Maria Andraos, Mario Ghossoub · 2026-09-25
A plain-English AI summary of what this paper means for investors — generated on demand from the abstract.
We consider an insurance market with hidden information, where the agent's type is private information and is drawn from an arbitrary type space. We study implementability of a collection of retention functions, namely, how to select premium schedules so that the resulting menu of contracts is incentive compatible, or truthful. Specifically, for general type spaces, implementability is equivalent to cyclical monotonicity of the collection of retention functions. For compact interval type spaces, we show that submodularity is a sufficient condition for implementability, under suitable type ordering assumptions. Moreover, for any implementable collection of retention functions, we characterize all corresponding premium schedules, up to a common additive constant. Finally, we apply our results to several standard classes of insurance contracts, for which the general implementability conditions admit simpler characterizations, and we provide several numerical illustrations.
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