-running,” which refers to the process when someone uses access to confidential information, or technology or market advantage to get prior knowledge of upcoming transactions. Front-running is a frequent activity on centralized as well as decentralized exchanges. By using bots functioning on a millisecond-scale timeframe, bad actors are able to take advantage of the forthcoming price movement and make economic gains at the cost of those who had introduced these transactions. The objective of a front runner is to buy a chunk of tokens at a low price and later sell them at a higher price while simultaneously exiting the position. Front-running can occur via manipulation of transaction validation and mining processes, or the theft or misappropriation of confidential information by insiders. To extent that front-running occurs in ETH markets, it may result in concerns as to the price integrity of digital asset exchanges and digital assets more generally. ETH trading platforms may be exposed to wash trading. ETH trading platforms on which ethereum trades may be susceptible to wash trading. Wash trading occurs when offsetting trades are entered into for other than bona fide reasons, such as the desire to inflate reported trading volumes. Wash trading may be motivated by non-economic reasons, such as a desire for increased visibility on popular websites that monitor markets for digital assets so as to improve their attractiveness to investors who look for maximum liquidity, or 44 it may be motivated by the ability to attract listing fees from token issuers who seek the most liquid and high-volume exchanges on which to list their coins. Results of wash trading may include unexpected obstacles to trade and erroneous investment decisions based on false information. Even in the United States, there have been allegations of wash trading even on regulated venues. Any actual or perceived false trading in the global digital asset trading market, and any other fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, could adversely affect the value of ETH and/or negatively affect the market perception of ETH. If they were to affect trading at a trading platform which is used to calculate the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, they could cause the Trust’s NAV to be calculated incorrectly and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. See “—The MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be affected by manipulative or fraudulent practices in the global ETH market or at constituent trading platforms.” To the extent that wash trading either occurs or appears to occur in ETH trading platforms on which ETH trades, investors may develop negative perceptions about ethereum and the digital assets industry more broadly, which could adversely impact the price of ethereum and, therefore, the price of Shares. Wash trading also may place more legitimate digital asset trading platforms at a relative competitive disadvantage. Competition from central bank digital currencies and emerging payments initiatives involving financial institutions could adversely affect the value of ETH and other digital assets. Central banks in various countries have introduced digital forms of legal tender (“CBDCs”). Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could have an advantage in competing with, or replace, ETH and other cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange or store of value. Central banks and other governmental entities have also announced cooperative initiatives and consortia with private sector entities, with the goal of leveraging blockchain and other technology to reduce friction in cross-border and interbank payments and settlement, and commercial banks and other financial institutions have also recently announced a number of initiatives of their own to incorporate new technologies, including blockchain and similar technologies, into their payments and settlement activities, which could compete with, or reduce the demand for, ETH. As a result of any of the foregoing factors, the value of ETH could decrease, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust. Prices of ETH may be affected due to stablecoins (including Tether and US Dollar Coin (“USDC”)), the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment. While the Trust does not invest in and will not hold stablecoins, it may nonetheless be exposed to risks that stablecoins pose for the ETH market and other digital asset markets. Stablecoins are digital assets designed to have a stable value over time as compared to typically volatile digital assets, and are typically marketed as being pegged to a fiat currency, such as the U.S. dollar, at a certain value. Although the prices of stablecoins are intended to be stable, their market value may fluctuate. This volatility has in the past apparently impacted the price of ETH. Stablecoins are a relatively new phenomenon, and it is impossible to know all of the risks that they could pose to participants in the ETH market. In addition, some have argued that some stablecoins, particularly Tether, are improperly issued without sufficient backing in a way that, when the stablecoin is used to pay for ETH, could cause artificial rather than genuine demand for ETH, artificially inflating the price of ETH, and also argue that those associated with certain stablecoins may be involved in laundering money. On February 17, 2021 the New York Attorney General entered into an agreement with Tether’s operators, including Bitfinex, requiring them to cease any further trading activity with New York persons and pay $18.5 million in penalties for false and misleading statements made regarding the assets backing Tether (the “NYAG Settlement Order”). The NYAG Settlement Order states that Bitfinex and Tether are under common ownership and management. Among other things, the NYAG Settlement Order asserts that Tether’s operators made a series of loans of some of the fiat currency reserves backing Tether stablecoins to Bitfinex, which Bitfinex used in its business, including to bridge liquidity difficulties it faced after Bitfinex lost a substantial amount of customer cash due to the actions of a payment processor it employed. In return, Bitfinex gave Tether a receivable promising to pay the funds back. The NYAG Settlement Order finds, among other things, that representations Tether’s operators made that each Tether stablecoin was backed 1:1 by fiat currency reserves were fraudulent under New York’s Martin Act, because some of the fiat currency reserves were replaced by a receivable issued by an affiliate (Bitfinex) without disclosure to the market. On October 15, 2021, the CFTC announced a settlement with Tether’s operators, Tether Holdings Limited, Tether Operations Limited, Tether Limited, and Tether International Limited, in which they agreed to pay $42.5 million in fines to settle charges that, among others, Tether’s claims that it maintained sufficient U.S. dollar reserves to back every Tether stablecoin in circulation with the “equivalent amount of corresponding fiat currency” held by Tether were untrue. Bitfinex also agreed to pay the CFTC a $1.5 million fine to settle charges that Bitfinex offered off-exchange leveraged, margined, or financed transactions involving cryptocurrencies, including ethereum, with U.S. customers who were not eligible contract participants and accepted funds (including in the form of Tether stablecoins) and orders in connection with such illegal off-exchange transactions, triggering an obligation to register with the CFTC, which the CFTC order asserts it violated. The 45 CFTC previously fined Bitfinex in 2016 on similar charges. In addition, a large amount of Tether is issued as ERC-20 tokens on the Ethereum network. If Tether were to no longer be issued or operating on the Ethereum network, there would be no need to use ethereum to pay the gas fees needed to record ERC-20 Tether transactions on the Ethereum Blockchain, and a substantial source of demand for ETH could be eliminated, which could cause the price of ETH to decrease, affecting the value of the Shares. USDC is a reserve-backed stablecoin issued by Circle Internet Financial that is commonly used as a method of payment in digital asset markets, including the ETH market. While USDC is designed to maintain a stable value at 1 U.S. dollar at all times, on March 10, 2023, the value of USDC fell below $1.00 for multiple days after Circle Internet Financial disclosed that US$3.3 billion of the USDC reserves were held at Silicon Valley Bank, which had entered Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) receivership earlier that day. Stablecoins are reliant on the U.S. banking system and U.S. treasuries, and the failure of either to function normally could impede the function of stablecoins, and therefore could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Given the foundational role that stablecoins play in global digital asset markets, their fundamental liquidity can have a dramatic impact on the broader digital asset market, including the market for ETH. Because a large portion of the digital asset market still depends on stablecoins such as Tether and USDC, there is a risk that a disorderly de-pegging or a run on Tether or USDC could lead to dramatic market volatility in digital assets more broadly. Volatility in stablecoins, operational issues with stablecoins (for example, technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns about the sufficiency of any reserves that support stablecoins or potential manipulative activity when unbacked stablecoins are used to pay for other digital assets (including ETH), or regulatory concerns about stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, such as exchanges, that support stablecoins, or the removal or migration of prominent stablecoins away from the Ethereum network, could impact individuals’ willingness to trade on trading venues that rely on stablecoins, reduce liquidity in the ETH market, and affect the value of ETH, and in turn impact an investment in the Shares. Given Bitfinex is currently a component of the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate and Bitfinex and Tether are understood to be under common ownership and management, problems with Tether specifically could potentially affect pricing of transactions on Bitfinex or otherwise disrupt Bitfinex’s operations. Competition from the emergence or growth of other digital assets or methods of investing in ETH could have a negative impact on the price of ETH and adversely affect the value of the Shares. As of June 30, 2024, ETH was believed to be the second largest digital asset by market capitalization of the more than approximately 8,000 digital assets (source: CoinGecko). In addition, many consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned smart contracts platforms rather than open platforms like the Ethereum network. Competition from the emergence or growth of alternative digital assets and smart contracts platforms, such as Solana, EOS, Tezos, Tron, and numerous others, could have a negative impact on the demand for, and price of, ethereum and thereby adversely affect the value of the Shares. If other blockchain networks with smart contracts or similar capabilities better meet the needs of users, application developers, and/or validators, whether due to higher performance or otherwise, or prove to be more popular than ETH for any reason, it could lead to less activity on the Ethereum blockchain and lower demand for ETH, causing the price of ETH and the value of the Shares to decline. In addition, some digital asset networks, including the Ethereum network, may be the target of ill will from users of other digital asset networks. For example, in July 2016, the Ethereum network underwent a contentious hard fork that resulted in the creation of a new digital asset network called Ethereum Classic. As a result, some users of the Ethereum Classic network may harbor ill will toward the Ethereum network. These users may attempt to negatively impact the use or adoption of the Ethereum network. Investors may invest in ETH through means other than the Shares, including through direct investments in ETH and other potential financial vehicles, possibly including securities backed by or linked to ETH and digital asset financial vehicles similar to the Trust, or other futures-based products. Market and financial conditions, and other conditions beyond the Sponsor’s control, may make it more attractive to invest in other financial vehicles or to invest in ETH directly, which could limit the market for, and reduce the liquidity of, the Shares. In addition, to the extent digital asset financial vehicles other than the Trust tracking the price of ETH are formed and represent a significant proportion of the demand for ETH, large purchases or redemptions of the securities of these digital asset financial vehicles, or private funds holding ETH, could negatively affect the Index, the Trust’s ETH holdings, the price of the Shares, the net asset value of the Trust and the NAV. 46 Failure of funds that hold digital assets to receive SEC approval to list their shares on exchanges could adversely affect the value of the Shares. There have been a growing a number of attempts to list on national securities exchanges the shares of funds that hold digital assets. These investment vehicles attempt to provide institutional and retail investors exposure to markets for digital assets and related products. The exchange listing of shares of digital asset funds would create more opportunities for institutional and retail investors to invest in the digital asset market. However, the SEC has repeatedly denied such requests. If exchange-listing requests continue to be denied by the SEC, increased investment interest by institutional or retail investors could fail to materialize, which could reduce the demand for digital assets generally and therefore adversely affect the value of the Shares. Risks Associated with the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate The MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate has a limited history. The MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate was developed by MarketVector and has a limited history. MarketVector has substantial discretion at any time to change the methodology used to calculate the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, including the constituent trading platforms that contribute prices to the Trust’s NAV. MarketVector does not have any obligation to take the needs of the Trust, the Trust’s Shareholders, or anyone else into consideration in connection with such changes. There is no guarantee that the methodology currently used in calculating the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate will appropriately track the price of ETH in the future. The MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is based on various inputs which may include price data from various third-party trading platforms and markets. MarketVector does not guarantee the validity of any of these inputs, which may be subject to technological error, manipulative activity, or fraudulent reporting from their initial source. The MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate could be calculated now or in the future in a way that adversely affects an investment in the Trust. The MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate could fail to track the global ETH price, and a failure of the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Although the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is intended to accurately capture the market price of ETH, third parties may be able to purchase and sell ETH on public or private markets not included among the constituent trading platforms used in calculating the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, and such transactions may take place at prices materially higher or lower than the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. Moreover, there may be variances in the prices of ethereum on the various constituent trading platforms used in calculating the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, including as a result of differences in fee structures or administrative procedures on different trading platforms. For example, the Bullish platform employs a proprietary order book combining a traditional limit order book with automated market maker instructions. As their automated market maker relies on a mathematical formula and does not rely on any external pricing data or third-party source, differences in the bids and asks placed by the automated market maker compared to prices offered by other digital currency trading venues, or other external market data sources, for the same digital assets may emerge. While the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate provides a U.S. dollar-denominated composite index for the price of ETH based on, at any given time, the prices on each such constituent trading platforms or pricing source may not be equal to the value of an ETH as represented by the Index. It is possible that the price of ETH on the ETH trading platforms could be materially higher or lower than the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate price. To the extent the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate price differs materially from the actual prices available on a ETH trading platforms used to calculate it, or the global market price of ETH, the price of the Shares may no longer track, whether temporarily or over time, the global market price of ETH, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust by reducing investors’ confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ETH. To the extent such prices differ materially from the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, investors may lose confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ETH, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares. If the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is not available, the Trust’s holdings may be fair valued in accordance with the policy approved by the Sponsor. To the extent the valuation determined in accordance with the policy approved by the Sponsor differs materially from the actual market price of ETH, the price of the Shares may no longer track, whether temporarily or over time, the global market price of ETH, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust by reducing investors’ confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the global market price of ETH. To the extent such prices differ materially from the market price for ETH, investors may lose confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ETH, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Marketvector has analyzed ETH trading platform data and developed insights that have informed Marketvector’s understanding of the ETH market and the design of the Trust. If such data or insights are inaccurate or incorrect, the value of an investment in the Trust may be adversely affected. 47 MarketVector has relied upon ETH market data in developing its analysis of the ETH market. This analysis has informed MarketVector’s understanding of the ETH market, the design of the Trust and the design of the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. The continued viability of the Trust relies upon access to accurate data, and MarketVector’s continued ability to effectively analyze such data. If data is inaccurate or becomes unavailable, or if MarketVector’s analysis of such data is incorrect, the value of an investment in the Trust may be adversely affected. The MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate used to calculate the value of the Trust’s ETH may be volatile, adversely affecting the value of the Shares. The price of ETH on public digital asset trading platforms has a limited history, and during this history, ETH prices on the digital asset markets more generally, and on digital asset exchanges individually, have been volatile and subject to influence by many factors, including operational interruptions. While the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is designed to limit exposure to the interruption of individual digital asset trading platforms, the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, and the price of ETH generally, remains subject to volatility experienced by digital asset trading platforms, and such volatility could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Furthermore, because the number of liquid and credible ETH trading platforms is limited, the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate will necessarily be composed of a limited number of ETH trading platforms. If a ETH trading platform were subjected to regulatory, volatility or other pricing issues, in the case of the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, the calculation agent would have limited ability to remove such ETH trading platform from the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, which could skew the price of ETH as represented by the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. Trading on a limited number of ETH trading platform may result in less favorable prices and decreased liquidity of ETH and, therefore, could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Purchasing activity associated with acquiring ETH required for the creation of Baskets may increase the market price of ethereum on the digital asset markets, which will result in higher prices for the Shares. Increases in the market price of ETH may also occur as a result of the purchasing activity of other market participants. Other market participants may attempt to benefit from an increase in the market price of ETH that may result from increased purchasing activity of ETH connected with the issuance of Baskets. Consequently, the market price of ETH may decline immediately after Baskets are created. Decreases in the market price of ETH may also occur as a result of sales in secondary markets by other market participants. If the Index price declines, the value of the Shares will generally also decline. The MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be affected by manipulative or fraudulent practices in the global ETH market or at constituent trading platforms . The global ETH market may be subject to fraud and manipulation, see “—Due to the unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of ETH trading platforms, which may be subject to regulation in a relevant jurisdiction, but may not be complying, they may experience fraud, manipulation, security failures or operational problems, which may adversely affect the value of ETH and, consequently, the value of the Shares,” and the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be affected to the extent they cause global prices of ETH to be subject to factors other than bona fide market forces. Fraud or manipulation may also affect the constituent trading platforms used to calculate the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. For example, Coinbase paid $6.5 million in 2021 to settle a CFTC enforcement action for reckless false, misleading, or inaccurate reporting as well as wash trading by a former employee on Coinbase’s GDAX platform. According to the CFTC’s order, during the relevant period prior to the enforcement action, Coinbase operated at least two trading programs which generated orders that, at times, matched with one another. Coinbase included the transactional information for these transactions, such as price and volume data, on its website and provided that information to reporting services, either directly or through access to its website, resulting in a perceived volume and level of liquidity of digital assets, including ethereum, on GDAX that was false, misleading or inaccurate. Additionally, between August and September 2016, the CFTC order finds that a former Coinbase employee intentionally placed buy and sell orders in the Litecoin/Bitcoin trading pair on GDAX, which he intended to match with one another and result in no loss or gain while creating the appearance of liquidity and trading interest in Litecoin. Ultimately, the transactions resulted in wash transactions that depicted a misleading picture of the Litecoin/Bitcoin market. In August 2017, it was reported that a trader or group of traders nicknamed “Spoofy” was placing large orders on Bitfinex without actually executing them, presumably in order to influence other investors into buying or selling by creating a false 48 appearance that greater demand existed in the market. In December 2017, an anonymous blogger (publishing under the pseudonym Bitfinex’d) cited publicly available trading data to support his or her claim that a trading bot nicknamed “Picasso” was pursuing a paint-the-tape-style manipulation strategy by buying and selling bitcoin and bitcoin cash between affiliated accounts in order to create the appearance of substantial trading activity and thereby influence the price of such assets. To the Trust’s and Sponsor’s actual knowledge, no regulator has brought charges against Bitfinex in connection with such reports, which remain unverified, and the sources of the reports remain anonymous. The Trust and Sponsor have no actual knowledge of the factual truth or falsity of such reports. Fraudulent and manipulative trading practices remain a risk at many cryptocurrency trading platforms. To the extent they occur at constituent trading platforms used to calculate the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, they could cause the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate to report inaccurate prices of ETH, causing the NAV of the Trust to be calculated incorrectly and thereby causing Shareholders to suffer losses. The Index Administrator could experience system failures or errors. If the computers or other facilities of the index administrator, data providers and/or relevant constituent ETH platforms malfunction for any reason, calculation and dissemination of the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be delayed. Errors in the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate data, the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate computations and/or construction may occur from time to time and may not be identified and/or corrected for a period of time or at all, which may have an adverse impact on the Trust and the Shareholders. Any of the foregoing may lead to the errors in the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, which may lead to a different investment outcome for the Trust and the Shareholders than would have been the case had such events not occurred. The MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate Price being used to determine the net asset value of the trust may not be consistent with GAAP. To the extent that the Trust’s financial statements are determined using a different pricing source that is consistent with GAAP, the net asset value reported in the Trust’s periodic financial statements may differ, in some cases significantly, from the Trust’s net asset value determined using the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate Pricing. The Trust will determine the NAV of the Trust on each Business Day based on the value of ETH as reflected by the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. The methodology used to calculate the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate to value ETH in determining the net asset value of the Trust may not be deemed consistent with GAAP. To the extent the methodology used to calculate the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is deemed inconsistent with GAAP, the Trust will utilize a GAAP-consistent pricing source for purposes of the Trust’s periodic financial statements. Creation and redemption of Baskets, the Sponsor’s management fee and other expenses borne by the Trust will be determined using the Trust’s net asset value determined daily based on the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. Such net asset value of the Trust determined using the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may differ, in some cases significantly, from the net asset value reported in the Trust’s periodic financial statements. The Sponsor can remove the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate and use a different pricing or valuation methodology instead. Under the Trust Agreement, the Sponsor has the exclusive authority to select, remove, change, or replace the pricing or valuation methodology or policies used to value the Trust’s assets and determine NAV and NAV per Share, in its sole discretion. The Sponsor has the right to change the pricing source used to determine NAV and NAV per Share from the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate to a different source or index. To the extent that there are material changes to the pricing or valuation methodology or policies or the pricing source described within this paragraph, notification will be made to Shareholders via a prospectus supplement and/or a current report filed with the SEC. Intellectual property rights claims may adversely affect the Trust and the value of the Shares. The Sponsor is not aware of any intellectual property rights claims that may prevent the Trust from operating and holding ethereum. However, third parties may assert intellectual property rights claims relating to the operation of the Trust and the mechanics instituted for the investment in, holding of and transfer of ethereum. Regardless of the merit of an intellectual property or other legal action, any legal expenses to defend or payments to settle such claims would be extraordinary expenses that would be borne by the Trust through the sale or transfer of its ethereum. Additionally, a meritorious intellectual property rights claim could prevent the Trust from operating and force the Sponsor to terminate the Trust and liquidate its ethereum. As a result, an intellectual property rights claim against the Trust could adversely affect the value of the Shares. 49 Risk Associated with Investing in the Trust The value of the Shares may be influenced by a variety of factors unrelated to the value of ETH. The value of the Shares may be influenced by a variety of factors unrelated to the price of ETH and the ETH trading platforms included in the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate that may have an adverse effect on the price of the Shares. These factors include the following factors: ● Unanticipated problems or issues with respect to the mechanics of the Trust’s operations and the trading of the Shares may arise, including the Clearing Services, in particular due to the fact that the mechanisms and procedures governing the creation and redemption of the Shares and storage of ETH have been developed specifically for this product; ● The Trust could experience difficulties in operating and maintaining its technical infrastructure, including in connection with expansions or updates to such infrastructure, which are likely to be complex and could lead to unanticipated delays, unforeseen expenses and security vulnerabilities; ● The Trust could experience unforeseen issues relating to the performance and effectiveness of the security procedures used to protect the Trust’s account with the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian or the security procedures may not protect against all errors, software flaws or other vulnerabilities in the Trust’s technical infrastructure, which could result in theft, loss or damage of its assets; ● Service providers may default on or fail to perform their obligations or deliver services under their contractual agreements with the Trust, or decide to terminate their relationships with the Trust, for a variety of reasons, which could affect the Trust’s ability to operate; or ● If the Ethereum network introduces privacy enhancing features in the future, service providers may decide to terminate their relationships with the Trust due to concerns that the introduction of privacy enhancing features to the Ethereum network may increase the potential for ethereum to be used to facilitate crime, exposing such service providers to potential reputational harm. Any of these factors could affect the value of the Shares, either directly or indirectly through their effect on the Trust’s assets. The Trust is subject to market risk. Market risk refers to the risk that the market price of ETH held by the Trust will rise or fall, sometimes rapidly or unpredictably. An investment in the Shares is subject to market risk, including the possible loss of the entire principal of the investment. An investment in Shares of the Trust is different from directly owning ETH. The market value of Shares of the Trust may not have a direct relationship with the prevailing price of ETH, and changes in the prevailing price of ETH similarly will not necessarily result in a comparable change in the market value of Shares of the Trust. The performance of the Trust will not reflect the specific return an investor would realize if the investor actually held or purchased ETH directly. The differences in performance may be due to factors such as fees, transaction costs, operating hours of the Exchange and index tracking risk. Investors will also forgo certain rights conferred by owning ethereum directly, such as the right to claim airdrops, or to participate in Staking Activities. The NAV may not always correspond to the market price of ETH and, as a result, Baskets may be created or redeemed at a value that is different from the market price of the Shares. The NAV of the Trust will change as fluctuations occur in the market price of the Trust’s ETH holdings. Shareholders should be aware that the public trading price per Share may be different from the NAV for a number of reasons, including price volatility, trading activity, the closing of ETH trading platforms due to fraud, failure, security breaches or otherwise, and the fact that supply and demand forces at work in the secondary trading market for Shares are related, but not identical, to the supply and demand forces influencing the market price of ETH. 50 An Authorized Participant may be able to create or redeem a Basket at a discount or a premium to the public trading price per Share, and the Trust will therefore maintain its intended fractional exposure to a specific amount of ETH per Share. Shareholders also should note that the size of the Trust in terms of total ETH held may change substantially over time and as Baskets are created and redeemed. Authorized Participants’ buying and selling activity associated with the creation and redemption of Baskets may adversely affect an investment in the Shares of the Trust. Liquidity Provider’s purchases of ETH in connection with Basket creation orders may cause the price of ETH to increase, which will result in higher prices for the Shares. Increases in the ETH prices may also occur as a result of ETH purchases by other market participants who attempt to benefit from an increase in the market price of ETH when Baskets are created. The market price of ETH may therefore decline immediately after Baskets are created. Selling activity associated with sales of ETH by Liquidity Providers in connection with redemption orders may decrease the ETH prices, which will result in lower prices for the Shares. Decreases in ETH prices may also occur as a result of selling activity by other market participants. In addition to the effect that purchases and sales of ETH by Liquidity Providers may have on the price of ETH, sales and purchases of ETH by similar investment vehicles, including competing exchange-traded products in the United States and other global markets that do or seek to hold ETH, could impact the price of ETH. If the price of ETH declines, the trading price of the Shares will generally also decline. The inability of Liquidity Providers to hedge their ETH exposure may adversely affect the liquidity of Shares and the value of an investment in the Shares. Liquidity Providers will generally want to hedge their ETH exposure in connection with Basket creation and redemption orders, while Authorized Participants would generally want to hedge their exposure to the Trust’s Shares to the extent possible. To the extent Authorized Participants and/or Liquidity Providers are unable to hedge their exposure to the Trust’s Shares or ETH respectively due to market conditions (e.g., insufficient ETH liquidity in the market, inability to locate an appropriate hedge counterparty, etc.), such conditions may make it difficult to create or redeem Baskets or cause them to not participate in creating or redeeming Baskets. In addition, the hedging mechanisms employed by Authorized Participants and/or Liquidity Providers to hedge their exposure to the Trust’s Shares or ETH, respectively, may not function as intended, which may make it more difficult for them to enter into such transactions. Such events could negatively impact the market price of the Trust and the spread at which the Trust trades on the open market. To the extent Liquidity Providers turn to the market for exchange-traded futures contracts for ETH (“ETH Futures”) as well as the non-exchange traded ETH derivatives markets for their hedging needs in connection with their ETH sales to and purchases from the Trust, both the exchange-traded ETH Futures market and the non-exchange traded ETH derivatives markets have limited trading history and operational experience and may be less liquid, more volatile and more vulnerable to economic, market and industry changes than more established futures and derivatives markets. The liquidity of the market will depend on, among other things, the adoption of ETH and the commercial and speculative interest in the market for the ability to hedge against the price of ETH with exchange-traded ETH Futures and non-exchange traded ETH derivatives. There can be no assurance that such markets will be able to meet the hedging needs of Liquidity Providers, which could cause such Liquidity Providers to refrain from participation in the Trust’s creation and redemption processes, which could have adverse effects on Shareholders such as wider spreads, a breakdown of the arbitrage mechanism used to keep the Trust’s Shares trading in line with NAV of the Trust’s ETH holdings, and potentially a disruption of the creation or redemption processes altogether. If the process of creation and redemption of Baskets encounters any unanticipated difficulties, the possibility for arbitrage transactions by Authorized Participants intended to keep the price of the Shares closely linked to the price of ETH may not exist and, as a result, the price of the Shares may fall or otherwise diverge from NAV. The processes of creation and redemption of Shares (which depend on timely transfers of ETH to and by the ETH Custodian and through the Clearing Services) could be disrupted or encounter challenges due to, for example, the price volatility of ETH, the insolvency, business failure or interruption, default, failure to perform, security breach, or other problems affecting the ETH Custodian, in its capacity as ETH Custodian under the Custody Agreement and the provider of Clearing Services under the Clearing Agreement. Authorized Participants and Liquidity Providers, who would otherwise be willing to purchase or redeem Baskets or ETH, as applicable, to take advantage of any arbitrage opportunity arising from discrepancies between the price of the Shares and the price of the underlying ETH, may decide not to take the risk that, as a result of those difficulties, they may not be able to realize the profit they expect, and reduce their transactions with or even refrain entirely from transacting with the Trust, which could disrupt the processes of creation and redemption 51 of Shares. If such events rise to the level of an emergency or cause creations and redemptions of Shares to be impracticable, the Sponsor may suspend the process of creation and redemption of Baskets. Any disruptions to the process of creating and redeeming Shares could cause trading spreads, and the resulting premium or discount, on Shares compared to NAV to widen. Alternatively, in the case of a Ethereum network outage or other problems affecting the Ethereum network, the processing of transactions on the Ethereum network may be disrupted, which in turn may prevent Liquidity Providers, or Authorized Participants or their designees, from depositing or withdrawing ETH from their accounts at the ETH Custodian, which in turn could affect the creation or redemption of Baskets. If this is the case, the liquidity of the Shares may decline and the price of the Shares may fluctuate independently of the price of ETH and may fall or otherwise diverge from NAV. Furthermore, in the event that the market for ETH should become relatively illiquid and thereby materially restrict opportunities for arbitraging, the price of the Shares may diverge from the value of ETH. Creation Baskets may be created or redeemed in exchange for ETH or cash. At present, only certain Authorized Participants have the ability to support in-kind creation and redemption activity. The use of cash creations and redemptions, as opposed to in-kind creations and redemptions, creates transaction costs of buying and selling ETH that are not present in an in-kind model. These costs include the bid-ask spread along with the operational costs from the labor and overhead involved in calculating, executing, monitoring, and accounting for transactions in the ETH markets and related cash movements. Furthermore, there are timing costs involved in the risk that the ETH price moves between the time when the NAV is established for a creation/redemption and the time when the ETH is traded (“slippage”). In addition, Liquidity Providers must settle ETH transactions with the Trust within a contractually specified time period, subject to customary exceptions. If the Liquidity Provider fails to perform its obligations within the contractually specified time period, the Trust would seek to use an alternate Liquidity Provider to execute the ETH transaction. However, the pricing or terms of the ultimate ETH transaction conducted through the alternate Liquidity Provider, if one is available, after the failure of the original Liquidity Provider to perform its obligations could deviate, potentially significantly, from the pricing or terms of the transaction that the Trust originally entered with the original Liquidity Provider. Transaction costs and slippage would be reduced if the Trust were able to use an in-kind creation and redemption model. The Trust’s Authorized Participant Agreement provides that transaction costs and slippage related to Basket creation and redemption are the responsibility of the Authorized Participant. Whether Authorized Participants who are unable to support in-kind creation and redemption activity and Liquidity Providers as market participants will find it economically viable or commercially attractive to participate in a cash creation and redemption model for a ETH exchange-traded product like the Trust, including a cash creation and redemption model where the Trust selects the Liquidity Provider with whom it executes transactions to buy or sell ETH and the Authorized Participant is not permitted to designate the Liquidity Provider from whom ETH is purchased or sold in connection with the Authorized Participant’s Basket subscription or redemption, is not known; however, there is a risk they will not. If the Trust is unable to attract sufficient Authorized Participants and Liquidity Providers, it will be unable to maintain an efficient arbitrage mechanism for keeping the trading price of the Shares in line with NAV and the value of the underlying ETH held by the Trust, which could negatively affect Shareholders and cause them to purchase or sell Shares at a premium or discount to the value of the underlying ETH, causing losses; alternatively, it could be unable to operate, as there would be no parties who would be able to create new Shares or redeem existing Shares, leading to the Trust being unsuccessful commercially and the Sponsor deciding to terminate and wind up the Trust’s operations. In addition, a failure to settle ETH transactions with Liquidity Providers could disrupt the calculation of the Trust’s NAV or potentially cause inaccuracies in NAV calculation, which could disrupt the Trust’s operations or cause Shareholders to suffer losses. The lack of ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions of Shares could have adverse consequences for the Trust. Authorized Participants must be registered broker-dealers. Registered broker-dealers are subject to various requirements of the federal securities laws and rules, including financial responsibility rules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements. On May 15, 2025, the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets and FINRA’s Office of General Counsel stated that broker-dealers are permitted to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions in connection with spot crypto exchange-traded products; however, there has yet to be definitive regulatory guidance on the specific details of how registered broker-dealers can comply with SEC rules with regard to transacting in or holding spot ETH. Until further regulatory clarity emerges regarding whether registered broker-dealers can hold and deal in ETH under such rules, there is a risk that registered broker-dealers participating in the in-kind creation or redemption of Shares for ETH may be unable to demonstrate compliance with such requirements. While compliance with rules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements would be the broker-dealer’s responsibility, a national securities exchange is required to enforce compliance by its member broker-dealers with applicable federal securities law and rules. Only certain Authorized Participants, at present, have the ability to also, through their affiliates, support in-kind creation and redemption activity. 52 Even with the SEC staff’s recent statement that in-kind creations and redemptions are not prohibited by SEC regulations, the Trust’s limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions could result in the exchange-traded product arbitrage mechanism failing to function as efficiently as it otherwise would, leading to the potential for the Shares to trade at premiums or discounts to the NAV, and such premiums or discounts could be substantial. Furthermore, if cash creations or redemptions are unavailable, either due to the Sponsor’s decision to reject or suspend such orders, the unavailability of Liquidity Providers or otherwise, Authorized Participants will be limited in their ability to redeem or create Shares, in which case the arbitrage mechanism may not function as efficiently. This could result in impaired liquidity for the Shares, wider bid/ask spreads in secondary trading of the Shares and greater costs to investors and other market participants. In addition, the Trust’s limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions, and resulting relative reliance on cash creations and redemptions, could cause the Sponsor to halt or suspend the creation or redemption of Shares during times of market volatility or turmoil, among other consequences. Further, there can be no assurance that broker-dealers would be willing to serve as Authorized Participants with respect to the in-kind creation and redemption of Shares. Any of these factors could adversely affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares. The Shares may trade at a price that is at, above or below the Trust’s NAV per Share as a result of the non-current trading hours between the Exchange and the digital asset market. The Trust’s NAV per Share will fluctuate with changes in the market value of ethereum, and the Sponsor expects the trading price of the Shares to fluctuate in accordance with changes in the Trust’s NAV per Share, as well as market supply and demand. However, the Shares may trade on the Exchange at a price that is at, above or below the Trust’s NAV per Share for a variety of reasons. For example, the Exchange is open for trading in the Shares for a limited period each day, but the digital asset market is a 24-hour marketplace. During periods when the Exchange is closed but constituent trading platforms are open, significant changes in the price of ethereum on the digital asset market could result in a difference in performance between the value of ethereum as measured by the Index and the most recent NAV per Share or closing trading price. For example, if the price of ethereum on the digital asset market, and the value of ethereum as measured by the Index, move significantly in a negative direction after the close of the Exchange, the trading price of the Shares may “gap” down to the full extent of such negative price shift when the Exchange reopens. If the price of ethereum on the digital asset market drops significantly during hours the Exchange is closed, shareholders may not be able to sell their Shares until after the “gap” down has been fully realized, resulting in an inability to mitigate losses in a negative market. Even during periods when the Exchange is open, large constituent trading platforms (or a substantial number of smaller constituent trading platforms) may be lightly traded or closed for any number of reasons, which could increase trading spreads and widen any premium or discount on the Shares. The liquidity of the Shares may also be affected by the withdrawal from participation of Authorized Participants or Liquidity Providers. In the event that one or more Authorized Participants or Liquidity Providers withdraw from or cease participation in creation and redemption activity or ETH transactions with the Trust for any reason, the liquidity of the Shares will likely decrease, which could adversely affect the market price of the Shares and result in your incurring a loss on your investment in Shares. The Trust is subject to risks due to its concentration of investments in a single asset class. Unlike other funds that may invest in diversified assets, the Trust’s investment strategy is concentrated in a single asset class: ETH. This concentration maximizes the degree of the Trust’s exposure to a variety of market risks associated with ETH. By concentrating its investment strategy solely in ETH, any losses suffered as a result of a decrease in the value of ETH can be expected to reduce the value of an interest in the Trust and will not be offset by other gains if the Trust were to invest in underlying assets that were diversified. An investment in the Trust may be deemed speculative and is not intended as a complete investment program. An investment in Shares should be considered only by persons financially able to maintain their investment and who can bear the risk of total loss associated with an investment in the Trust. Investors should review closely the objective and strategy of the Trust and redemption rights, as discussed herein, and familiarize themselves with the risks associated with an investment in the Trust. 53 The lack of active trading markets for the Shares of the Trust may result in losses on Shareholders’ investments at the time of disposition of Shares. Although Shares of the Trust are expected to be publicly listed and traded on an exchange, there can be no guarantee that an active trading market for the Trust will develop or be maintained. If Shareholders need to sell their Shares at a time when no active market for them exists, the price Shareholders receive for their Shares, assuming that Shareholders are able to sell them, likely will be lower than the price that Shareholders would receive if an active market did exist and, accordingly, a Shareholder may suffer losses. Possible illiquid markets may exacerbate losses, increase the variability between the Trust’s NAV and its market price or affect the Trust’s ability to meet cash Creation Orders and Redemption Orders. ETH is a relatively new asset with a limited trading history. Therefore, the markets for ETH may be less liquid and more volatile than other markets for more established products. It may be difficult to execute a ETH trade at a specific price when there is a relatively small volume of buy and sell orders in the ETH market. A market disruption can also make it more difficult to liquidate a position or find a suitable counterparty at a reasonable cost. Market illiquidity may cause losses for the Trust. The large size of the positions that the Trust may acquire will increase the risk of illiquidity by both making the positions more difficult to liquidate and increasing the losses incurred while trying to do so should the Trust need to liquidate its ETH, or making it more difficult for Authorized Participants to acquire or liquidate ETH as part of the creation and/or redemption of Shares of the Trust. To the extent that the Trust conducts creation and redemption transactions for cash, such illiquidity may affect the Trust’s ability to meet such cash creation and redemption orders. Any type of disruption or illiquidity will potentially be exacerbated due to the fact that the Trust will typically invest in ETH, which is highly concentrated. The Trust is an “emerging growth company” and it cannot be certain if the reduced disclosure requirements applicable to emerging growth companies will make the Shares less attractive to investors. The Trust is an “emerging growth company” as defined in the JOBS Act. For as long as the Trust continues to be an emerging growth company it may choose to take advantage of certain exemptions from various reporting requirements applicable to other public companies but not to emerging public companies, which include, among other things: ● exemption from the auditor attestation requirements under Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; ● reduced disclosure obligations regarding executive compensation in the Trust’s periodic reports and audited financial statements in this Report; exemptions from the requirements of holding advisory “say-on-pay” votes on executive compensation and shareholder advisory votes on “golden parachute” compensation; and ● exemption from any rules requiring mandatory audit firm rotation and auditor discussion and analysis and, unless otherwise determined by the SEC, any new audit rules adopted by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The Trust could be an emerging growth company until the last day of the fiscal year following the fifth anniversary after its initial public offering, or until the earliest of (1) the last day of the fiscal year in which it has annual gross revenue of $1.235 billion or more, (2) the date on which it has, during the previous three year period, issued more than $1 billion in non-convertible debt or (3) the date on which it is deemed to be a large accelerated filer under the federal securities laws. The Trust will qualify as a large accelerated filer as of the first day of the first fiscal year after it has (A) more than $700 million in outstanding equity held by nonaffiliates, (B) been public for at least 12 months and (C) filed at least one annual report on Form 10-K. Under the JOBS Act, emerging growth companies are also permitted to elect to delay adoption of new or revised accounting standards until companies that are not subject to periodic reporting obligations are required to comply, if such accounting standards apply to non-reporting companies. However, the Trust has chosen to opt out of this extended transition period for complying with new or revised accounting standards. Section 107 of the JOBS Act provides that the decision to opt out of the extended transition period for complying with new or revised accounting standards is irrevocable. The Trust cannot predict if investors will find an investment in the Trust less attractive if it relies on these exemptions. Several factors may affect the Trust’s ability to achieve its investment objective on a consistent basis. 54 There is no guarantee that the Trust will meet its investment objective. Factors that may affect the Trust’s ability to meet its investment objective include, without limitation: (1) Liquidity Providers’ ability and willingness to purchase and sell ETH in an efficient manner to effectuate creation and redemption orders; (2) transaction fees associated with the Ethereum network; (3) the ETH market becoming illiquid or disrupted; (4) the Trust’s Share prices being rounded to the nearest cent and/or valuation methodologies; (5) the need to conform the Trust’s portfolio holdings to comply with investment restrictions or policies or regulatory or tax law requirements; (6) early or unanticipated closings of the markets on which ETH trades, resulting in the inability of Liquidity Providers to execute intended portfolio transactions; (7) accounting standards; (8) Authorized Participants refraining from participating in creation and redemption of Baskets; and (9) the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate becoming disrupted or unavailable. The amount of ETH represented by the Shares will decline over time. The amount of ETH represented by the Shares will continue to be reduced during the life of the Trust due to the transfer of the Trust’s ETH to pay for the Sponsor Fee, and to pay for litigation expenses or other extraordinary expenses. This dynamic will occur irrespective of whether the trading price of the Shares rises or falls in response to changes in the price of ETH. Although the Sponsor has agreed to assume all fees and other expenses incurred by the Trust in the ordinary course of its affairs incurred by the Trust, not all Trust expenses have been assumed by the Sponsor. For example, any taxes and other governmental charges that may be imposed on the Trust’s property will not be paid by the Sponsor. Each outstanding Share represents a fractional, undivided interest in the ETH held by the Trust. The Trust does not generate any income and transfers ETH to pay for the Sponsor Fee, and to pay for litigation expenses or other extraordinary expenses. Therefore, the amount of ETH represented by each Share will gradually decline over time. This is also true with respect to Shares that are issued in exchange for additional deposits of ETH over time, as the amount of ETH required to create Shares proportionally reflects the amount of ETH represented by the Shares outstanding at the time of such creation unit being created. Assuming a constant ETH price, the trading price of the Shares is expected to gradually decline relative to the price of ETH as the amount of ETH represented by the Shares gradually declines. Shareholders should be aware that the gradual decline in the amount of ETH represented by the Shares will occur regardless of whether the trading price of the Shares rises or falls in response to changes in the price of ETH. The Trust is a passive investment vehicle. The Trust is not actively managed and will be affected by a general decline in the price of ETH. The Sponsor does not actively manage the ETH held by the Trust. This means that the Sponsor does not sell ETH at times when its price is high, or acquire ETH at low prices in the expectation of future price increases. It also means that the Sponsor does not make use of any of the hedging techniques available to professional ETH investors to attempt to reduce the risks of losses resulting from price decreases. Any losses sustained by the Trust will adversely affect the value of your Shares. The development and commercialization of the Trust is subject to competitive pressures. The Trust and the Sponsor face competition with respect to the creation of competing products, including with respect to the potential creation of competing exchange-traded ETH products. If the SEC were to approve many or all of the currently pending applications for such exchange-traded ETH products, many or all of such products, including the Trust, could fail to acquire substantial assets, initially or at all. Such competing products may become available for public exchange trading before the Trust and/or have a lower expense ratio than the Trust, which could have a detrimental effect on the scale and sustainability of the Trust. The Sponsor’s charge a substantially lower fee than the Sponsor’s Fee in order to achieve initial market acceptance and scale and competitors may have greater financial, technical and human resources than the Sponsor. These competitors may also compete with the Sponsor in recruiting and retaining qualified personnel. Smaller or early stage companies may also prove to be effective competitors, particularly through collaborative arrangements with large and established companies. Accordingly, the Sponsor’s competitors may commercialize a product involving ethereum more rapidly or effectively than the Sponsor is able to, which could adversely affect the Sponsor’s competitive position, the likelihood that the Trust will achieve initial market acceptance and the Sponsor’s ability to generate meaningful revenues from the Trust. If the Trust fails to achieve sufficient scale due to competition, the Sponsor may have difficulty raising sufficient revenue to cover the costs associated with launching and maintaining the Trust and such shortfalls could impact the Sponsor’s ability to properly invest in robust ongoing operations and controls of 55 the Trust to minimize the risk of operating events, errors, or other forms of losses to the Shareholders. In addition, the Trust may also fail to attract adequate liquidity in the secondary market due to such competition, resulting in a sub-standard number of Authorized Participants willing to make a market in the Shares, which in turn could result in a significant premium or discount in the Shares for extended periods and the Trust’s failure to reflect the performance of the price of ETH. Security threats to the Trust’s account with the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian could result in the halting of Trust operations and a loss of Trust assets or damage to the reputation of the Trust, each of which could result in a reduction in the price of the Shares. Security breaches, computer malware and computer hacking attacks have been a prevalent concern in relation to digital assets. The Sponsor believes that the Trust’s ETH held in the Trust’s ETH Account and Clearing Account with the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Account with the Additional ETH Custodian will be an appealing target to hackers or malware distributors seeking to destroy, damage or steal the Trust’s ETH and will only become more appealing as the Trust’s assets grow. To the extent that the Trust, the Sponsor, the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian is unable to identify and mitigate or stop new security threats or otherwise adapt to technological changes in the digital asset industry, the Trust’s ETH may be subject to theft, loss, destruction or other attack. The Sponsor has evaluated the security procedures in place for safeguarding the Trust’s ETH. Nevertheless, the security procedures cannot guarantee the prevention of any loss due to a security breach, hack, software defect or act of God that may be borne by the Trust and the security procedures may not protect against all errors, software flaws or other vulnerabilities in the Trust’s technical infrastructure, which could result in theft, loss or damage of its assets. The Sponsor does not control the ETH Custodian’s or the Additional ETH Custodian’s operations or implementation of such security procedures and there can be no assurance that such security procedures will actually work as designed or prove to be successful in safeguarding the Trust’s assets against all possible sources of theft, loss or damage. The security procedures and operational infrastructure may be breached due to the actions of outside parties, error or malfeasance of an employee of the Sponsor, the ETH Custodian, the Additional ETH Custodian or otherwise, and, as a result, an unauthorized party may obtain access to the Trust’s account with the ETH Custodian, the private keys (and therefore ETH) or other data of the Trust. Additionally, outside parties may attempt to fraudulently induce employees of the Sponsor, the ETH Custodian, the Additional ETH Custodian or the Trust’s other service providers to disclose sensitive information in order to gain access to the Trust’s infrastructure. As the techniques used to obtain unauthorized access, disable or degrade service, or sabotage systems change frequently, or may be designed to remain dormant until a predetermined event and often are not recognized until launched against a target, the Sponsor, the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian may be unable to anticipate these techniques or implement adequate preventative measures. The ETH Custodian is also dependent on key service providers, including, without limitation, its data centers, and if these were to cease operation or be the subject of operational problems or security threats, it could affect the Trust’s ETH Account or Clearing Account with the ETH Custodian. An actual or perceived breach of the Trust’s ETH Account or Clearing Account with the ETH Custodian or Additional ETH Account with the Additional ETH Custodian could harm the Trust’s operations, result in partial or total loss of the Trust’s assets, damage the Trust’s reputation and negatively affect the market perception of the effectiveness of the Trust, all of which could in turn reduce demand for the Shares, resulting in a reduction in the price of the Shares. The Trust may also cease operations, the occurrence of which could similarly result in a reduction in the price of the Shares. The Clearing Account permits hot storage which is less secure than cold storage. Although the Custody Agreement requires the ETH Custodian to hold the Trust’s ETH in its ETH Account in cold storage, ETH may be temporarily stored in an omnibus hot storage wallet associated with the Trust’s Clearing Account in connection with both creations and redemptions, as well as in connection with transfers of ETH out of the Trust to pay the Sponsor Fee and to reimburse the Sponsor in ETH for payment of reimbursable extraordinary expenses paid by the Sponsor. Cold storage is a safeguarding method by which the private key(s) corresponding to ETH is (are) generated and stored in an offline manner. Private keys are generated in offline computers or devices that are not connected to the internet so that they are more resistant to being hacked. By contrast, in hot storage, the private keys are held online, where they are more accessible, leading to more efficient transfers, though they are potentially more vulnerable to being hacked or stolen. 56 If a Liquidity Provider Agreement, the Custody Agreement, the Additional ETH Custody Agreement, an Authorized Participant Agreement or Clearing Agreement is terminated or a Liquidity Provider, an Authorized Participant, the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian fails to participate in the creation or redemption processes of the Trust or fails to provide services as required, the Sponsor may need to find and appoint a replacement Liquidity Provider, Authorized Participant, the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian quickly, which could pose a challenge to the Trust’s ability to create and redeem Shares or the safekeeping of the Trust’s ETH, and the Trust’s ability to continue to operate may be adversely affected. The Trust is dependent on the ETH Custodian to operate, pursuant to the Custody Agreement and the Clearing Agreement. The ETH Custodian performs essential functions in terms of safekeeping the Trust’s ETH and, via the Clearing Services, facilitates the transfer of ethereum to the Trust by Liquidity Providers and from the Trust in connection with creations and redemptions and to pay the Sponsor Fee and extraordinary Trust expenses, and in extraordinary circumstances, to liquidate the Trust. If the ETH Custodian fails to perform the functions it performs for the Trust, the Trust may be unable to operate or create or redeem Baskets, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares. The Sponsor could decide to replace the ETH Custodian as a custodian of the Trust’s ETH, pursuant to the Custody Agreement. Similarly, the ETH Custodian under the Custody Agreement and Clearing Agreement may terminate the Custody Agreement and Clearing Agreement respectively upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately, upon the occurrence of a Termination Event (as defined below) that is incapable of being cured within ten business days or if it determines in its sole discretion it is necessary to take such action to comply with applicable laws and regulations or in connection with Gemini’s fraud or other compliance program. Under the Custody Agreement, a “Termination Event” occurs when (i) any representation, warranty, certification or statement made by the Trust was or becomes incorrect in any material respect when made; (ii) the Trust materially breaches, or fails in any material respect to perform any of its obligations under the Custody Agreement; (iii) the Trust requests a postponement of maturity or a moratorium with respect to any indebtedness or is adjudged bankrupt or insolvent, or there is commenced against the Trust a case under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or other similar law now or hereafter in effect, or the Trust files a petition for bankruptcy or an application for an arrangement with its creditors, seeks or consents to the appointment of a receiver, administrator or other similar official for all or any substantial part of its property, admits in writing its inability to pay its debts as they mature, or takes any corporate action in furtherance of any of the foregoing, or fails to meet applicable legal minimum capital requirements; or (iv) a change of control of the Trust, or an event, change or development that causes or is likely to cause a material adverse effect on the Trust, or in the ability of the Trust to fulfill its responsibilities under the Custody Agreement, occurs. Transferring maintenance responsibilities of the Trust’s account at the ETH Custodian to another custodian may be complex and could subject the Trust’s ETH to the risk of loss during the transfer, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets. Also, if the ETH Custodian becomes insolvent, suffers business failure, ceases business operations, defaults on or fails to perform its obligations under the Custody Agreement or Clearing Agreement with the Trust, or abruptly discontinues the services it provides to the Trust for any reason, the Trust’s operations would be adversely affected. On October 19, 2023, Gemini, the ETH Custodian for the Trust, was named in a complaint filed by the New York Attorney General (“NYAG Lawsuit”) against Gemini and other entities, including Genesis and its affiliates (collectively, the “Genesis Entities”) in a New York state court, alleging, inter alia, that Gemini had violated New York’s Martin Act by soliciting money from the public, including persons in New York, with false assurances that an investment program called Gemini Earn, pursuant to which customers of Gemini could deposit money in Earn accounts at Gemini that would then be loaned to the Genesis Entities and repaid with interest by them, was a highly liquid investment and that Genesis was a creditworthy borrower based on the ETH Custodian’s ongoing risk monitoring. On February 9, 2024, NYAG amended its lawsuit to add additional allegations against defendants other than Gemini. No new allegations were made against Gemini as part of the February 9 amendments. On April 19, 2024, the United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York in the Genesis bankruptcy proceedings, approved a settlement that allowed for certain payments, on an in-kind “coin-for-coin” basis, to be made. Gemini made certain payments, on an in-kind “coin-for-coin” basis to Gemini Earn investors on May 29, 2024, however these investors were not made completely whole and were still owed approximately $50 million in cryptocurrency. On June 14, 2024, Gemini and NYAG entered into a Stipulation and Consent to Judgement which resolves claims against Gemini set out in the NYAG Lawsuit as described above (the “NYAG Settlement”). As part of the NYAG Settlement, Gemini will return approximately $50 million worth of digital assets to investors of the Gemini Earn program who were entitled to receive, and did receive, distributions from Gemini on May 29, 2024. Gemini will be required to make such full and complete restitution on an in-kind “coin-for-coin” basis. Additionally, Gemini will be banned from operating any cryptocurrency lending program in New York, unless a future state or federal legislation specifically permits cryptocurrency lending programs in or from the State of New York at which point NYAG’s consent shall be required. 57 On February 28, 2024, Gemini and the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) announced that they had entered into an administrative consent settlement agreement (the “NYDFS Settlement”) that included findings, primarily with respect to the Gemini Earn program, that Gemini had conducted some of its business in an unsafe and unsound manner, made false or misleading advertising statements, and failed to maintain an effective customer due diligence program, and committed other violations of New York Banking Law and NYDFS regulations. Pursuant to this settlement, Gemini has agreed to ensure that at least $1.1 billion is returned to Gemini Earn users through the Genesis bankruptcy proceedings that are also creditors in the Genesis bankruptcy. In addition, Gemini has agreed to contribute at least $40 million for the benefit of impacted Gemini Earn users and pay a $37 million fine to NYDFS. In determining the appropriate amount of the penalty, the NYDFS acknowledged and commended Gemini’s cooperation and recognized Gemini’s engagement with the NYDFS on the matters identified in the NYDFS Settlement and its ongoing efforts to remediate the shortcomings identified in the NYDFS Settlement and during the NYDFS’ most recent examination of Gemini. Additionally, pursuant to the NYDFS Settlement, Gemini agreed to provide an action plan to NYDFS including implementing the recommendations of an outside consultant in connection with a governance and management assessment, continuing to strengthen its controls, policies and procedures to ensure robust compliance programs in connection with its virtual currency business activity, and continuing its cooperation with the NYDFS to remediate the violations identified in the NYDFS Settlement and previous examinations. The NYDFS Settlement also reserves the NYDFS’s right to bring an action against Gemini if Gemini fails to fulfill its obligations under NYDFS Settlement. The NYDFS Settlement does not resolve any other regulatory proceedings or litigation involving Gemini. As a regulated entity with financial services licenses in multiple jurisdictions, it is possible that other regulators may decide to initiate their own action with respect to Gemini based on the findings contained in the NYDFS Settlement. Gemini, as the ETH Custodian, could be required, as a result of judicial or regulatory determinations, or could choose, to restrict or curtail the services it offers (whether in or from New York State or generally), its licenses could be impacted, or its financial condition and ability to provide services to the Trust could be affected as a result of the NYDFS Settlement, NYAG Settlement, or other litigation. If the ETH Custodian were to be required or choose, as a result of the NYDFS Settlement, NYAG Settlement, or other litigation or regulatory action, to restrict, curtail, or terminate the services it offers, it could negatively affect the Trust’s ability to operate, hold ethereum, or process creations or redemptions of Baskets, which could force the Trust to engage an alternate ETH custodian or to liquidate and could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Similarly, the Additional ETH Custodian performs essential functions in terms of safekeeping the Trust’s ETH in the Additional ETH Vault Balance. If the Additional ETH Custodian fails to perform the functions they perform for the Trust, the Trust may be unable to operate or create or redeem Baskets, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares. On March 22, 2023, Coinbase, Inc., which is an affiliate of the Additional ETH Custodian, and its parent (such parent, “Coinbase Global” and together with Coinbase Inc., the “Relevant Coinbase Entities”) received a “Wells Notice” from the SEC staff stating that the SEC staff made a “preliminary determination” to recommend that the SEC file an enforcement action against the Relevant Coinbase Entities alleging violations of the federal securities laws, including the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. According to Coinbase Global’s public reporting company disclosure, based on discussions with the SEC staff, the Relevant Coinbase Entities believe these potential enforcement actions would relate to aspects of the Relevant Coinbase Entities’ Coinbase Prime service, spot market, staking service Coinbase Earn, and Coinbase Wallet, and the potential civil action may seek injunctive relief, disgorgement, and civil penalties. On June 6, 2023, the SEC filed a complaint against the Relevant Coinbase Entities in federal district court in the Southern District of New York, alleging, inter alia: (i) that Coinbase Inc. has violated the Exchange Act by failing to register with the SEC as a national securities exchange, broker-dealer, and clearing agency, in connection with activities involving certain identified digital assets that the SEC’s complaint alleges are securities, (ii) that Coinbase Inc. has violated the Securities Act by failing to register with the SEC the offer and sale of its staking program, and (iii) that Coinbase Global is jointly and severally liable as a control person under the Exchange Act for Coinbase Inc.’s violations of the Exchange Act to the same extent as Coinbase Inc. The SEC’s complaint against the Relevant Coinbase Entities does not allege that ethereum is a security nor does it allege that Coinbase Inc’s activities involving ethereum caused the alleged registration violations, and the Additional Ethereum Custodian was not named as a defendant. The SEC’s complaint seeks a permanent injunction against the Relevant Coinbase Entities to prevent them from violations of the Exchange Act or Securities Act, disgorgement, civil monetary penalties, and such other relief as the court deems appropriate or necessary. While the Additional Ethereum Custodian is not named in the complaint, if Coinbase Global, as the parent of the Additional ETH Custodian, is required, as a result of a judicial determination, or could choose, to restrict or curtail the services its subsidiaries provide to the Trust, or its financial condition is negatively affected, it could negatively affect the Trust’s ability to operate. 58 Alternatively, the Sponsor could decide to replace the Additional ETH Custodian as a custodian of the Trust’s ETH, pursuant to the Additional Custodial Services Agreement (the “Additional ETH Custody Agreement”). Similarly, the Additional ETH Custodian could terminate services under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement for any reason and without Cause upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately for Cause (“Cause” is defined in the Additional ETH Custody Agreement as (i) the Trust breaches any provision of the Additional ETH Custody Agreement and such breach is not cured within three (3) business days after notice of such breach is given to the Trust in the case of a payment-related breach or is not cured within ten (10) business days after notice of such breach is given to the Trust; (ii) the Trust takes any action to dissolve or liquidate (iii) the Trust becomes insolvent, makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, becomes subject to direct control of a trustee, receiver or similar authority; (iv) the Trust becomes subject to any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding; (v) the Additional ETH Custodian becomes aware of any facts or circumstances with respect to the Trust’s financial, legal, regulatory or reputational position which reasonably would materially adversely affect The Trust’s ability to comply with its obligations under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement, and such facts and circumstances cannot be cured within five (5) business days; (vi) termination is required pursuant to a facially valid subpoena, court order or binding order of a government authority; (vii) the Trust’s Additional ETH Account is subject to any pending litigation, investigation or government proceeding; or (viii) the Additional ETH Custodian reasonably suspects the Trust of attempting to circumvent the Additional ETH Custodian’s controls in a manner the Additional ETH Custodian otherwise deems inappropriate or potentially harmful to itself or third parties.) Transferring maintenance responsibilities of the Trust’s account at the Additional ETH Custodian to another custodian may be complex and could subject the Trust’s ETH to the risk of loss during the transfer, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets. Also, if the Additional ETH Custodian becomes insolvent, suffers business failure, ceases business operations, default on or fail to perform their obligations under its contractual agreement with the Trust, or abruptly discontinue the services it provides to the Trust for any reason, the Trust’s operations including its creation and redemption processes would be adversely affected. The Sponsor may not be able to find a party willing to serve as the custodian or perform clearing services under the same terms as the current Custody Agreement, Additional ETH Custody Agreement and Clearing Agreement. To the extent that Sponsor is not able to find a suitable party willing to serve as the custodian or to perform clearing services, the Sponsor may be required to terminate the Trust and liquidate the Trust’s ETH. In addition, to the extent that the Sponsor finds a suitable party but must enter into a modified Custody Agreement, Additional ETH Custody Agreement or Clearing Agreement that is less favorable for the Trust or Sponsor, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected. If an Authorized Participant or a Liquidity Provider suffers insolvency, business failure or interruption, default, failure to perform, security breach, or if an Authorized Participant or a Liquidity Provider chooses not to participate in the creation and redemption processes of the Trust due to the risks described in “—The Inability Of Liquidity Providers To Hedge Their ETH Exposure May Adversely Affect The Liquidity Of Shares And The Value Of An Investment In The Shares” and “—If The Process Of Creation And Redemption Of Baskets Encounters Any Unanticipated Difficulties, The Possibility For Arbitrage Transactions By Authorized Participants Intended To Keep The Price Of The Shares Closely Linked To The Price Of ETH May Not Exist And, As A Result, The Price Of The shares May Fall Or Otherwise Diverge From NAV,” and the Trust is unable to engage replacement Authorized Participants or Liquidity Providers on commercially acceptable terms or at all, then the creation and redemption processes of the Trust or the arbitrage mechanism used to keep the Trust’s Shares trading in line with NAV could be negatively affected. The lack of full insurance and Shareholders’ limited rights of legal recourse against the Trust, Trustee, Sponsor, Administrator, Cash Custodian, ETH Custodian and Additional ETH Custodian expose the Trust and its Shareholders to the risk of loss of the Trust’s ethereum for which no person or entity is liable. Neither the Trust not the Sponsor insure the Trust’s ETH. The Trust is not a banking institution or otherwise a member of the FDIC or Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) and, therefore, deposits held with or assets held by the Trust are not subject to the protections enjoyed by depositors with FDIC or SIPC member institutions. The ETH Custodian currently maintains digital asset insurance consisting of a $100 million specie policy and a $25 million crime policy. Such insurance is shared with all other customers and clients of the ETH Custodian and is not specific to the Trust. Shareholders cannot be assured that either the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian will maintain adequate insurance in respect of the ETH they hold for the Trust, that such coverage will cover losses with respect to the Trust’s ETH, or that sufficient insurance proceeds will be available to cover the Trust’s losses in full. The ETH Custodian’s insurance may not cover the type of losses experienced by the Trust. 59 Alternatively, the Trust may be forced to share such insurance proceeds with other clients or customers of the ETH Custodian, which could reduce the amount of such proceeds that are available to the Trust. The Trust is not a named insured under the ETH Custodian’s insurance policies, though the ETH Custodian has represented to the Sponsor that the insurance covers customer losses, including losses suffered by the Trust, arising from specified events, including fraud, theft, and cybersecurity breaches. In addition, the ETH insurance market is limited, and the level of insurance maintained by the ETH Custodian may be substantially lower than the assets of the Trust, or the amount of claims against the ETH Custodian of all of the customers whose losses are covered by the ETH Custodian’s insurance coverage. While the ETH Custodian maintains certain capital reserve requirements depending on the assets under custody, and such capital reserves may provide additional means to cover client asset losses, the Trust cannot be assured that the ETH Custodian will maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover actual or potential losses with respect to the Trust’s digital assets. Furthermore, under the Custody Agreement, the ETH Custodian’s liability is limited in various ways, including that the ETH Custodian cannot be held responsible for any failure or delay to act by the ETH Custodian, its service providers, or its banks that is within the time limits permitted by the Custody Agreement, or that is caused by the Trust’s negligence or is required to comply with applicable laws and regulations. The ETH Custodian is not liable for any System Failure or Downtime (both as defined in the Custody Agreement), which prevents the ETH Custodian from fulfilling its obligations under the Custody Agreement, provided that ETH Custodian took reasonable care and used commercially reasonable efforts to prevent or limit such System Failures or Downtime and otherwise complied with the Custody Agreement. The Custody Agreement provides that “Downtime” means scheduled maintenance and a “System Failure” shall mean a failure of any computer hardware, software, computer systems, or telecommunications lines or devices used by the ETH Custodian, or interruption, loss, or malfunction of utility, data center, Internet or network provider services used by the ETH Custodian; provided, however, that a cybersecurity attack, data breach, hack, or other intrusion, or unauthorized disclosure by a third party, the ETH Custodian, a service provider to the ETH Custodian, or an agent or subcontractor of the ETH Custodian, shall not be deemed a System Failure, to the extent such events or any losses arising therefrom are due to the ETH Custodian’s failure to comply with its obligations under the Custody Agreement. The ETH Custodian cannot be held responsible for any circumstances beyond the ETH Custodian’s reasonable control, provided the ETH Custodian took reasonable care and used commercially reasonable efforts in executing its responsibilities to the Trust pursuant to the Custody Agreement, which includes exercising the degree of care, diligence and skill that a prudent and competent professional provider of services similar to the custodial services would exercise in the circumstances, or such higher care where required by law or the Custody Agreement (collectively, the “Standard of Care”). The ETH Custodian makes no guarantees regarding the ETH network’s security, functionality, or availability, and will not be liable for or in connection with any acts, decisions, or omissions made by developers of the ETH network. The ETH Custodian is not liable for any losses or claims arising out of actions that are in the Trust’s control and related to the Trust’s use of the ETH Custodian’s online platform, including but not limited to, the Trust’s failure to follow security protocols, the ETH Custodian’s platform controls, improper instructions, failure to secure the Trust’s credentials from third parties, or anything else in the Trust’s control and is also not liable for any amount greater than the value of the assets on deposit in Trust’s account at the ETH Custodian at the time of, and directly relating to, the events giving rise to the liability occurred, the value of which shall be determined in accordance with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Ethereum Reference Rate or any successor thereto. The ETH Custodian is not liable to the Trust (whether under contract, tort (including negligence) or otherwise) for any indirect, incidental, special, punitive or consequential losses suffered or incurred by the Trust (whether or not any such losses were foreseeable). The ETH Custodian is not liable to the Trust or anyone else for any loss or injury resulting directly or indirectly from any damage or interruptions caused by any computer viruses, spyware, scamware, trojan horses, worms, or other malware that may affect the Trust’s computer or other equipment, provided such malware did not originate from the ETH Custodian or its agents. The Custody Agreement’s “Force Majeure” provision provides that the ETH Custodian is not liable for delays, suspension of operations, failure in performance, or interruption of service to the extent it is directly due to a cause or condition beyond the reasonable control of the ETH Custodian including, but not limited to, any act of God, nuclear or natural disaster, epidemic, action or inaction of civil or military authorities, act of war, terrorism, sabotage, civil disturbance, strike or other labor dispute, accident, or state of emergency; provided, however, that for the avoidance of doubt, the Custody Agreement’s Force Majeure provision shall not apply in respect of System Failures or Downtime, which are subject to other respective provisions of the Custody Agreement. The occurrence of an event described in the Force Majeure provision shall not affect the validity and enforceability of any remaining provisions of the Custody Agreement. In the event of potential losses incurred by the Trust as a result of the ETH Custodian losing control of the Trust’s ETH or failing to properly execute instructions on behalf of the Trust, the ETH Custodian’s liability with respect to the Trust will be subject to certain limitations which may allow it to avoid liability for potential losses or may be insufficient to cover the value of such potential losses. Furthermore, the insurance maintained by the ETH Custodian may be insufficient to cover its liabilities to the Trust. Both the Trust and the ETH Custodian are required to indemnify each other under certain circumstances. 60 Subject to the Force Majeure provision and as limited by the limitations of liability in the Custody Agreement, the ETH Custodian shall be liable to the Trust for the Loss (defined below) of any of the Trust’s ETH or fiat currency to the extent that such Loss was caused by the negligence, fraud, willful or reckless misconduct of the ETH Custodian or breach by the ETH Custodian of its Standard of Care. The Custody Agreement provides that “Loss” means if, at any time the Trust’s ETH Account or Fiat Account, as applicable, does not hold the ETH or fiat currency that had been (1) received by ETH Custodian in connection with the Trust’s ETH Account or Fiat Account pursuant to the Custody Agreement, or (2) duly sent to the ETH Custodian by the Trust or Authorized Participants in connection with the Trust’s ETH Account pursuant to the Custody Agreement but not received because of a failure caused by the ETH Custodian. The Custody Agreement provides that “Loss” shall include situations where the ETH Custodian fails to execute a valid withdrawal request, ETH are withdrawn from the Trust’s ETH Account other than pursuant to a withdrawal request, or the Trust is not able to timely withdraw ETH from the ETH Account pursuant to a withdrawal request, in each case due to a failure caused by the ETH Custodian; provided, however, that the ETH Custodian’s failure to permit timely withdrawals because it has determined that it cannot do so due to the requirements of applicable laws and regulations or because of the operation of its fraud detection controls shall not be considered a Loss, provided the ETH Custodian is acting reasonably and in good faith. The Custody Agreement provides that should a Loss of the Trust’s ETH or fiat currency due to the negligence, fraud, willful or reckless misconduct of the ETH Custodian or a breach by the ETH Custodian of its Standard of Care occur, the ETH Custodian will, as soon as practicable, return to the Trust a quantity of the same digital asset that is equal to the quantity of digital assets involved in the Loss, or return to the Trust a quantity of the same fiat currency that is equal to the quantity of fiat currency involved in the Loss (if the Loss involved the Fiat Account). However, the Trust does not control the ETH Custodian and cannot guarantee that the ETH Custodian will perform its obligations to the Trust under the Custody Agreement, in a timely manner or at all. The Custody Agreement provides that (i) the ETH Custodian does not own or control the underlying software protocols of networks which govern the operation of digital assets (including the Ethereum Blockchain), (ii) the ETH Custodian makes no guarantees regarding their security, functionality, or availability, and (iii) in no event shall the ETH Custodian be liable for or in connection with any acts, decisions, or omissions made by developers or promoters of digital assets, including ETH. Similarly, under the Clearing Agreement, the ETH Custodian’s liability in connection with the Clearing Services is limited as follows, among others: the ETH Custodian does not have any responsibility for any sale or purchase of ETH for cash to a Liquidity Provider through the Clearing Services (such a transaction, a “Clearing Transaction”), other than as specifically identified in the Clearing Agreement. The ETH Custodian may rely upon, without liability on its part, any clearing request submitted through Gemini’s platform. Absent gross negligence, willful misconduct or fraud, the ETH Custodian shall not be liable for any loss resulting from a clearing request or the use of Clearing Services. Validation and confirmation procedures used by Gemini are designed only to verify the source of clearing requests and that each party has met its respective obligations in respect of a clearing request and not to detect errors in the content of a clearing request or to prevent duplicate clearing requests. The Trust is responsible for losses resulting from clearing requests provided by it and for any errors made by or on behalf of the Trust, any errors resulting, directly or indirectly, from fraud or the duplication of any clearing request by or on behalf of the Trust, or any losses resulting from the malfunctioning of any devices used by the Trust or loss or compromise of credentials used by the Trust to deliver clearing requests. The ETH Custodian may reject, refuse to settle or otherwise not complete any request to settle a ETH transaction through the Clearing Services for any reason necessary to comply with applicable laws and regulations or in connection with its fraud or other compliance controls and systems, and the ETH Custodian shall have no liability whatsoever to the Trust, any transaction counterparty or any other party in connection with or arising out of the ETH Custodian rejecting, refusing or otherwise not completing the settlement of a transaction through the Clearing Services. The ETH Custodian will not settle transactions through the Clearing Services: (i) if either party to a Clearing Transaction has not fully funded its accounts held with the ETH Custodian and used in connection with the Clearing Services (in the Trust’s case, the Clearing Account and Fiat Account), as applicable, with the required fiat currency amount or ETH amount, as applicable, prior to the agreed expiration time; (ii) if either party to a Clearing Transaction has not confirmed its acceptance of the clearing request to the ETH Custodian prior to the agreed expiration time; (iii) if either party to a transaction is not a Gemini customer; or (iv) for any other reason as determined by the Ethereum Custodian in its sole discretion to comply with applicable laws and regulation or in connection with the ETH Custodian’s fraud or other compliance controls and systems. Although the ETH Custodian has represented to the Sponsor that Clearing Transactions ordinarily settle automatically within minutes once the ETH and cash have been funded by both the Trust and the Liquidity Provider in their respective accounts at the ETH Custodian used in connection with the Clearing Services (in the Trust’s case, the Clearing Account and Fiat Account), the ETH Custodian is not required by the Clearing Agreement to settle the Clearing Transaction that quickly. These and the other limitations on the ETH Custodian’s liability may allow it to avoid liability for potential losses, even if the ETH Custodian directly caused such losses. The Clearing Agreement provides that it is subject to Gemini’s user agreement (the “User Agreement”). Pursuant to the User Agreement, Gemini agrees to take reasonable care and use commercially reasonable efforts in executing Gemini’s responsibilities to the Trust pursuant to the User Agreement, or such higher care where required by law or as specified by the User Agreement. Gemini uses commercially reasonable efforts to provide the Trust with a reliable and secure 61 platform. From time to time, interruptions, errors or other deficiencies in service may occur due to a variety of factors, some of which are outside of our control. These factors can contribute to delays, errors in service, or system outages, creating difficulties in accessing the Trust’s account, withdrawing fiat currency or ethereum, depositing fiat currency or ethereum, and/or placing and/or canceling orders. Under the User Agreement, Gemini is not liable for any delays, failure in performance or interruption of service which result directly or indirectly from any cause or condition, whether or not foreseeable, beyond Gemini’s reasonable control, including, but not limited to, any act of God, nuclear or natural disaster, epidemic, action or inaction of civil or military authorities, act of war, terrorism, sabotage, civil disturbance, strike or other labor dispute, accident, state of emergency or interruption, loss, or malfunction of equipment or utility, communications, computer (hardware or software), Internet or network provider services. Except to the extent required by law, Gemini is not liable under the User Agreement, whether in contract or tort, for any punitive, special, indirect, consequential, incidental, or similar damages, including lost trading or other profits, diminution in asset value, or lost business opportunities (even if Gemini have been advised of the possibility thereof) in connection with the transactions subject to the User Agreement. Gemini’s total liability for breach of the User Agreement shall be limited by the value of any of the Trust’s allegedly lost fiat currency and digital assets in the custody of Gemini at the time of loss. Under the User Agreement, Gemini is not liable for delays or interruptions in service caused by automated or other compliance checks or for other reasonable delays or interruptions in service, by definition to include any delay or interruption shorter than one week, or delays or interruptions in service beyond the control of Gemini or its service providers. The limitation on liability under the User Agreement includes, but is not limited to any damage or interruptions caused by any computer viruses, spyware, scamware, trojan horses, worms, or other malware that may affect the Trust’s computer or other equipment, or any phishing, spoofing, domain typosquatting, or other attacks, failure of mechanical or electronic equipment or communication lines, telephone or other interconnect problems (e.g., you cannot access your internet service provider), unauthorized access, theft, operator errors, strikes or other labor problems, or any force majeure. Gemini does not guarantee continuous, uninterrupted, or secure access to Gemini. Gemini is not responsible for any failure or delay to act by any Gemini service provider, including Gemini’s banks, or any other participant that is within the time limits permitted by the User Agreement or prescribed by law, or that is caused by the Trust’s negligence. Under the User Agreement, Gemini is not responsible for any “System Failure” (defined as a failure of any computer hardware or software used by Gemini, a Gemini service provider, or any telecommunications lines or devices used by Gemini or a Gemini service provider), or scheduled or unscheduled maintenance or downtime, which prevents Gemini from fulfilling its obligations under the User Agreement, provided that Gemini used commercially reasonable efforts to prevent or limit such System Failures, or downtime. Gemini cannot be held responsible for any other circumstances beyond Gemini’s reasonable control. The Additional ETH Custodian’s parent, Coinbase Global maintains a commercial crime insurance policy of up to $320 million, which is intended to cover the loss of client assets held by Coinbase Global and all of its subsidiaries, including the Additional ETH Custodian (collectively, Coinbase Global and its subsidiaries are referred to as the “Coinbase Insureds”), including from employee collusion or fraud, physical loss including theft, damage of key material, security breach or hack, and fraudulent transfer. The insurance maintained by Coinbase Global is shared among all of Coinbase’s customers, is not specific to the Trust or to customers of the Additional ETH Custodian and may not be available or sufficient to protect the Trust from all possible losses or sources of losses. Coinbase Global’s insurance may not cover the type of losses experienced by the Trust. Alternatively, the Trust may be forced to share such insurance proceeds with other clients or customers of the Coinbase Insureds, which could reduce the amount of such proceeds that are available to the Trust. In addition, the ethereum insurance market is limited, and the level of insurance maintained by Coinbase Global may be substantially lower than the assets of the Trust. While the Additional ETH Custodian maintains certain capital reserve requirements depending on the assets under custody, and such capital reserves may provide additional means to cover Trust asset losses, the Trust cannot be assured that the Additional ETH Custodian will maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover actual or potential losses with respect to the Trust’s digital assets. Additionally, under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement, the Additional ETH Custodian’s liability is limited as follows, among others: (i) in respect of any incidental, indirect, special, punitive, consequential or similar losses, the 62 Additional ETH Custodian is not liable, even if the Additional ETH Custodian has been advised of or knew or should have known of the possibility thereof; (ii) the Additional ETH Custodian, its affiliates or its respective officers, directors, agents, employees and representatives shall in no event have any liability with respect to any breach of its obligations under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement which does not result from its negligence, fault, fraud or willful misconduct; and (iii) except for the: (i) Excluded Liabilities; (ii) fraud; or (iii) willful misconduct, in no event shall any Coinbase entity’s aggregate liability with respect to any breach of its obligations under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement exceed the greater of (a) the value of the ETH involved in the transaction giving rise to such liability and (b) the aggregate amount of fees paid by the Trust to such Coinbase entity in respect of services relating to custody, trade execution, lending or post-trade credit (if applicable) and other services in the 12-month period prior to the event giving rise to such liability, and solely in respect of custodial services provided pursuant to the Additional ETH Custody Agreement, the liability of the Additional ETH Custodian shall not exceed the greater of (i) the aggregate amount of fees paid by the Trust to the Additional ETH Custodian in respect of the custodial services in the 12-month period prior to the event giving rise to such liability; or (ii) the value of the ethereum on deposit in Trust’s Additional ETH Account(s) involved in the event giving rise to such liability; provided, that in no event shall the Additional ETH Custodian’s aggregate liability in respect of each cold storage address exceed one hundred million US dollars ($100,000,000.00 USD). “Excluded Liabilities” means (x) with respect to the Trust, (1) the Trust’s defense and indemnity obligations under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement; (2) any outstanding commissions or fees owed by the Trust under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement and (3) the Trust’s breach of representations and warranties under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement; and (y) with respect to the Additional ETH Custodian, its defense and indemnity obligations under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement. With respect to the Excluded Liabilities, the Additional ETH Custodian’s liability to the Trust for any losses arising out of or in connection with the Additional ETH Custodian’s defense and indemnity obligations under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement will be limited, in the aggregate, to an amount equal to five million U.S. dollars ($5,000,000.00 USD). In general, the Additional ETH Custodian is not liable under the Additional ETH Custody Agreement unless in the event of its negligence, fraud, material violation of applicable law or willful misconduct. The Additional ETH Custodian is not liable for delays, suspension of operations, failure in performance, or interruption of service to the extent it is directly due to a cause or condition beyond the reasonable control of the Additional ETH Custodian. Furthermore, the insurance maintained by the Additional ETH Custodian may be insufficient to cover its liabilities to the Trust. The Additional ETH Custodian requires up to twenty-four (24) hours between any request to withdraw ETH from the Trust’s Additional ETH Account and submission of the Trust’s withdrawal to the ETH network. It may be necessary to retrieve certain information from offline storage in order to facilitate a withdrawal in accordance with the Trust’s instructions, which may delay the initiation or crediting of such withdrawal from the Trust’s Additional ETH Account. ETH shall not be deposited or withdrawn upon less than twenty-four (24) hours’ notice initiated from the Trust’s Additional ETH Account. The time of such request shall be the time such notice is transmitted from the Trust’s Additional ETH Account. In the context of the foregoing and during such twenty-four (24) hours’ notice period, the Additional ETH Custodian makes no representations or warranties with respect to the availability and/or accessibility of (1) the ETH, (2) a Custody Transaction (as defined in the Additional ETH Custody Agreement, which includes a deposit or withdrawal), (3) the Additional ETH Account, or (4) the Custodial Services (as defined in the Additional ETH Custody Agreement). While the Additional ETH Custodian will make reasonable efforts to process client initiated deposits in a timely manner, the Additional ETH Custodian makes no representations or warranties regarding the amount of time needed to complete processing of deposits as such processing is dependent upon many factors outside of the Additional ETH Custodian’s control. Moreover, in the event of an insolvency or bankruptcy of the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian in the future, given that the contractual protections and legal rights of customers with respect to digital assets held on their behalf by third parties are relatively untested in a bankruptcy of an entity such as the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian in the virtual currency industry, there is a risk that customers’ assets – including the Trust’s assets – may be considered the property of the bankruptcy estate of the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian, and customers – including the Trust – may be at risk of being treated as general unsecured creditors of such entities and subject to the risk of total loss or markdowns on value of such assets. Each of the Custody Agreement and the Additional ETH Custody Agreement contains an agreement by the parties to treat the ethereum credited to the Trust’s Vault Balance (as defined in the Custody Agreement) and the Trust’s Additional ETH Vault Balance (as defined in the Additional ETH Custody Agreement) as financial assets under Article 8 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code (“Article 8”), in addition to stating that the ETH Custodian and 63 the Additional ETH Custodian will serve as fiduciary and custodian on the Trust’s behalf. It is possible that a court would not treat custodied digital assets as part of the ETH Custodian’s or the Additional ETH Custodian’s general estate in the event the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian were to experience insolvency. However, due to the novelty of digital asset custodial arrangements courts have not yet considered this type of treatment for custodied digital assets and it is not possible to predict with certainty how they would rule in such a scenario. In the case of the Clearing Account, because it is an omnibus account in which the assets of multiple customers – including the Trust’s assets – are held together, it is likely the Trust would be treated as a general unsecured creditor in respect of the Clearing Account held with the ETH Custodian in the event of the ETH Custodian’s insolvency. The Clearing Agreement does not contain an Article 8 opt-in. If the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian became subject to insolvency proceedings and a court were to rule that the custodied ethereum were part of the ETH Custodian’s or the Additional ETH Custodian’s general estate and not the property of the Trust, then the Trust would be treated as a general unsecured creditor in the ETH Custodian’s or the Additional ETH Custodian’s insolvency proceedings and the Trust could be subject to the loss of all or a significant portion of its assets. Moreover, in the event of the bankruptcy of the Ethereum Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian, an automatic stay could go into effect and protracted litigation could be required in order to recover the assets held with the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian, all of which could significantly and negatively impact the Trust’s operations and the value of the Shares. Under the Trust Agreement, the Trustee and the Sponsor will not be liable for any liability or expense incurred, including, without limitation, as a result of any loss of ethereum by the ETH Custodian, absent gross negligence or bad faith on the part of the Trustee or the Sponsor or breach by the Sponsor of the Trust Agreement, as the case may be. As a result, the recourse of the Trust or the Shareholders to the Trustee or the Sponsor, including in the event of a loss of ethereum by the ETH Custodian, is limited. The Shareholders’ recourse against the Sponsor, the Trustee, and the Trust’s other service providers for the services they provide to the Trust, including, without limitation, those relating to the holding of ETH or the provision of instructions relating to the movement of ethereum, is limited. For the avoidance of doubt, neither the Sponsor, the Trustee, nor any of their affiliates, nor any other party has guaranteed the assets or liabilities, or otherwise assumed the liabilities, of the Trust, or the obligations or liabilities of any service provider to the Trust, including, without limitation, the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian. Consequently, a loss may be suffered with respect to the Trust’s ETH that is not covered by the ETH Custodian’s or the Additional ETH Custodian’s insurance and for which no person is liable in damages. As a result, the recourse of the Trust or the Shareholders, under applicable law, is limited. Loss of a critical banking relationship for, or the failure of a bank used by, the Trust could adversely impact the Trust’s ability to create or redeem Baskets, or could cause losses to the Trust. The Cash Custodian and ETH Custodian, under the Clearing Agreement, facilitate the creation and redemption of Baskets (in exchange for cash subscriptions by Authorized Participants, or in exchange for redemptions of Shares by Authorized Participants), and other cash movements, including in connection with the purchase of ETH by the Trust to effectuate subscriptions for cash and the selling of ETH by the Trust to effect redemptions for cash or pay the Sponsor Fee and, to the extent applicable, other Trust expenses, and in extraordinary circumstances, to effect the liquidation of the Trust’s ETH. The Trust relies on the Cash Custodian and ETH Custodian, in connection with the Trust’s Fiat Account, to hold any cash related to the purchase or sale of ETH. To the extent that the Trust faces difficulty establishing or maintaining banking relationships, the loss of the Trust’s banking partners, including the Cash Custodian or the banks at which the ETH Custodian, in connection with the Trust’s Fiat Account, maintains customer cash balances (including the cash balance of the Trust held in the Fiat Account), or the imposition of operational restrictions by these banking partners and the inability for the Trust to utilize other financial institutions may result in a disruption of creation and redemption activity of the Trust, or cause other operational disruptions or adverse effects for the Trust. In the future, it is possible that the Trust could be unable to establish accounts at new banking partners or establish new banking relationships, or that the banks with which the Trust is able to establish relationships may not be as large or well-capitalized or subject to the same degree of prudential supervision as the existing providers. The Trust could also suffer losses in the event that a bank or money market fund in which the Trust holds cash, including the cash associated with the Trust’s account at the Cash Custodian or the Trust’s Fiat Account with the ETH Custodian (which is held at the ETH Custodian’s banks or money market funds for the benefit of its customers, including the Trust), fails, becomes insolvent, enters receivership, is taken over by regulators, enters financial distress, or otherwise suffers adverse effects to its financial condition or operational status. Recently, some banks have experienced financial distress. For example, on March 8,2023, the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation (“DFPI”) announced that Silvergate Bank had entered voluntary liquidation, and on March 10, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank, 64 (“SVB”), was closed by the DFPI, which appointed the FDIC, as receiver. Similarly, on March 12, 2023, the New York Department of Financial Services took possession of Signature Bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver. A joint statement by the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC on March 12, 2023, stated that depositors in Signature and SVB will have access to all of their funds, including funds held in deposit accounts, in excess of the insured amount. On May 1, 2023, First Republic Bank was closed by the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, which appointed the FDIC as receiver. Following a bidding process, the FDIC entered into a purchase and assumption agreement with JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, to acquire the substantial majority of the assets and assume certain liabilities of First Republic Bank from the FDIC. If the Cash Custodian, the ETH Custodian, or the Banks or money market funds at which the ETH Custodian holds customer cash balances, including those associated with the Trust’s Fiat Account, were to experience financial distress or its financial condition is otherwise affected, the Cash Custodian’s or ETH Custodian’s ability to provide services to the Trust could be affected. Moreover, the future failure of a bank or money market fund at which the Trust (including through the Fiat Account) maintains cash, could result in losses to the Trust, to the extent the balances are not subject to deposit insurance, notwithstanding the regulatory requirements to which the Cash Custodian is subject or other potential protections. In addition, the Trust may maintain cash balances with the Cash Custodian in the Fiat Account with the that are not insured or are in excess of the FDIC’s insurance limits, or which are maintained by the Cash Custodian or ETH Custodian at money market accounts (in the case of the Fiat Account) and subject to the attendant risks (e.g., “breaking the buck”). As a result, the Trust could suffer losses. The Trust may be required, or the Sponsor may deem it appropriate, to terminate and liquidate at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders. Pursuant to the terms of the Trust Agreement, the Trust is required to dissolve under certain circumstances. In addition, the Sponsor may, in its sole discretion, dissolve the Trust for a number of reasons, including if the Sponsor determines, in its sole discretion, that it is desirable or advisable for any reason to discontinue the affairs of the Trust. If the Trust is required to terminate and liquidate, or the Sponsor determines in accordance with the terms of the Trust Agreement that it is appropriate to terminate and liquidate the Trust, such termination and liquidation could occur at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders, such as when the actual exchange rate of ETH is lower than the Index was at the time when Shareholders purchased their Shares. In such a case, when the Trust’s ETH is sold as part of its liquidation, the resulting proceeds distributed to Shareholders will be less than if the actual exchange rate at such time were higher at the time of sale. The Sponsor is solely responsible for determining the value of the ETH holdings and ethereum holdings per Share, and any errors, discontinuance or changes in such valuation calculations may have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. The Sponsor has the exclusive authority to determine the Trust’s NAV and the Trust’s NAV per Share, which it has delegated to the Administrator. The Administrator will determine the Trust’s ETH holdings and ETH holdings per Share on a daily basis as soon as practicable after 4:00 p.m. ET on each business day. The Administrator’s determination is made utilizing data from the operations of the Trust and the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, calculated at 4:00 p.m. ET on such day. To the extent that the ETH holdings or ETH holdings per Share are incorrectly calculated, the Sponsor will not be liable (absent gross negligence or wilful misconduct) for any error and such misreporting of valuation data could adversely affect the value of the Shares. If the Sponsor determines in good faith that the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate does not reflect an accurate ETH price, then the Sponsor will instruct the Administrator to employ an alternative method to determine the fair value of the Trust’s assets. There are no predefined criteria to make a good faith assessment as to which of the rules the Sponsor will apply and the Sponsor may make this determination in its sole discretion. The Administrator may calculate the NAV in a manner that ultimately inaccurately reflects the price of ETH. To the extent that the Trust’s NAV and the Trust’s NAV per Share, the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, or the Administrator’s or the Sponsor’s other valuation methodology are incorrectly calculated, neither the Sponsor, the Administrator nor the Trustee may be liable for any error and such misreporting of valuation data could adversely affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. Moreover, the terms of the Trust Agreement do not prohibit the Sponsor from changing the index used to calculate NAV or other valuation method used to calculate the net asset value of the Trust. Any such change in the index or other valuation method could affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. 65 To the extent the methodology used to calculate the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is deemed not to be consistent with GAAP, the Trust’s periodic financial statements may not utilize the Trust’s NAV or the Trust’s NAV per Share. For purposes of the Trust’s financial statements, the Trust will utilize a pricing source that is consistent with GAAP, as of the financial statement measurement date. The Sponsor will determine in its sole discretion the valuation sources and policies used to prepare the Trust’s financial statements. To the extent that such valuation sources and policies used to prepare the Trust’s financial statements result in an inaccurate price, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. Moreover, the terms of the Trust Agreement do not prohibit the Sponsor from changing the valuation method used to calculate the net asset value to be reported in the Trust’s financial statements. Any such change in such valuation method could affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. Extraordinary expenses resulting from unanticipated events may become payable by the Trust, adversely affecting the value of the shares. In partial consideration for the Sponsor’s Fee, the Sponsor shall assume and pay all fees and other expenses incurred by the Trust in the ordinary course of its affairs, with the exception of those described in the registration statement. Expenses incurred by the Trust but not assumed by the Sponsor, such as, among others, taxes and governmental charges; expenses and costs of any extraordinary services performed by the Sponsor (or any other service provider) on behalf of the Trust to protect the Trust or the interests of Shareholders (including, for example, in connection with any fork of the Ethereum Blockchain, any Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency); or extraordinary legal fees and expenses are not assumed by the Sponsor and are borne by the Trust. The Sponsor may sell ETH to pay certain expenses not assumed by the Sponsor. Accordingly, the Sponsor may be required to sell or otherwise dispose of ETH at a time when the trading prices for those assets are depressed. The sale or other disposition of assets of the Trust in order to pay extraordinary expenses could have a negative impact on the value of the Shares for several reasons. These include the following factors: ● The Trust is not actively managed and no attempt will be made to protect against or to take advantage of fluctuations in the price of ETC. Consequently, if the Trust incurs expenses in U.S. dollars, the Trust’s ETH may be sold at a time when the values of the disposed assets are low, resulting in a negative impact on the value of the Shares. ● Because the Trust does not generate any income, every time that the Trust pays expenses, it will deliver ETH to the Sponsor or sell ETH. Any sales of the Trust’s assets in connection with the payment of expenses will decrease the amount of the Trust’s assets represented by each Share each time its assets are sold by or transferred to the Sponsor. The value of the Shares will be adversely affected if the Trust is required to indemnify the Sponsor, the Trustee, the Transfer Agent, the ETH Custodian, the Additional ETH Custodian or the Cash Custodian under the Trust documents. Under the Trust documents, each of the Sponsor, the Trustee, the Transfer Agent, the ETH Custodian, the Additional ETH Custodian and the Cash Custodian has a right to be indemnified by the Trust for certain liabilities or expenses that it incurs without gross negligence, bad faith or wilful misconduct on its part. Therefore, the Sponsor, Trustee, Transfer Agent, the ETH Custodian, the Additional ETH Custodian or the Cash Custodian may require that the assets of the Trust be used for indemnification in order to cover losses or liability suffered by them. This would reduce the ethereum holdings of the Trust and the value of the Shares. Gemini serves as the ETH Custodian for several competing exchange-traded ethereum products, and the Trust’s Cash Custodian and Liquidity Providers may also transact with competing exchange-traded ETH products or with other companies in the digital assets industry, which could heighten interconnectedness and contagion risks and adversely affect creation and redemption processes of the Trust. By virtue of its prominent market position and capabilities, and the relatively limited number of institutionally-capable providers of cryptoasset brokerage and custody services, Gemini serves as the ETH custodian for several competing exchange-traded ETH products. Therefore, Gemini’s size and market share creates the risk that Gemini may fail to properly resource its operations to support all such products that use its services, and the broader risk that its concentrated focus on the industry could adversely affect its financial condition or disrupt its operations if its customers in the digital assets industry experience problems or issues, which could harm the Trust, the Shareholders and the value of 66 the Shares. If Gemini were to favor the interests of certain products over others, it could result in inadequate attention or comparatively unfavorable commercial terms to less favored products, which could adversely affect the Trust’s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares. Similarly, although the Sponsor presently has no knowledge of the Cash Custodian’s customer base, if and to the extent the Cash Custodian serves other competing exchange-traded cryptocurrency products or other similar investment vehicles, it could conceivably divert the Cash Custodian’s focus and resources away from serving the Trust, leading to harm to the Trust and its Shareholders. The ETH Custodian is, and Liquidity Providers in many cases are, prominent companies with active operations in the digital assets industry. As illustrated by the 2022 Events, many of the players in the digital assets markets are interconnected – for example, certain market participants may be active in both borrowing and lending, or engage in a wide variety of trading relationships and transactions, with respect to many of the same counterparties, or with respect to the same digital assets or blockchain networks – which can heighten the contagion risks if one of them defaults on its obligations to others or a given digital blockchain network or digital asset were to stop functioning properly or lose substantial value, as applicable, leading to correlated failures in a wider market downturn or a disruption or market dislocation affecting that particular blockchain network or that particular digital asset. It is possible that, in circumstances similar to the 2022 Events, this interconnectedness risk affecting the ETH Custodian and the Liquidity Providers to the Trust could adversely affect the Trust or its Shareholders, for instance by disrupting creation and redemption processes. Coinbase serves as the ETH Custodian for several competing exchange-traded ethereum products, which could adversely affect the trust’s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares. The Additional ETH Custodian is an affiliate of Coinbase Global. As of the date hereof, Coinbase Global is the largest publicly traded cryptoasset company in the world by market capitalization and is also the largest cryptoasset custodian in the world by assets under custody. By virtue of its leading market position and capabilities, and the relatively limited number of institutionally-capable providers of cryptoasset brokerage and custody services, Coinbase serves as the ETH Custodian for several competing exchange-traded ETH products. Therefore, Coinbase has a critical role in supporting the U.S. spot ethereum exchange-traded product ecosystem, and its size and market share creates the risk that Coinbase may fail to properly resource its operations to adequately support all such products that use its services that could harm the Trust, the Shareholders and the value of the Shares. If Coinbase were to favor the interests of certain products over others, it could result in inadequate attention or comparatively unfavorable commercial terms to less favored products, which could adversely affect the Trust’s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares. The Trust’s Authorized Participants act in similar or identical capacities for several competing exchange-traded ETH products, which may impact the ability or willingness of one or more Authorized Participants to participate in the creation and redemption process, adversely affect the Trust’s ability to create or redeem Baskets and adversely affect the Trust’s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares. Many of the Trust’s Authorized Participants, now or in the future, act or may act in the same capacity for several competing exchange-traded ETH products. Due to balance sheet capacity or other concerns or constraints, Authorized Participants, none of which are obligated to engage in creation and/or redemption transactions, may not be able or willing to submit creation or redemption orders with the Trust or may do so in limited capacities, particularly during times of heightened market trading activity or market volatility or turmoil. The inability or unwillingness of Authorized Participants to do so could lead to the potential for the Shares to trade at premiums or discounts to the NAV, and such premiums or discounts could be substantial. Furthermore, if creations or redemptions are unavailable due the inability or unwillingness of one or more of the Trust’s Authorized Participants to submit creation or redemption orders with the Trust (or do so in a limited capacity), the arbitrage mechanism may fail to function as efficiently as it otherwise would or be unavailable. This could result in impaired liquidity for the Shares, wider bid/ask spreads in the secondary trading of the Shares and greater costs to investors and other market participants, all of which could cause the Sponsor to halt or suspend the creation or redemption of Shares during such times, among other consequences. The Trust is not permitted to engage in Staking Activities, which could negatively affect the value of the Shares. Staking Activities refer to employing ETH in actions where any portion of the Trust’s ETH becomes subject to the Ethereum proof-of-stake validation or is used to earn additional ETH or generate income or other earnings. Neither the Trust, nor the Sponsor, nor the ETH Custodian, nor any other person associated with the Trust will, directly or indirectly, employ the Trust’s ETH in Staking Activities. Accordingly, the Trust will not earn any form of staking rewards, or income of any kind, from Staking Activities. 67 The inability of the Trust to participate in Staking Activities and receive such rewards could place the Shares at a comparative disadvantage relative to an investment in ethereum directly or through a vehicle that is not subject to such a prohibition, which could negatively affect the value of the Shares. Regulatory Risk Digital asset markets in the United States exist in a state of regulatory uncertainty, and adverse legislative or regulatory developments could significantly harm the value of ETH or the Shares, such as by banning, restricting or imposing onerous conditions or prohibitions on the use of ethereum, mining activity, digital wallets, the provision of services related to trading and custodying ethereum, the operation of the Ethereum network, or the digital asset markets generally. There is a lack of consensus regarding the regulation of digital assets, including ETH, and their markets. As a result of the growth in the size of the digital asset market, as well as the 2022 Events, the U.S. Congress and a number of U.S. federal and state agencies (including FinCEN, SEC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”), U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”), FINRA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the IRS, state financial institution regulators, and others) have been examining the operations of digital asset networks, digital asset users and the digital asset markets. Many of these state and federal agencies have brought enforcement actions or issued consumer advisories regarding the risks posed by digital assets to investors. Ongoing and future regulatory actions with respect to digital assets generally or ETH in particular may alter, perhaps to a materially adverse extent, the nature of an investment in the Shares or the ability of the Trust to continue to operate. The 2022 Events, including among others the bankruptcy filings of FTX and its subsidiaries, Three Arrows Capital, Celsius Network, Voyager Digital, Genesis, BlockFi and others, and other developments in the digital asset markets, have resulted in calls for heightened scrutiny and regulation of the digital asset industry, with a specific focus on intermediaries such as digital asset exchanges, platforms, and custodians. Federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies may introduce and enact new laws and regulations to regulate crypto asset intermediaries, such as digital asset exchanges and custodians. The March 2023 collapses of Silicon Valley Bank, Silvergate Bank, and Signature Bank, which in some cases provided services to the digital assets industry, may amplify and/or accelerate these trends. On January 3, 2023, the federal banking agencies issued a joint statement on crypto-asset risks to banking organizations following events which exposed vulnerabilities in the crypto-asset sector, including the risk of fraud and scams, legal uncertainties, significant volatility, and contagion risk though on March 7, 2025, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency withdrew its participation in the joint statement on crypto asset risks to banking organizations. Although banking organizations are not prohibited from crypto-asset related activities, the agencies have at times expressed significant safety and soundness concerns with business models that are concentrated in crypto-asset related activities or have concentrated exposures to the crypto-asset sector. US federal and state regulators, as well as the White House, have issued reports and releases concerning crypto assets, including ETH and crypto asset markets. Further, in 2023 the House of Representatives formed two new subcommittees: the Digital Assets, Financial Technology and Inclusion Subcommittee and the Commodity Markets, Digital Assets, and Rural Development Subcommittee, each of which were formed in part to analyze issues concerning crypto assets and demonstrate a legislative intent to develop and consider the adoption of federal legislation designed to address the perceived need for regulation of and concerns surrounding the crypto industry. However, the extent and content of any forthcoming laws and regulations are not yet ascertainable with certainty, and it may not be ascertainable in the near future. A divided Congress makes any prediction difficult. We cannot predict how these and other related events will affect us or the crypto asset business. Former President Biden’s March 9, 2022 Executive Order, asserting that technological advances and the rapid growth of the digital asset markets “necessitate an evaluation and alignment of the United States Government approach to digital assets,” signals an ongoing focus on digital asset policy and regulation in the United States. A number of reports issued pursuant to the Executive Order have focused on various risks related to the digital asset ecosystem, and have recommended additional legislation and regulatory oversight. There have also been several bills introduced in Congress that propose to establish additional regulation and oversight of the digital asset markets. It is not possible to predict whether Congress will grant additional authorities to the SEC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how they might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function or how any new regulations that may flow from such authorities might impact the value of digital assets generally and ETH held by the Trust specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on the Trust and the Shares. FinCEN requires any administrator or exchanger of convertible digital assets to register with FinCEN as a money transmitter and comply with the anti-money laundering regulations applicable to money transmitters. Entities which fail to 68 comply with such regulations are subject to fines, may be required to cease operations, and could have potential criminal liability. For example, in 2015, FinCEN assessed a $700,000 fine against a sponsor of a digital asset for violating several requirements of the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act (as amended) (“BSA”) by acting as an MSB and selling the digital asset without registering with FinCEN, and by failing to implement and maintain an adequate anti-money laundering program. In 2017, FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-e, a now defunct digital asset exchange, for similar violations. The requirement that exchangers that do business in the United States register with FinCEN and comply with anti-money laundering regulations may increase the cost of buying and selling ethereum and therefore may adversely affect the price of ETH and an investment in the Shares. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “U.S. Treasury Department”) has added digital currency addresses, including on the Ethereum Blockchain, to the list of Specially Designated Nationals whose assets are blocked, and with whom U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing. Such actions by OFAC, or by similar organizations in other jurisdictions, may introduce uncertainty in the market as to whether ETH that has been associated with such addresses in the past can be easily sold. This “tainted” ETH may trade at a substantial discount to untainted ETH. Reduced fungibility in the ethereum markets may reduce the liquidity of ETH and therefore adversely affect their price. In February 2020, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin stated that digital assets were a “crucial area” on which the U.S. Treasury Department has spent significant time. Secretary Mnuchin announced that the U.S. Treasury Department is preparing significant new regulations governing digital asset activities to address concerns regarding the potential use for facilitating money laundering and other illicit activities. In December 2020, FinCEN, a bureau within the U.S. Treasury Department, proposed a rule that would require financial institutions to submit reports, keep records, and verify the identity of customers for certain transactions to or from so-called “unhosted” wallets, also commonly referred to as self-hosted wallets. In January 2021, U.S. Treasury Secretary nominee Janet Yellen stated her belief that regulators should “look closely at how to encourage the use of digital assets for legitimate activities while curtailing their use for malign and illegal activities.” Under regulations from the NYDFS, businesses involved in digital asset business activity for third parties in or involving New York, excluding merchants and consumers, must apply for a license, commonly known as a BitLicense, from the NYDFS and must comply with anti-money laundering, cybersecurity, consumer protection, and financial and reporting requirements, among others. As an alternative to a BitLicense, a firm can apply for a charter to become a limited purpose trust company under New York law qualified to engage in certain digital asset business activities. Other states have considered or approved digital asset business activity statutes or rules, passing, for example, regulations or guidance indicating that certain digital asset business activities constitute money transmission requiring licensure. The inconsistency in applying money transmitting licensure requirements to certain businesses may make it more difficult for these businesses to provide services, which may affect consumer adoption of ETH and its price. In an attempt to address these issues, the Uniform Law Commission passed a model law in July 2017, the Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act, which has many similarities to the BitLicense and features a multistate reciprocity licensure feature, wherein a business licensed in one state could apply for accelerated licensure procedures in other states. It is still unclear, however, how many states, if any, will adopt some or all of the model legislation. Law enforcement agencies have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations. However, certain privacy-enhancing features have been, or are expected to be, introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If the Ethereum network were to adopt any of these features, these features may provide law enforcement agencies with less visibility into transaction-level data. For example, “privacy pools,” zero knowledge proofs, and other technologies that could enhance privacy have been discussed by participants in the Ethereum network. Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, released a report in October 2017 noting the increased use of privacy-enhancing digital assets like Zcash and Monero in criminal activity on the internet. In August 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. citizens from using Tornado Cash, a digital asset protocol designed to obfuscate blockchain transactions, by adding certain Ethereum wallet addresses associated with the protocol to its Specially Designated Nationals list. On October 19, 2023, FinCEN published a proposed rulemaking to apply the authorities in Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to impose requirements on financial institutions that engage in convertible virtual currency (“CVC”) transactions with CVC mixers. The proposed rule, if adopted, would require covered financial institutions to report to FinCEN any CVC transactions they process that involves CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States. The term “CVC mixing” covers more than just transactions that involve CVC mixers like Tornado Cash, and seemingly could cover a broader range of conduct involving technologies, services, or methods that have the effect of obfuscating the source, destination, or amount of a CVC transaction, whether or not the obfuscation was intentional. If the rule were to be adopted as proposed and if the Ethereum network were to be deemed to or were to adopt features which come within the rule’s ambit, it could cause covered financial institutions – such as many virtual currency exchanges, or the Trust’s service providers, such as the 69 Cash Custodian – to reduce support for or cease offering services for ETH or to the Trust, which could impair the utility of ETH, the value of the Shares and the Trust’s ability to operate in compliance with new laws and regulations. A determination that ETH or any other digital asset is a “security” may adversely affect the value of ETH and the value of the Shares, and result in potentially extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to, or termination of, the Trust. Depending on its characteristics, a digital asset may be considered a “security” under the federal securities laws. The test for determining whether a particular digital asset is a “security” is complex and difficult to apply, and the outcome is difficult to predict. Public, though non-binding, statements made in the past by senior officials at the SEC and endorsed by its previous Chairman in a letter to a member of Congress appeared to indicate that the SEC did not consider ETH to be a security at that time. However, a recent federal court decision ruled that the SEC has not to date issued a definitive statement of its position on whether ETH is a security for purposes of federal law. HODL Law, PLLC v. Securities and Exchange Commission, Case No. 22-cv-1832-L-JLB, 2023 WL 4852322 (Jul. 28, 2023), at *6. The SEC has brought enforcement actions against the issuers and promoters of several other digital assets on the basis that the digital assets in question are securities. The CFTC has for years considered ETH to be a commodity subject to its regulatory jurisdiction, supported by certain federal district court decisions, and ETH Futures have been listed for years on CFTC-regulated exchanges while cleared ETH swaps have been listed for trading on CFTC-regulated swap execution facilities not registered with the SEC without being deemed “mixed swaps” subject to joint CFTC and SEC jurisdiction to the Sponsor’s knowledge. Whether a digital asset is a security under the federal securities laws depends on whether it is included in the lists of instruments making up the definition of “security” in the 1933 Act, the Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act. Digital assets as such do not appear in any of these lists, although each list includes the terms “investment contract” and “note,” and the SEC has typically analyzed whether a particular digital asset is a security by reference to whether it meets the tests developed by the federal courts interpreting these terms, known as the Howey and Reves tests, respectively. For many digital assets, whether or not the Howey or Reves tests are met is difficult to resolve definitively, and substantial legal arguments can often be made both in favor of and against a particular digital asset qualifying as a security under one or both of the Howey and Reves tests. Adding to the complexity, the SEC staff has indicated that the security status of a particular digital asset can change over time as the relevant facts evolve. As part of determining whether ETH is a security for purposes of the federal securities laws, the Sponsor takes into account a number of factors, including the various definitions of “security” under the federal securities laws and federal court decisions interpreting elements of these definitions, such as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the Howey and Reves cases, as well as reports, orders, press releases, public statements and speeches by the SEC and its staff providing guidance on when a digital asset may be a security for purposes of the federal securities laws, and other materials relevant to the status of ETH as a security (or not). Finally, the Sponsor discusses the security status of ETH with its external securities lawyers. Through this process the Sponsor believes that it is applying the proper legal standards in making a good faith determination that it believes ETH is not presently a security under federal law in light of the uncertainties inherent in the Howey and Reves tests. In light of these uncertainties and the fact-based nature of the analysis, the Sponsor acknowledges that ETH may currently be a security, based on the facts as they exist today, or may in the future be found by the SEC or a federal court to be a security under the federal securities laws notwithstanding the Sponsor’s prior conclusion; and the Sponsor’s prior conclusion, even if reasonable under the circumstances and made in good faith, would not preclude legal or regulatory action based on the presence of a security. The Sponsor may dissolve the Trust if the Sponsor determines ETH is a security under the federal securities laws, whether that determination is initially made by the Sponsor itself, or because the SEC or a federal court subsequently makes that determination. Because the legal tests for determining whether a digital asset is or is not a security often leave room for interpretation, and because the SEC has not taken a definitive position, for so long as the Sponsor believes there to be good faith grounds to conclude that the Trust’s ethereum is not a security, the Sponsor does not intend to dissolve the Trust on the basis that ETH could at some future point be determined to be a security. Any enforcement action by the SEC or a state securities regulator asserting that ETH is a security, or a court decision to that effect would be expected to have an immediate material adverse impact on the trading value of ETH, as well as the Shares. This is because the business models behind most digital assets are incompatible with regulations applying to transactions in securities. The New York Attorney General alleged in a lawsuit filed in March 2023 that ETH was a security under New York and federal securities law and that a cryptocurrency exchange that deals in ETH, unlawfully failed to register as a securities dealer under New York state law. However, the New York Attorney General alleged in the alternative in the same case that ETH was a commodity under both New York state and federal law. The defendant settled the New York Attorney General’s lawsuit without a court adjudicating whether ETH was a security, a commodity, or neither for purposes of New York state or federal law. 70 If a digital asset is determined or asserted to be a security, it is likely to become difficult or impossible for the digital asset to be traded, cleared or custodied in the United States through the same channels used by non-security digital assets, which in addition to materially and adversely affecting the trading value of the digital asset is likely to significantly impact its liquidity and market participants’ ability to convert the digital asset into U.S. dollars. For example, in 2020 the SEC filed a complaint against the issuer of XRP, Ripple Labs, Inc., and two of its executives, alleging that they raised more than $1.3 billion through XRP sales that should have been registered under the federal securities laws, but were not. In the years prior to the SEC’s action, XRP’s market capitalization at times reached over $140 billion. However, in the weeks following the SEC’s complaint, XRP’s market capitalization fell to less than $10 billion, which was less than half of its market capitalization in the days prior to the complaint. The SEC’s action against XRP’s issuer underscores the continuing uncertainty around which digital assets are securities, and demonstrates that such factors as how long a digital asset has been in existence, how widely held it is, how large its market capitalization is and that it has actual usefulness in commercial transactions, ultimately may have no bearing on whether the SEC or a court will find it to be a security. In addition, if ETH is determined to be a security, the Trust could be considered an unregistered “investment company” under SEC rules, which could necessitate the Trust’s liquidation. In this case, the Trust and the Sponsor may be deemed to have participated in an illegal offering of securities and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will be able to register the Trust under the Investment Company Act at such time or take such other actions as may be necessary to ensure the Trust’s activities comply with applicable law, which could force the Sponsor to liquidate the Trust. Moreover, whether or not the Sponsor or the Trust were subject to additional regulatory requirements as a result of any SEC or federal court determination that its assets include securities, the Sponsor may nevertheless decide to terminate the Trust, in order, if possible, to liquidate the Trust’s assets while a liquid market still exists. For example, in response to the SEC’s action against the issuer of XRP, certain significant market participants announced they would no longer support XRP and announced measures, including the delisting of XRP from major digital asset trading platforms. The sponsor of the Grayscale XRP Trust subsequently dissolved this trust and liquidated its assets. If the SEC or a federal court were to determine that ETH is a security, it is likely that the value of the Shares of the Trust would decline significantly, and that the Trust itself may be terminated and, if practical, its assets liquidated. Competing industries may have more influence with policymakers than the digital asset industry, which could lead to the adoption of laws and regulations that are harmful to the digital asset industry. The digital asset industry is relatively new and it does not have the same access to policymakers and lobbying organizations in many jurisdictions compared to industries with which digital assets may be seen to compete, such as banking, payments and consumer finance. Competitors from other, more established industries may have greater access to and influence with governmental officials and regulators and may be successful in persuading these policymakers that digital assets require heightened levels of regulation compared to the regulation of traditional financial services. As a result, new laws and regulations may be proposed and adopted in the United States and elsewhere, or existing laws and regulations may be interpreted in new ways, that disfavor or impose compliance burdens on the digital asset industry or digital asset platforms, which could adversely impact the value of ETH and therefore the value of the Shares. Shareholders do not have the protections associated with ownership of Shares in an investment company registered under the 1940 Act or the protections afforded by the CEA. The 1940 Act is designed to protect investors by preventing insiders from managing investment companies to their benefit and to the detriment of public investors, such as: the issuance of securities having inequitable or discriminatory provisions; 71 the management of investment companies by irresponsible persons; the use of unsound or misleading methods of computing earnings and asset value; changes in the character of investment companies without the consent of investors; and investment companies from engaging in excessive leveraging. To accomplish these ends, the 1940 Act requires the safekeeping and proper valuation of fund assets, restricts greatly transactions with affiliates, limits leveraging, and imposes governance requirements as a check on fund management. The Trust is not registered as an investment company under the 1940 Act, and the Sponsor believes that the Trust is not required to register under such act. Consequently, Shareholders do not have the regulatory protections provided to investors in investment companies. The Trust will not hold or trade in commodity interests regulated by the CEA, as administered by the CFTC. Furthermore, the Sponsor believes that the Trust is not a commodity pool for purposes of the CEA, and that neither the Sponsor nor the Trustee is subject to regulation by the CFTC as a commodity pool operator or a commodity trading advisor in connection with the operation of the Trust. Consequently, Shareholders will not have the regulatory protections provided to investors in CEA-regulated instruments or commodity pools. Future legal or regulatory developments may negatively affect the value of ETH or require the Trust or the Sponsor to become registered with the SEC or CFTC, which may cause the Trust to liquidate. Current and future legislation, SEC and CFTC rulemaking, and other regulatory developments may impact the manner in which ETH are treated for classification and clearing purposes. In particular, although ETH is currently understood to be a commodity when transacted on a spot basis, ETH itself in the future might be classified by the CFTC as a “commodity interest” under the CEA, subjecting all transactions in ETH to full CFTC regulatory jurisdiction. Alternatively, in the future ETH might be classified by the SEC as a “security” under U.S. federal securities laws. The Sponsor and the Trust cannot be certain as to how future regulatory developments will impact the treatment of ETH under the law. In the face of such developments, the required registrations and compliance steps may result in extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to the Trust. If the Sponsor decides to terminate the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances, the Trust may be dissolved or liquidated at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders. The SEC has stated that certain digital assets may be considered “securities” under the federal securities laws. The test for determining whether a particular digital asset is a “security” is complex and the outcome is difficult to predict. If ETH is in the future determined to be a “security” under federal or state securities laws by the SEC or any other agency, or in a proceeding in a court of law or otherwise, it would likely have material adverse consequences for the value of ETH. For example, it may become more difficult or impossible for ETH to be traded, cleared and custodied in the United States as compared to other digital assets that are not considered to be securities, which could in turn negatively affect the liquidity and general acceptance of ETH and cause users to migrate to other digital assets. To the extent that ETH is determined to be a security, the Trust and the Sponsor may also be subject to additional regulatory requirements, including under the 1940 Act, and the Sponsor may be required to register as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”). If the Sponsor determines not to comply with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, the Sponsor will terminate the Trust. Any such termination could result in the liquidation of the Trust’s ethereum at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders. To the extent that ETH is deemed to fall within the definition of a “commodity interest” under the CEA, the Trust and the Sponsor may be subject to additional regulation under the CEA and CFTC regulations. These additional requirements may result in extraordinary, recurring and/or nonrecurring expenses of the Trust, thereby materially and adversely impacting the Shares. If the Sponsor and/or the Trust determines not to comply with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, the Sponsor may terminate the Trust. Any such termination could result in the liquidation of the Trust’s ETH at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders. The SEC has recently proposed amendments to the custody rules under Rule 406(4)-2 of the Advisers Act. The proposed rule changes would amend the definition of a “qualified custodian” under Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6) and expand the current custody rule in 406(4)-2 to cover all digital assets, including ethereum, and related advisory activities. If enacted as proposed, these rules would likely impose additional regulatory requirements with respect to the custody and storage of digital assets, including ETH. The Sponsor is studying the impact that such amendments may have on the Trust and its arrangements with the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian. It is possible that such amendments, if adopted, could prevent the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian from serving as service providers to the Trust, or require potentially significant modifications to existing arrangements under the Custody Agreement and the Additional ETH Custody Agreement, which could cause the Trust to bear potentially significant increased costs. If the Sponsor is unable to make such modifications or appoint successor service providers to fill the role that the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian currently plays, the Trust’s operations (including in relation to creations and redemptions of 72 Baskets and the holding of ETH) could be negatively affected, the Trust could dissolve (including at a time that is potentially disadvantageous to Shareholders), and the value of the Shares or an investment in the Trust could be affected. Further, the proposed amendments could have a severe negative impact on the price of ETH and therefore the value of the Shares if enacted, by, among other things, making it more difficult for investors to gain access to ETH, or causing certain holders of ethereum to sell their holdings. If regulatory changes or interpretations of an Authorized Participant’s, Liquidity Provider’s, the Trust’s or the Sponsor’s activities require the regulation of an Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, the Trust or the Sponsor as a money service business under the regulations promulgated by FINCEN under the authority of the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act or as a money transmitter or digital asset business under state regimes for the licensing of such businesses, an Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, the Trust or the Sponsor may be required to register and comply with such regulations, which could result in extraordinary, recurring and/or nonrecurring expenses to the Authorized Participant, Trust or Sponsor or increased commissions for the Authorized Participant’s clients, thereby reducing the liquidity of the Shares. To the extent that the activities of any Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, the Trust or the Sponsor cause it to be deemed a “money services business” under the regulations promulgated by FinCEN under the authority of the BSA, such Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, the Trust or the Sponsor may be required to comply with FinCEN regulations, including those that would mandate the Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, Trust or the Sponsor to implement anti-money laundering programs, make certain reports to FinCEN and maintain certain records. Similarly, the activities of an Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, the Trust or the Sponsor may require it to be licensed as a money transmitter or as a digital asset business, such as under NYDFS’ BitLicense regulation. Such additional regulatory obligations may cause the Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, the Trust or the Sponsor to incur extraordinary expenses. If the Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, the Trust or the Sponsor decide to seek the required licenses, there is no guarantee that they will timely receive them. The Authorized Participant or Liquidity Provider may also instead decide to terminate its role as Authorized Participant or Liquidity Provider of the Trust, or the Sponsor may decide to terminate the Trust. Termination by the Authorized Participant may decrease the liquidity of the Shares, which may adversely affect the value of the Shares, and any termination of the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances may be at a time that is disadvantageous to the Shareholders. Additionally, to the extent the Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, the Trust or the Sponsor is found to have operated without appropriate state or federal licenses by any regulator or court, it may be subject to investigation, administrative or court proceedings, operating restrictions, and civil or criminal monetary fines and penalties, all of which would harm the reputation of the Authorized Participant, Liquidity Provider, the Trust or the Sponsor, disrupt their operations, and have a material adverse effect on the price of the Shares. Although Liquidity Providers represent to the Trust that they have obtained all necessary governmental licenses in the Liquidity Provider agreements, if such representations prove inaccurate, such Liquidity Providers may suffer adverse consequences and be unable to perform their obligations or engage in ethereum transactions with the Trust, or the Trust’s operations could be adversely affected and decreased liquidity for the Shares or losses for Shareholders could result. Anonymity, sanctions, and illicit financing risk. Although transaction details of peer-to-peer transactions are recorded on the Ethereum Blockchain, a buyer or seller of digital assets on a peer-to-peer basis directly on the Ethereum network may never know to whom the public key belongs or the true identity of the party with whom it is transacting. Public key addresses are randomized sequences of alphanumeric characters that, standing alone, do not provide sufficient information to identify users. In addition, certain technologies, such as tumbling or mixing services, may obscure the origin or chain of custody of digital assets. In August 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. citizens from using Tornado Cash, a digital asset protocol designed to obfuscate blockchain transactions, by adding certain Ethereum wallet addresses associated with the protocol to its Specially Designated Nationals list. On October 19, 2023, FinCEN published a proposed rulemaking under authorities in Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act that would impose requirements on financial institutions that engage in CVC transactions that involve CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States. FinCEN’s rulemaking states that CVC mixing transactions can play a central role in facilitating the laundering of CVC derived from a variety of illicit activity, and are frequently used by criminals and state actors to facilitate a range of illicit activity, including, but not limited to, money laundering, sanctions evasion and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Given that the Ethereum network is global and anyone can validate transactions using or program DApps or smart contracts that will operate and record transactions on the Ethereum Blockchain, and the fact that their operators, creators or programmers sometimes remain anonymous, it is not inconceivable that bad actors, such as those subject to sanctions, could seek to do so. 73 The opaque nature of the market poses asset verification challenges for market participants, regulators and auditors and gives rise to an increased risk of manipulation and fraud, including the potential for Ponzi schemes, bucket shops and pump and dump schemes. Digital assets have in the past been used to facilitate illicit activities. If a digital asset was used to facilitate illicit activities, or a digital asset, or prominent DApp or smart contract or network participant, such as validators or users, were associated with bad actors or illicit activity, businesses that facilitate transactions in such digital assets could be at increased risk of potential criminal or civil lawsuits, or of having banking or other services cut off, and such digital asset could be removed from digital asset exchanges. Any of the aforementioned or similar occurrences could adversely affect the price of the relevant digital asset, the attractiveness of the respective blockchain network and an investment in the Shares. If the Trust or the Sponsor or the Trustee were to transact with a sanctioned entity, the Trust, the Sponsor or the Trustee would be at risk of potential criminal or civil lawsuits or liability. The Trust takes measures with the objective of reducing illicit financing risks in connection with the Trust’s activities. However, illicit financing risks are present in the digital asset markets, including markets for ethereum. There can be no assurance that the measures employed by the Trust will prove successful in reducing illicit financing risks, and the Trust is subject to the complex illicit financing risks and vulnerabilities present in the digital asset markets. If such risks eventuate, the Trust or the Sponsor or their affiliates could face civil or criminal liability, fines, penalties, or other punishments, be subject to investigation, have their assets frozen, lose access to banking services or services provided by other service providers, or suffer disruptions to their operations, any of which could negatively affect the Trust’s ability to operate or cause losses in value of the Shares. The Sponsor and the Trust have adopted and implemented policies and procedures that are designed to comply with applicable anti-money laundering and sanctions laws and regulations including any applicable KYC laws and regulations. The Sponsor and the Trust will only interact with known third party service providers with respect to whom it has engaged in a due diligence process to ensure a thorough KYC process, such as the Authorized Participants, Liquidity Providers, the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian. Authorized Participants, as broker-dealers, and the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian, as limited purpose trust companies subject to New York Banking Law, are subject to the BSA and U.S. economic sanctions laws. In addition, the Trust will only accept creations and redemption requests from regulated Authorized Participants who themselves are subject to applicable sanctions and anti-money laundering laws and have compliance programs that are designed to ensure compliance with those laws. In addition, the Liquidity Providers are contractually obligated to have policies and procedures reasonably designed to comply with the money laundering and related provisions of the BSA and implementing regulations, and applicable sanctions laws. The Trust will not hold any ethereum except those that have been delivered by a Liquidity Provider in connection with creation requests. Each of the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian have adopted and implemented an anti-money laundering and sanctions compliance program, which provides additional protections to ensure that the Sponsor and the Trust do not transact with a sanctioned party. Notably, the ETH Custodian performs Know-Your-Transaction (“KYT”) screening using blockchain analytics to identify, detect, and mitigate the risk of transacting with a sanctioned or other unlawful actor. Pursuant to the ETH Custodian’s KYT program, any ethereum that is delivered to the Trust’s ETH Account will undergo screening to ensure that the origins of that ethereum are not illicit. The Additional ETH Custodian’s KYT program includes robust internal policies, procedures and controls that combat the attempted use of the Additional ETH Custodian for illegal or illicit purposes, including a customer identification program, annual training of all employees and officers in anti-money laundering obligations and requirements, filing of Suspicious Activity Reports with the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and annual independent audits of the Additional ETH Custodian’s anti-money laundering program. There is no guarantee that such procedures will always be effective. If the Authorized Participants or Liquidity Providers have inadequate policies, procedures and controls for complying with applicable anti-money laundering and applicable sanctions laws or the Trust’s diligence or procedures are ineffective, violations of such laws could result, which could result in regulatory liability for the Trust, the Sponsor, the Trustee or their affiliates under such laws, including governmental fines, penalties, and other punishments, as well as potential liability to or cessation of services by the ETH Custodian, the Additional ETH Custodian, Liquidity Providers, or the Trust’s other service providers and counterparties. Moreover, AML and related procedures by the ETH Custodian and Additional ETH Custodian could result in the Trust’s ETH being blocked or frozen, and thus made unavailable to the Trust. Any of the foregoing could result in losses to the Shareholders or negatively affect the Trust’s ability to operate. 74 Trading on ETH exchanges outside the United States is not subject to U.S. regulation, and may be less reliable than U.S. exchanges. Barring cash creations and redemptions, or a liquidation of the Trust, the Trust does not purchase or sell ETH. To the extent any of the Trust’s trading is conducted on ETH trading platforms outside the United States, trading on such exchanges is not regulated by any U.S. governmental agency and may involve certain risks not applicable to trading on U.S. exchanges. Certain foreign markets may be more susceptible to disruption than U.S. exchanges. These factors could adversely affect the performance of the Trust. Regulatory changes or actions in foreign jurisdictions may affect the value of the Shares or restrict the use of ETH, mining activity or the operation of their networks or the global ETH markets in a manner that adversely affects the value of the Shares. Various foreign jurisdictions have, and may continue to adopt laws, regulations or directives that affect digital asset networks (including the Ethereum network), the digital asset markets (including the ETH market), and their users, particularly digital asset exchanges and service providers that fall within such jurisdictions’ regulatory scope. For example, if China or other foreign jurisdictions were to ban or otherwise restrict validating activity, including by regulating or limiting manufacturers’ ability to produce or sell semiconductors or hard drives in connection with ethereum mining, it would have a material adverse effect on digital asset networks (including the Ethereum network), the digital asset market, and as a result, impact the value of the Shares. A number of foreign jurisdictions have recently taken regulatory action aimed at digital asset activities. China has made transacting in cryptocurrencies illegal for Chinese citizens in mainland China, and additional restrictions may follow. Both China and South Korea have banned initial coin offerings entirely and regulators in other jurisdictions, including Canada, Singapore and Hong Kong, have opined that initial coin offerings may constitute securities offerings subject to local securities regulations. In May 2021, the Chinese government announced renewed efforts to restrict cryptocurrency trading and mining activities. Regulators in the Inner Mongolia and other regions of China have proposed regulations that would create penalties for companies engaged in cryptocurrency mining activities and introduce heightened energy saving requirements on industrial parks, data centers and power plants providing electricity to cryptocurrency miners. The United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority published final rules in October 2020 banning the sale of derivatives and exchange traded notes that reference certain types of digital assets, contending that they are “ill-suited” to retail investors citing extreme volatility, valuation challenges and association with financial crime. A new bill, the Financial Services and Markets Bill (“FSMB”), became law in 2023. The FSMB brings digital asset activities within the scope of existing laws governing financial institutions, markets and assets. In addition, the European Council of the European Union approved the text of Markets in Crypto-Assets (“MiCA”) in October 2022. MiCA came into effect in 2024, establishing a regulatory framework for digital asset services across the European Union. MiCA is intended to serve as a comprehensive regulation of digital asset markets and imposes various obligations on digital asset issuers and service providers. The main aims of MiCA are industry regulation, consumer protection, prevention of market abuse and upholding the integrity of digital asset markets. Foreign laws, regulations or directives may conflict with those of the United States and may negatively impact the acceptance of one or more digital assets by users, merchants and service providers outside the United States and may therefore impede the growth or sustainability of the digital asset economy in the European Union, China, Japan, Russia and the United States and globally, or otherwise negatively affect the value of ETH. Moreover, other events, such as the interruption in telecommunications or internet services, cyber-related terrorist acts, civil disturbances, war or other catastrophes, could also negatively affect the digital asset economy in one or more jurisdictions. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 led to volatility in digital asset prices, with an initial steep decline followed by a sharp rebound in prices. The effect of any future regulatory change on the Trust or ETH is impossible to predict, but such change could be substantial and adverse to the Trust and the value of the Shares. Tax Risk The treatment of the Trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes is uncertain. The Sponsor intends to take the position that the Trust is properly treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Assuming that the Trust is a grantor trust, the Trust will not be subject to U.S. federal income tax. Rather, if the Trust is a grantor trust, each beneficial owner of Shares will be treated as directly owning its pro rata share of the Trust’s assets and a pro rata portion of the Trust’s income, gain, losses and deductions will “flow through” to each beneficial owner of Shares. 75 The Trust may take certain positions with respect to the tax consequences of Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency. If the IRS were to disagree with, and successfully challenge, any of these positions, the Trust might not qualify as a grantor trust. In addition, the Sponsor has committed to cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency to which the Trust may become entitled in the future. However, there can be no assurance that these abandonments would be treated as effective for U.S. federal income tax purposes, or that the Sponsor will continue to cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency if there are future regulatory developments that would make it feasible for the Trust to retain those assets. If the Trust were treated as owning any asset other than ETH as of any date on which it creates or redeems Shares, it may likely cease to qualify as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Because of the evolving nature of digital currencies, it is not possible to predict potential future developments that may arise with respect to digital currencies, including forks, airdrops and other similar occurrences. Assuming that the Trust is currently a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, certain future developments could render it impossible, or impracticable, for the Trust to continue to be treated as a grantor trust for such purposes. If the Trust is not properly classified as a grantor trust, the Trust might be classified as a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes. If the Trust were classified as a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes, the tax consequences of owning Shares generally would not be materially different from the tax consequences described herein, although there might be certain differences, including with respect to timing of the recognition of taxable income or loss and (in certain circumstances) withholding taxes. In addition, tax information reports provided to beneficial owners of Shares would be made in a different form. If the Trust were not classified as either a grantor trust or a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes, it generally would be classified as a corporation for such purposes. If it were treated as a corporation, the Trust would be subject to entity-level U.S. federal income tax (currently at the rate of 21%), plus possible state and/or local taxes, on its net taxable income, and certain distributions made by the Trust to Shareholders would be treated as taxable dividends to the extent of the Trust’s current and accumulated earnings and profits. Any such dividend distributed to a beneficial owner of Shares that is a non-U.S. person for U.S. federal income tax purposes generally would be subject to U.S. federal withholding tax at a rate of 30% (or such lower rate as provided in an applicable tax treaty). The treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes is uncertain. Assuming that the Trust is properly treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, each beneficial owner of Shares will be treated for U.S. federal income tax purposes as the owner of an undivided interest in the ethereum held in the Trust. Due to the new and evolving nature of digital assets and the absence of comprehensive guidance with respect to digital assets, many significant aspects of the U.S. federal income tax treatment of digital assets (including digital currency) are uncertain. In 2014, the IRS released a notice (the “Notice”) discussing certain aspects of “convertible virtual currency” (that is, digital currency that has an equivalent value in fiat currency or that acts as a substitute for fiat currency) for U.S. federal income tax purposes and, in particular, stating that such digital currency (i) is “property” (ii) is not “currency” for purposes of the rules relating to foreign currency gain or loss and (iii) may be held as a capital asset. In 2019, the IRS released a revenue ruling and a set of “Frequently Asked Questions” (the “Ruling & FAQs”) that provide some additional guidance, including guidance to the effect that, under certain circumstances, hard forks of digital currencies are taxable events giving rise to ordinary income and guidance with respect to the determination of the tax basis of digital currency. However, the Notice and the Ruling & FAQs do not address other significant aspects of the U.S. federal income tax treatment of digital assets. Moreover, although the Ruling & FAQs address the treatment of hard forks, there continues to be uncertainty with respect to the timing and amount of the income inclusions. Future developments that may arise with respect to digital assets may increase the uncertainty with respect to the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes. For example, the Notice addresses only digital currency that is “convertible virtual currency,” and it is conceivable that, as a result of a fork, airdrop or similar occurrence, the Trust will hold certain types of digital assets that are not within the scope of the Notice. There can be no assurance that the IRS will not alter its position with respect to digital assets in the future or that a court would uphold the treatment set forth in the Notice and the Ruling & FAQs. It is also unclear what additional guidance on the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes may be issued in the future. Any future guidance on the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes could increase the expenses of the Trust and could have an adverse effect on the prices of digital assets, including on the price of ETH in the digital asset markets. As a result, any such future guidance could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Shareholders are urged to consult their tax advisers regarding the tax consequences of owning and disposing of Shares and digital assets in general. 76 Future developments regarding the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes could adversely affect the value of the Shares. As discussed above, many significant aspects of the U.S. federal income tax treatment of digital assets, such as ETH, are uncertain, and it is unclear what guidance on the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes may be issued in the future. It is possible that any such guidance would have an adverse effect on the prices of digital assets, including on the price of ethereum in digital asset exchanges, and therefore may have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Because of the evolving nature of digital assets, it is not possible to predict potential future developments that may arise with respect to digital assets, including forks, airdrops and similar occurrences. Such developments may increase the uncertainty with respect to the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Moreover, certain future developments could render it impossible, or impracticable, for the Trust to continue to be treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Future developments in the treatment of digital assets for tax purposes other than U.S. federal income tax purposes could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The taxing authorities of certain states, including New York, (i) have announced that they will follow the Notice with respect to the treatment of digital currencies for state income tax purposes and/or (ii) have issued guidance exempting the purchase and/or sale of digital currencies for fiat currency from state sales tax. Other states have not issued any guidance on these points, and could take different positions (e.g., imposing sales taxes on purchases and sales of digital assets for fiat currency), and states that have issued guidance on their tax treatment of digital currencies (or other digital assets) could update or change their tax treatment of digital currencies (or other digital currencies). It is unclear what further guidance on the treatment of digital currencies for state or local tax purposes may be issued in the future. A state or local government authority’s treatment of ethereum may have negative consequences, including the imposition of a greater tax burden on investors in ETH or the imposition of a greater cost on the acquisition and disposition of ETH generally. The treatment of digital assets for tax purposes by non U.S. jurisdictions may differ from the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal, state or local tax purposes. It is possible, for example, that a non U.S. jurisdiction would impose sales tax or value-added tax on purchases and sales of digital assets for fiat currency. If a foreign jurisdiction with a significant share of the market of ETH users imposes onerous tax burdens on digital currency users, or imposes sales or value-added tax on purchases and sales of digital assets for fiat currency, such actions could result in decreased demand for ETH in such jurisdiction. Any future guidance on the treatment of digital assets for state, local or non U.S. tax purposes could increase the expenses of the Trust and could have an adverse effect on the prices of digital assets, including on the price of ETH in digital asset exchanges. As a result, any such future guidance could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. A U.S. Tax-Exempt Shareholder may recognize “unrelated business taxable income” as a consequence of an investment in Shares. Under the guidance provided in the Ruling & FAQs, hard forks, airdrops and similar occurrences with respect to digital currencies will under certain circumstances be treated as taxable events giving rise to ordinary income. In the absence of guidance to the contrary, it is possible that any such income recognized by a U.S. tax-exempt shareholder would constitute “unrelated business taxable income” (“UBTI”). Tax-exempt shareholders should consult their tax advisers regarding whether such Shareholder may recognize UBTI as a consequence of an investment in Shares. Shareholders could incur a tax liability without an associated distribution of the Trust. In the normal course of business, it is possible that the Trust could incur a taxable gain in connection with the sale of ETH (such as sales of ETH to obtain fiat currency with which to pay the Sponsor Fee or Trust expenses, and including deemed sales of ETH as a result of the Trust using ETH to pay the Sponsor Fee or its expenses) that 77 is otherwise not associated with a distribution to Shareholders. Shareholders may be subject to tax due to the grantor trust status of the Trust even though there is not a corresponding distribution from the Trust. A hard “fork” of the Ethereum Blockchain could result in Shareholders incurring a tax liability. If a hard fork occurs in the Ethereum Blockchain, the Trust could hold both the original ETH and the alternative new ETH. The IRS has held that a hard fork resulting in the creation of new units of cryptocurrency is a taxable event giving rise to ordinary income. Moreover, if such an event occurs, the Trust Agreement provides that the Sponsor shall have the discretion to determine whether the original or the alternative asset shall constitute ETH. The Trust shall treat whichever asset the Sponsor determines is not ETH as Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency, which it has committed to irrevocably abandon. The Ruling & FAQs do not address whether income recognized by a non-U.S. person as a result of a fork, airdrop or similar occurrence could be subject to the 30% withholding tax imposed on U.S.-source “fixed or determinable annual or periodical” income. Non-U.S. shareholders should assume that, in the absence of guidance, a withholding agent (including the Sponsor) is likely to withhold 30% of any such income recognized by a non-U.S. shareholder in respect of its Shares, including by deducting such withheld amounts from proceeds that such non-U.S. shareholder would otherwise be entitled to receive in connection with a distribution of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. The Sponsor has committed to cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency to which the Trust may become entitled in the future. However, there can be no assurance that these abandonments would be treated as effective for U.S. federal income tax purposes, or that the Sponsor will continue to cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency if there are future regulatory developments that would make it feasible for the Trust to retain those assets. The receipt, distribution and/or sale of the alternative ETH may cause Shareholders to incur a United States federal, state, and/or local, or non-U.S. tax liability. Any tax liability could adversely impact an investment in the Shares and may require Shareholders to prepare and file tax returns they would not otherwise be required to prepare and file. Other Risks Potential conflicts of interest may arise among the Sponsor or its affiliates and the Trust. The Sponsor and its affiliates have no fiduciary duties to the Trust and its Shareholders other than as provided in the Trust Agreement, which may permit them to favor their own interests to the detriment of the Trust and its Shareholders. The Sponsor will manage the affairs of the Trust. Conflicts of interest may arise among the Sponsor and its affiliates, on the one hand, and the Trust and its Shareholders, on the other hand. As a result of these conflicts, the Sponsor may favor its own interests and the interests of its affiliates over the Trust and its Shareholders. These potential conflicts include, among others, the following: ● the Sponsor has no fiduciary duties to, and is allowed to take into account the interests of parties other than, the Trust and its Shareholders in resolving conflicts of interest, provided the Sponsor does not act in bad faith; ● the Trust has agreed to indemnify the Sponsor, the Trustee and their respective affiliates pursuant to the Trust Agreement; ● the Sponsor is responsible for allocating its own limited resources among different clients and potential future business ventures, to each of which it may owe fiduciary duties; ● the Sponsor and its staff also service affiliates of the Sponsor, and may also service other digital asset investment vehicles, and their respective clients and cannot devote all of its, or their, respective time or resources to the management of the affairs of the Trust; ● MarketVector, which is the index administrator of the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, is an affiliate of the Sponsor; ● the Sponsor, its affiliates and their officers and employees are not prohibited from engaging in other businesses or activities, including those that might be in direct competition with the Trust; ● affiliates of the Sponsor may start to have substantial direct investments in ETH, or other digital assets or companies in the digital assets ecosystem that they are permitted to manage taking into account their own 78 interests without regard to the interests of the Trust or its Shareholders, and any increases, decreases or other changes in such investments could affect the Index price and, in turn, the value of the Shares; ● the Sponsor decides whether to retain separate counsel, accountants or others to perform services for the Trust; ● the Sponsor may appoint an agent to act on behalf of the Shareholders which may be the Sponsor or an affiliate of the Sponsor; ● VanEck is a minority interest holder in the parent company of Gemini Trust Company, LLC, which is the ETH Custodian, representing less than 1% of its equity. The ETH Custodian serves as a fiduciary and custodian on the Trust’s behalf, and is responsible for safeguarding the ETH, and holding the private keys that provide access to the ETH in the Trust’s ETH Account. ● VanEck is a minority equity holder in Metatech Holdings, the parent company of Nonco LLC and holds approximately 6% of its equity. Nonco LLC is a Liquidity Provider to the Trust, and the Trust conducts its ETH purchase and sale transactions by trading directly with Liquidity Providers, including Nonco LLC. By purchasing the Shares, Shareholders agree and consent to the provisions set forth in the Trust Agreement. Shareholders cannot be assured of the Sponsor’s continued services, the discontinuance of which may be detrimental to the Trust. Shareholders cannot be assured that the Sponsor will be willing or able to continue to serve as sponsor to the Trust for any length of time. If the Sponsor discontinues its activities on behalf of the Trust and a substitute sponsor is not appointed, the Trust will terminate and liquidate its ETH. Appointment of a substitute sponsor will not guarantee the Trust’s continued operation, successful or otherwise. Because a substitute sponsor may have no experience managing a digital asset financial vehicle, a substitute sponsor may not have the experience, knowledge or expertise required to ensure that the Trust will operate successfully or continue to operate at all. Therefore, the appointment of a substitute sponsor may not necessarily be beneficial to the Trust and the Trust may terminate. Although the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian are fiduciaries with respect to the Trust’s assets, they could resign or be removed by the Sponsor, which may trigger early dissolution of the Trust. The ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian are fiduciaries under § 100 of the New York Banking Law and qualified custodians for purposes of Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6) under the Advisers Act and are licensed to custody the Trust’s ETH in trust on the Trust’s behalf. However, the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian may terminate the Custody Agreement or the Additional ETH Custody Agreement, as the case may be, immediately or upon providing the applicable notice provided under the Custody Agreement or the Additional ETH Custody Agreement. If either the ETH Custodian or the Additional ETH Custodian resigns, is removed, or is prohibited by applicable law or regulation to act as custodian, and no successor custodian has been employed, the Sponsor may dissolve the Trust in accordance with the terms of the Trust Agreement. Shareholders may be adversely affected by the lack of independent advisers representing investors in the Trust. The Sponsor has consulted with counsel, accountants and other advisers regarding the formation and operation of the Trust. No counsel was appointed to represent investors in connection with the formation of the Trust or the establishment of the terms of the Trust Agreement and the Shares. Moreover, no counsel has been appointed to represent an investor in connection with the offering of the Shares. Accordingly, an investor should consult his, her or its own legal, tax and financial advisers regarding the desirability of the value of the Shares. Lack of such consultation may lead to an undesirable investment decision with respect to investment in the Shares. Shareholders and Authorized Participants lack the right under the Custody Agreement to assert claims directly against the ETH Custodian, which significantly limits their options for recourse. Neither the Shareholders nor any Authorized Participant or Liquidity Provider have a right under the Custody Agreement to assert a claim against the ETH Custodian. Claims under the Custody Agreement may only be asserted by the Sponsor on behalf of the Trust . 79 The Exchange on which the Shares are listed may halt trading in the Trust’s Shares, which would adversely impact a Shareholder’s ability to sell Shares. 80 The Trust’s Shares are listed and traded on the Exchange under the market symbol “ETHV.” Trading in Shares may be halted due to market conditions or, in light of the Exchange rules and procedures, for reasons that, in the view of the Exchange, make trading in Shares inadvisable. In addition, trading is subject to trading halts caused by extraordinary market volatility pursuant to “circuit breaker” rules that require trading to be halted for a specified period based on a specified market decline. Additionally, there can be no assurance that the requirements necessary to maintain the listing of the Trust’s Shares will continue to be met or will remain unchanged. The liquidity of the Shares may also be affected by the withdrawal from participation of Authorized Participants, which could adversely affect the market price of the Shares. In the event that one or more Authorized Participants or market makers that have substantial interests in the Trust’s Shares withdraw or “step away” from participation in the purchase (creation) or sale (redemption) of the Trust’s Shares, the liquidity of the Shares will likely decrease, which could adversely affect the market price of the Shares and result in Shareholders incurring a loss on their investment. The market infrastructure of the ETH spot market could result in the absence of active Authorized Participants able to support the trading activity of the Trust. ETH is extremely volatile, and concerns exist about the stability, reliability and robustness of many trading platforms where ETH trade. In a highly volatile market, or if one or more exchanges supporting the ETH market faces an issue, it could be extremely challenging for any Authorized Participants to provide continuous liquidity in the Shares. There can be no guarantee that the Sponsor will be able to find an Authorized Participant to actively and continuously support the Trust. ETH spot exchanges are not subject to same regulatory oversight as traditional equity exchanges, which could negatively impact the ability of Authorized Participants to implement arbitrage mechanisms . The trading for spot ETH occurs on multiple trading venues that have various levels and types of regulation, but are not regulated in the same manner as traditional stock and bond exchanges. If these exchanges do not operate smoothly or face technical, security or regulatory issues, that could impact the ability of Authorized Participants to make markets in the Shares. In such an event, trading in the Shares could occur at a material premium or discount against the NAV. Shareholders that are not Authorized Participants may only purchase or sell their Shares in secondary trading markets, and the conditions associated with trading in secondary markets may adversely affect Shareholders’ investment in the Shares. Only Authorized Participants may create or redeem Baskets. All other Shareholders that desire to purchase or sell Shares must do so through the Exchange or in other markets, if any, in which the Shares may be traded. Shares may trade at a premium or discount to the NAV per Share. As the Sponsor and its management have limited history of operating investment vehicles like the Trust, their experience may be inadequate or unsuitable to manage the Trust. The past performances of the Sponsor’s management in other investment vehicles are no indication of their ability to manage an investment vehicle such as the Trust. If the experience of the Sponsor and its management is inadequate or unsuitable to manage an investment vehicle such as the Trust, the operations of the Trust may be adversely affected. Furthermore, the Sponsor is currently engaged in the management of other investment vehicles which could divert their attention and resources. If the Sponsor were to experience difficulties in the management of such other investment vehicles that damaged the Sponsor or its reputation, it could have an adverse impact on the Sponsor’s ability to continue to serve as Sponsor for the Trust. The Sponsor is leanly staffed and relies heavily on key personnel. The Sponsor is leanly staffed and relies heavily on key personnel to manage its activities. These key personnel intend to allocate their time managing the Trust in a manner that they deem appropriate. If such key personnel were to leave or be unable to carry out their present responsibilities, it may have an adverse effect on the management of the Sponsor. The Trust is new, and if it is not profitable, the Trust may terminate and liquidate at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders . 81 The Trust is new. If the Trust does not attract sufficient assets to remain open, then the Trust could be terminated and liquidated at the direction of the Sponsor. Termination and liquidation of the Trust could occur at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders. When the Trust’s assets are sold as part of the Trust’s liquidation, the resulting proceeds distributed to Shareholders may be less than those that may be realized in a sale outside of a liquidation context. Shareholders may be adversely affected by redemption or creation orders that are subject to postponement, suspension or rejection under certain circumstances. Shareholders do not have the rights enjoyed by investors in certain other vehicles and may be adversely affected by a lack of statutory rights and by limited voting and distribution rights . The Shares have limited voting rights and limited distribution rights. For example, Shareholders do not have the right to elect directors, the Trust may enact splits or reverse splits without Shareholder approval and the Trust is not required to pay regular distributions, although the Trust may pay distributions at the discretion of the Sponsor. The Sponsor and the Trustee may agree to amend the Trust Agreement, including to increase the Sponsor Fee, without Shareholder consent. If an amendment imposes new fees and charges or increases existing fees or charges, including the Sponsor’s Fee (except for taxes and other governmental charges, registration fees or other such expenses), or prejudices a substantial existing right of Shareholders, it will become effective for outstanding Shares 30 days after notice of such amendment is given to registered owners. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Sponsor shall have the right to increase or decrease the amount of the Sponsor Fee (i) upon three (3) business days’ prior notice of the increase or decrease being posted on the website of the Trust and (ii) upon three (3) business days’ prior written notice of the increase or decrease being given to the Trustee. Shareholders that are not registered owners (which most shareholders will not be) may not receive specific notice of a fee increase other than through an amendment to the prospectus. Moreover, at the time an amendment becomes effective, by continuing to hold Shares, Shareholders are deemed to agree to the amendment and to be bound by the Trust Agreement as amended without specific agreement to such increase (other than through the “negative consent” procedure described above). The Trust Agreement includes provisions that limit Shareholders’ voting rights and restrict Shareholders’ right to bring a derivative action. Under the Trust Agreement, Shareholders have limited voting rights and the Trust will not have regular Shareholder meetings. Shareholders take no part in the management or control of the Trust. Accordingly, Shareholders do not have the right to authorize actions, appoint service providers or take other actions as may be taken by shareholders of other trusts or companies where shares carry such rights. The Sponsor may take actions in the operation of the Trust that may be adverse to the interests of Shareholders and may adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, pursuant to the terms of the Trust Agreement, Shareholders’ statutory right under Delaware law to bring a derivative action (i.e., to initiate a lawsuit in the name of the Trust in order to assert a claim belonging to the Trust against a fiduciary of the Trust or against a third party when the Trust’s management has refused to do so) is restricted. Under Delaware law, a shareholder may bring a derivative action if the shareholder is a shareholder at the time the action is brought and either (i) was a shareholder at the time of the transaction at issue or (ii) acquired the status of shareholder by operation of law or the Trust’s governing instrument from a person who was a shareholder at the time of the transaction at issue. Additionally, Section 3816(e) of the DSTA specifically provides that a “beneficial owner’s right to bring a derivative action may be subject to such additional standards and restrictions, if any, as are set forth in the governing instrument of the statutory trust, including, without limitation, the requirement that beneficial owners owning a specified beneficial interest in the statutory trust join in the bringing of the derivative action.” In addition to the requirements of applicable law and in accordance with Section 3816(e), the Trust Agreement provides that no Shareholder will have the right, power or authority to bring or maintain a derivative action, suit or other proceeding on behalf of the Trust unless two or more Shareholders who (i) are not “Affiliates” (as defined in the Trust Agreement) of one another and (ii) collectively hold at least 10% of the outstanding Shares join in the bringing or maintaining of such action, suit or other proceeding. This provision applies to any derivative actions brought in the name of the Trust other than claims under the federal securities laws and the rules and regulations thereunder. Due to this additional requirement, a Shareholder attempting to bring or maintain a derivative action in the name of the Trust will be required to locate other Shareholders with which it is not affiliated and that have sufficient Shares to meet the 10% threshold based on the number of Shares outstanding on the date the claim is brought and thereafter throughout the duration of the action, suit or proceeding. This may be difficult and may result in increased costs to a Shareholder attempting to seek redress in the name of the Trust in court. Moreover, if Shareholders bringing a derivative action, suit or proceeding pursuant to this provision of the Trust Agreement do not hold 10% of the outstanding Shares on the date such 82 an action, suit or proceeding is brought, or such Shareholders are unable to maintain Share ownership meeting the 10% threshold throughout the duration of the action, suit or proceeding, such Shareholders’ derivative action may be subject to dismissal. As a result, the Trust Agreement limits the likelihood that a Shareholder will be able to successfully assert a derivative action in the name of the Trust, even if such Shareholder believes that he or she has a valid derivative action, suit or other proceeding to bring on behalf of the Trust. The non-exclusive jurisdiction for certain types of actions and proceedings and waiver of trial by jury clauses set forth in the Trust Agreement may have the effect of limiting a Shareholder’s rights to bring legal action against the Trust and could limit a purchaser’s ability to obtain a favorable judicial forum for disputes with the Trust. The Trust Agreement provides that the courts of the state of Delaware and any federal courts located in Wilmington, Delaware will be the non-exclusive jurisdiction for any claims, suits, actions or proceedings, provided that suits brought to enforce a duty or liability created by the 1933 Act, the Exchange Act or any other claim for which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction and the federal district courts of the United States of America shall be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any complaint asserting a cause of action arising under the 1933 Act, the Exchange Act, or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. By purchasing Shares in the Trust, Shareholders waive certain claims that the courts of the state of Delaware and any federal courts located in Wilmington, Delaware is an inconvenient venue or is otherwise inappropriate. As such, Shareholder could be required to litigate a matter relating to the Trust in a Delaware court, even if that court may otherwise be inconvenient for the Shareholder. The Trust Agreement also waives the right to trial by jury in any such claim, suit, action or proceeding, including any claim under the U.S. federal securities laws, to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law. If a lawsuit is brought against the Trust, it may be heard only by a judge or justice of the applicable trial court, which would be conducted according to different civil procedures and may result in different outcomes than a trial by jury would have, including results that could be less favorable to the plaintiffs in any such action. No Shareholder can waive compliance with respect to the U.S. federal securities laws and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. If a Shareholder opposed a jury trial demand based on the waiver, the applicable court would determine whether the waiver was enforceable based on the facts and circumstances of that case in accordance with applicable federal laws. To our knowledge, the enforceability of a contractual pre-dispute jury trial waiver in connection with claims arising under the U.S. federal securities laws has not been finally adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, we believe that a contractual pre-dispute jury trial waiver provision is generally enforceable, including under the laws of the State of Delaware, which govern the Trust Agreement. By purchasing Shares in the Trust, Shareholders waive a right to a trial by jury which may limit a Shareholder’s ability to bring a claim in a judicial forum that it finds favorable for disputes with the Trust. An investment in the Trust may be adversely affected by competition from other investment vehicles focused on ETH or other cryptocurrencies. The Trust will compete with direct investments in ETH, other cryptocurrencies, ETH Futures, and other potential financial vehicles, possibly including securities backed by or linked to cryptocurrency and other investment vehicles that focus on other digital assets. Market and financial conditions, and other conditions beyond the Trust’s control, may make it more attractive to invest in other vehicles, which could adversely affect the performance of the Trust. Shareholders cannot be assured of the Sponsor’s continued services, the discontinuance of which may be detrimental to the Trust. Shareholders cannot be assured that the Sponsor will be able to continue to service the Trust for any length of time. If the Sponsor discontinues its activities on behalf of the Trust, the Trust may be adversely affected, as there may be no entity servicing the Trust for a period of time. Such an event could result in termination of the Trust. Shareholders may be adversely affected by creation or redemption orders that are subject to postponement, suspension or rejection under certain circumstances. The Trust may, in its discretion, suspend the right of creation or redemption or may postpone the redemption or purchase settlement date, for (1) any period during which the Exchange is closed other than customary weekend or holiday closings, or trading on the Exchange is suspended or restricted, (2) any period during which an emergency exists as a result of which the fulfillment of a purchase order or the redemption distribution is not reasonably practicable (for example, as a result of a significant technical failure, power outage, or network error), or (3) such other period as the Sponsor determines to be necessary for the protection of the Shareholders of the Trust (for example, where acceptance of the Basket Deposit would have certain adverse tax consequences to the Trust or its Shareholders). In addition, the Trust may 83 reject a redemption order if (1) the order is not in proper form as described in the Authorized Participant Agreement, (2) the fulfillment of the order counsel advises may be illegal under applicable laws and regulations, or (3) if circumstances outside the control of the Sponsor, the person authorized to take redemption orders in the manner provided in the Authorized Participant Agreement, Cash Custodian or the Ethereum Custodian make it for all practical purposes not feasible for the Shares to be delivered or the redemption distribution to be made. Any such postponement, suspension or rejection could adversely affect a redeeming Authorized Participant. Suspension of creation privileges may adversely impact how the Shares are traded and arbitraged on the secondary market, which could cause them to trade at levels materially different (premiums and discounts) from the fair value of their underlying holdings. If such a suspension or postponement occurs at a time when an Authorized Participant intends to redeem Shares, and the price of ETH decreases before such Authorized Participant is able again to surrender for redemption Baskets, such Authorized Participant will sustain a loss with respect to the amount that it would have been able to obtain in exchange for the ethereum received from the Trust upon the redemption of its Shares, had the redemption taken place when such Authorized Participant originally intended it to occur. As a consequence, Authorized Participants may reduce their trading in Shares during periods of suspension, decreasing the number of potential buyers of Shares in the secondary market and, therefore, decreasing the price a Shareholder may receive upon sale. Shareholders may be adversely affected by an overstatement or understatement of the NAV Calculation of the Trust due to the valuation method employed on the date of the NAV calculation. In certain circumstances, the Trust’s ETH investments may be valued using techniques other than reliance on the price established by the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. The Sponsor will monitor for significant events related to crypto assets that may impact the value of ETH and will determine in good faith, and in accordance with its valuation policies and procedures, whether to fair value the Trust’s ETH on a given day based on whether certain pre-determined criteria have been met. For example, if the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate deviates by more than a pre-determined amount from an alternate benchmark available to the Sponsor, then the Sponsor may determine to utilize the alternate benchmark. The Sponsor evaluates its fair value criteria and the factors in determining such criteria from time to time and no less than quarterly. The Sponsor may also fair value the Trust’s ETH using observed market transactions from one or more exchanges. The Sponsor may also fair value the Trust’s ETH using a combination of inputs in certain situations (e.g., using observed market transactions, OTC quotations from brokers, etc.). The value of the Shares of the Trust established by using the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be different from what would be produced through the use of another methodology. ETH or other digital asset investments that are valued using techniques other than those employed by the MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, including ETH investments that are “fair valued,” may be subject to greater fluctuation in their value from one day to the next than would be the case if market-price valuation techniques were used. The liability of the Sponsor and the Trustee is limited, and the value of the Shares will be adversely affected if the Trust is required to indemnify the Trustee or the Sponsor. Under the Trust Agreement, the Trustee and the Sponsor are not liable, and have the right to be indemnified, for any liability or expense incurred absent gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of the Trustee or the Sponsor or breach by the Sponsor of the Trust Agreement, as the case may be. As a result, the Sponsor may require the assets of the Trust to be sold in order to cover losses or liability suffered by it or by the Trustee. Any sale of that kind would reduce the NAV of the Trust and the value of its Shares. Due to the increased use of technologies, intentional and unintentional cyber-attacks pose operational and information security risks. With the increased use of technologies such as the internet and the dependence on computer systems to perform necessary business functions, the Trust is susceptible to operational and information security risks. In general, cyber incidents can result from deliberate attacks or unintentional events. Cyber-attacks include, but are not limited to, gaining unauthorized access to digital systems for purposes of misappropriating assets or sensitive information, corrupting data, or causing operational disruption. Cyber-attacks may also be carried out in a manner that does not require gaining unauthorized access, such as causing denial-of-service attacks on websites. Cybersecurity failures or breaches of one or more of the Trust’s service providers (including, but not limited to, MarketVector, the administrator, transfer agent, and the ETH Custodian) have the ability to cause disruptions and impact business operations, potentially resulting in financial losses, the inability of the Shareholders to transact business, violations of applicable privacy and other laws, regulatory fines, penalties, reputational damage, reimbursement or other compensation costs, and/or additional compliance costs. 84 In addition, substantial costs may be incurred in order to prevent any cyber incidents in the future. The Trust and its Shareholders could be negatively impacted as a result. While the Trust has established business continuity plans, there are inherent limitations in such plans. The Trust and its service providers are subject to certain operational risks. The Trust and its service providers, including the Sponsor, Administrator, Transfer Agent, ETH Custodian and Cash Custodian (as well as Authorized Participants and market makers) may experience disruptions that arise from human error, processing and communications errors, counterparty or third-party errors, or technology or systems failures, any of which may have an adverse impact on the Trust. Although the Trust and its service providers seek to mitigate these operational risks through their internal controls and operational risk management processes, these measures may not identify or may be inadequate to address all such risks. Additionally, the ETH Custodian and the Additional ETH Custodian, which were established in 2015 and 2012, respectively, each have a limited operating company and experience, which could heighten certain operational risks. Risk Factors Related to ERISA Notwithstanding the commercially reasonable efforts of the Sponsor, it is possible that the underlying assets of the Trust will be deemed to include “plan assets” for the purposes of Title I of ERISA or Section 4975 of the Code. If the assets of the Trust were deemed to be “plan assets,” this could result in, among other things, (i) the application of the prudence and other fiduciary standards of ERISA to investments made by the Trust and (ii) the possibility that certain transactions in which the Trust might otherwise seek to engage in the ordinary course of its business and operation could constitute non-exempt “prohibited transactions” under Section 406 of ERISA and/or Section 4975 of the Code, which could restrict the Trust from entering into an otherwise desirable investment or from entering into an otherwise favorable transaction. In addition, fiduciaries who decide to invest in the Trust could, under certain circumstances, be liable for “prohibited transactions” or other violations as a result of their investment in the Trust or as co-fiduciaries for actions taken by or on behalf of the Trust or the Sponsor. There may be other federal, state, local, non-U.S. law or regulation that contains one or more provisions that are similar to the foregoing provisions of ERISA and the Code that may also apply to an investment in the Trust. The application of ERISA (including the corresponding provisions of the Code and other relevant laws) may be complex and dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of the Trust and of each Plan, and it is the responsibility of the appropriate fiduciary of each investing Plan to ensure that any investment in the Trust by such Plan is consistent with all applicable requirements. Each Shareholder, whether or not subject to Title I of ERISA or Section 4975 of the Code, should consult its own legal and other advisors regarding the considerations discussed above and all other relevant ERISA and other considerations before purchasing the Shares.