What changed in this filing

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Item 1A. Risk Factors

2025-11-14 compared with 2025-08-19 · 63 added, 44 removed, 76 unchanged (58% of the section changed)

12 unchanged sentences

may not realize the anticipated benefits of the acquisition of Metagramm

March 2025, we acquired Metagramm, a company that specializes in developing advanced writing assistance tools and licenses its

products on a subscription basis.

March 2025, we acquired Metagramm, a company that specializes in developing advanced writing assistance tools and licenses its products

on a subscription basis.

Metagramm’s products and revenue model differs from those of our current platforms.

not be able to assimilate or integrate the acquired personnel, operations, products, services, and technologies of Metagramm

successfully or effectively manage the business of Metagramm and our management may be distracted from operating our business.

also may not achieve the anticipated benefits from the acquisition of Metagramm due to a number of factors, including, without

limitation, unanticipated costs or liabilities associated with the acquisition and difficulty of incorporating Metagramm’s

technology into our platforms.

If the acquisition of Metagramm fails to meet our expectations, our operating results, business, and

financial condition may suffer.

We may not be able

to assimilate or integrate the acquired personnel, operations, products, services, and technologies of Metagramm successfully or effectively

manage the business of Metagramm and our management may be distracted from operating our business.

We also may not achieve the anticipated

benefits from the acquisition of Metagramm due to a number of factors, including, without limitation, unanticipated costs or liabilities

associated with the acquisition and difficulty of incorporating Metagramm’s technology into our platforms.

If the acquisition of

Metagramm fails to meet our expectations, our operating results, business, and financial condition may suffer.

has concluded that there is substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern, and our condensed financial statements

for the quarter ended June 30, 2025 include an explanatory paragraph as to our ability to continue as a going concern, which could prevent

us from obtaining new financing on reasonable terms or at all.

for the quarter ended September 30, 2025 include an explanatory paragraph as to our ability to continue as a going concern, which could

prevent us from obtaining new financing on reasonable terms or at all.

we have had recurring losses and negative cash flows from operating activities, substantial doubt exists regarding our ability to remain

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Accordingly, our condensed financial statements for the quarter

ended June 30, 2025 include an explanatory paragraph as to our potential inability to continue as a going concern.

ended September 30, 2025 include an explanatory paragraph as to our potential inability to continue as a going concern.

The doubts regarding

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and citizens.

the October 7th attacks by Hamas terrorists in Israel’s southern border, Israel declared war against Hamas and since then, Israel

has been involved in military conflicts with Hamas, Hezbollah, a terrorist organization based in Lebanon, and Iran, both directly and

through proxies like the Houthi movement in Yemen and armed groups in Iraq and other terrorist organizations.

Additionally, following

the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Israel has conducted limited military operations targeting the Syrian army, Iranian military assets

and infrastructure linked to Hezbollah and other Iran-supported groups.

Although certain ceasefire agreements have been reached, and

some Iranian proxies have declared a halt to their attacks, there is no assurance that these agreements will be upheld, military activity

and hostilities continue to exist at varying levels of intensity, and the situation remains volatile, with the potential for escalation

into a broader regional conflict involving additional terrorist organizations and possibly other countries.

In June 2025, in light of

continued nuclear threats and intelligence assessments indicating imminent attacks, Israel launched a preemptive strike directly targeting

military and nuclear infrastructure inside Iran, aimed at disrupting Iran’s capacity to coordinate or launch further hostilities

against Israel, as well as to degrade its nuclear program.

In response, Iran launched multiple waves of drones and ballistic missiles

at Israeli cities.

October 2023, Hamas terrorists infiltrated Israel’s southern border from the Gaza Strip and conducted a series of attacks on civilian

and military targets.

Hamas also launched extensive rocket attacks on Israeli population and industrial centers located along Israel’s

border with the Gaza Strip and in other areas within the State of Israel.

These attacks resulted in extensive deaths, injuries and kidnapping

of civilians and soldiers.

Following the attack, Israel’s security cabinet declared war against Hamas and a military campaign against

these terrorist organizations commenced in parallel to their continued rocket and terror attacks.

In January 2025, Israel and Hamas entered

into a ceasefire agreement, which remained in effect until March 18, 2025, when hostilities resumed.

As of October 9, 2025, Israel and

Hamas entered into a renewed ceasefire agreement calling for a permanent end of the war.

However, there are no assurances that such as

agreement will hold.

While the conflict has created heightened security concerns, disruptions to business operations, and economic instability,

the ceasefire may contribute to improved regional stability.

However, the security situation remains fluid, and any renewed military

actions, restrictions, or government-imposed measures could adversely affect our operations, supply chains, and financial condition.

the commencement of these events, there have been continued hostilities along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon (with the Hezbollah

terror organization) and on other fronts from various extremist groups in region, such as the Houthis in Yemen and various rebel militia

groups in Syria and Iraq.

In October 2024, Israel began limited ground operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and in November 2024,

a ceasefire was brokered between Israel and Hezbollah, but there are no guarantees as to whether the agreement will hold or whether further

hostilities will resume.

addition, in April 2024 and October 2024, Iran launched direct attacks on Israel involving hundreds of drones and missiles and has threatened

to continue to attack Israel and is widely believed to be developing nuclear weapons.

In June 2025, in light of continued nuclear threats

and intelligence assessments indicating imminent attacks, Israel launched a preemptive strike directly targeting military and nuclear

infrastructure inside Iran, aimed at disrupting Iran’s capacity to coordinate or launch further hostilities against Israel, as

well as to degrade its nuclear program.

In response, Iran launched multiple waves of drones and ballistic missiles at Israeli cities.

While most of these attacks were intercepted, several caused civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

Israeli military conducted additional operations against Iranian assets.

While a ceasefire was reached between Israel and Iran in June

2025 after 12 days of hostilities, the situation remains volatile.

A broader regional conflict involving additional state and non-state

actors remains a significant risk.

Iran is also believed to have a strong influence among extremist groups in the region, such as Hamas

in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen and various rebel militia groups in Syria and Iraq.

These situations may

potentially escalate in the future to more violent events which may affect Israel and us.

our facilities have not been damaged during the current war, the hostilities with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and its proxies and others have

caused and may continue to cause damage to private and public facilities, infrastructure, utilities, and telecommunication networks,

and potentially disrupting our operations and supply chains.

In addition, Israeli organizations, government agencies and companies have

been subject to extensive cyber attacks.

This could lead to increased costs, risks to employee safety, and challenges to business continuity,

with potential financial losses.

While a ceasefire was

reached between Israel and Iran in June 2025 after 12 days of hostilities, the situation remains volatile.

A broader regional conflict

involving additional state and non-state actors remains a significant risk.

Iran is also believed to have a strong influence among extremist

groups in the region, such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen and various rebel militia groups in Syria

These situations may potentially escalate in the future to more violent events which may affect Israel and us.

our facilities have not been damaged during the recent war, the hostilities with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and its proxies and others caused,

and may continue to cause if hostilities resume, damage to private and public facilities, infrastructure, utilities, and telecommunication

networks, and potentially disrupting our operations and supply chains.

In addition, Israeli organizations, government agencies and companies

have been subject to extensive cyber attacks.

This could lead to increased costs, risks to employee safety, and challenges to business

continuity, with potential financial losses.

The continuation of the war has also led to a deterioration of certain indicators of Israel’s

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which in turn may materially and adversely affect our ability to deliver or provide products and services to customers.

the intensity and duration of the security situation in Israel has been difficult to predict, as were the economic implications on our

business and operations and on Israel’s economy in general, the ceasefire marks a potential shift towards stability in the region.

If sustained, this could reduce the risk of disruptions to our business and the Israeli economy in general.

However, if the war is renewed

or expands to other fronts, such as Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank, our operations may be harmed.

commercial insurance does not cover losses that may occur as a result of events associated with war and terrorism.

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Compared sentence by sentence after normalising whitespace, quotation marks, case and digits, so re-formatting and restated figures do not read as changed language. Wording changes appear as one removal and one addition. The current filing and the prior one are authoritative.

What changed 10-Q

Item 1A. Risk Factors