Grayscale Bitcoin Trust ETF 10-K

Item 1A. Risk Factors The following risks, some of which have occurred and any of which may occur in the future, can have a material adverse effect on our business or financial performance, which in turn can affect the price of the Shares. These are not the only risks we face. There may be other risks we are not currently aware of or that we currently deem not to be material but may become material in the future. The risk factors below should be read in conjunction with the other information included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K, including the Trust’s financial statements and related notes thereto, and our other filings with the SEC. Risk Factors Related to Digital Assets The trading prices of many digital assets, including Bitcoin, have experienced extreme volatility and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including declines in the trading prices of Bitcoin, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. The trading prices of many digital assets, including Bitcoin, have experienced extreme volatility throughout their existence and may continue to do so. For instance, following significant increases throughout the majority of 2020, digital asset prices, including Bitcoin, experienced significant volatility throughout 2021 and 2022. This volatility became extreme in November 2022 when FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), halted customer withdrawals. Additionally, on October 10, 2025, it was reported that a sharp decline in digital asset market prices triggered the liquidation of approximately $20 billion in leveraged positions across the digital asset industry. Any similar halting of withdrawals or liquidations across leveraged positions in the digital asset industry in the future could further impact trading prices. See “—Recent developments in the digital asset economy have led to extreme volatility and disruption in digital asset markets, a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem, significant negative publicity surrounding digital assets broadly and market-wide declines in liquidity.” Digital asset prices, including Bitcoin, have continued to fluctuate widely through the date of this Annual Report. Extreme volatility in the future, including declines in the trading prices of Bitcoin, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. Furthermore, negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the digital asset economy may reduce confidence in the digital asset economy and may result in greater volatility in the price of Bitcoin and other digital assets, including a depreciation in value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any actions to take advantage, or mitigate the impacts, of volatility in the price of Bitcoin. For additional information that quantifies the volatility of Bitcoin prices and the value of the Shares, see “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Historical NAV and Bitcoin Prices.” Furthermore, changes in U.S. political leadership and economic policies may create uncertainty that materially affects the price of Bitcoin and the Trust’s Shares. For example, on March 6, 2025, President Trump signed an Executive Order to establish a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and a United States Digital Asset Stockpile. Pursuant to this Executive Order, the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve will be capitalized with Bitcoin owned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury that was forfeited as part of criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings, and the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce are authorized to develop budget-neutral strategies for acquiring additional Bitcoin, provided that those strategies impose no incremental costs on American taxpayers. Conversely, the Digital Asset Stockpile will consist of all digital assets other than Bitcoin owned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury that were forfeited in criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings, but the U.S. government will not acquire additional assets for the U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile beyond those obtained through such proceedings. The anticipation of a U.S. government-funded strategic cryptocurrency reserve had motivated large-scale purchases of Bitcoin in the expectation of the U.S. government acquiring such assets to fund such reserve, and the market price of Bitcoin decreased significantly as a result of the ultimate content of the Executive Order. Any similar action or omission by the U.S. federal administration or other government authorities with respect to Bitcoin or other digital assets may negatively and significantly impact the price of Bitcoin and the Trust’s Shares. Digital assets such as Bitcoin were only introduced within the past two decades, and the medium-to-long term value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies and to the fundamental investment characteristics of digital assets. Digital assets such as Bitcoin were only introduced within the past two decades, and the medium-to-long term value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies, such as the recency of their development, their dependence on the internet and other technologies, their dependence on the role played by users, developers and miners and the potential for malicious activity. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares: • Digital asset networks and related protocols are in the early stages of development. Given the recency of the development of digital asset networks and related protocols, digital assets and the underlying digital asset networks and related protocols 44 may not function as intended and parties may be unwilling to use digital assets, which would dampen the growth, if any, of digital asset networks and related protocols. • The loss of access to a private key required to access a digital asset may be irreversible. If a private key is lost and no backup of the private key is accessible, or if the private key is otherwise compromised, the owner would be unable to access the digital asset corresponding to that private key. • Digital asset networks and related protocols are dependent upon the internet. A disruption of the internet or a digital asset network or related protocol, such as the Bitcoin Network, would affect the ability to transfer digital assets, including Bitcoin, and, consequently, their value. • The acceptance of software patches or upgrades to a digital asset network by a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the users and miners in a digital asset network, such as the Bitcoin Network, could result in a “fork” in such network’s blockchain, resulting in the operation of multiple separate blockchain networks. • Digital asset mining operations can consume significant amounts of electricity, which may have a negative environmental impact and give rise to public opinion against allowing, or government regulations restricting, the use of electricity for mining operations. Additionally, miners may be forced to cease operations during an electricity shortage or power outage. • Many digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges and are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. These attempts to increase the volume of transactions may not be effective. • The open-source structure of many digital asset network protocols, such as the protocol for the Bitcoin Network, means that developers and other contributors are generally not compensated for their contributions in maintaining and developing such protocols. As a result, the developers and other contributors of a particular digital asset may lack a financial incentive to maintain or develop the network, or may lack the resources to adequately address emerging issues. Alternatively, some developers may be funded by companies whose interests are at odds with other participants in a particular digital asset network. A failure to properly monitor and upgrade the protocol of the Bitcoin Network could damage that network. • Moreover, in the past, flaws in the source code for digital asset networks and related protocols have been exposed and exploited, including flaws that disabled some functionality for users, exposed users’ personal information and/or resulted in the theft of users’ digital assets. The cryptography underlying the Bitcoin Network could prove to be flawed or ineffective, or developments in mathematics and/or technology, including advances in digital computing, algebraic geometry and quantum computing, could result in such cryptography becoming ineffective. Quantum computing technology is an emerging phenomenon which, because it is still developing, makes it difficult to predict its ultimate effect on the future value of Bitcoin and other digital assets. However, if quantum computing technology is able to advance and significantly increase its capacity relative to the capacity of today’s leading quantum computers, it could potentially undermine the viability of many of the cryptographic algorithms used across the world’s information technology infrastructure, including the cryptographic algorithms used for digital assets like Bitcoin. If quantum computing is able to advance in that way, there is a risk that quantum computing could materially reduce the security assumptions underlying Bitcoin’s protocol and result in the cryptography underlying the Bitcoin Network becoming ineffective. If such is realized, it could compromise the security of the Bitcoin Network or allow a malicious actor to compromise the wallets holding Bitcoin owned by the Trust or others on the Bitcoin Network, which would result in losses to shareholders. For example, if sufficiently powerful quantum computers are developed, they could use known quantum algorithms to derive private keys from publicly available public keys, potentially allowing malicious actors to forge transaction signatures and misappropriate Bitcoin. There is no guarantee that new quantum-proof architectures will be built and appropriate transitions will be implemented across the network at scale in a timely manner; any such changes could require the achievement of broad consensus within the Bitcoin Network community and may result in a fork (or multiple forks), and there can be no assurance that such consensus would be achieved or the changes implemented successfully. In such a scenario, the Bitcoin Network may not be able to transition to quantum-resistant cryptography in a timely or effective manner. In any of these circumstances, a malicious actor may be able to take the Trust’s Bitcoin, which would adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, functionality of the Bitcoin Network may be negatively affected by such an exploit such that it is no longer attractive to users, thereby dampening demand for Bitcoin. Even if another digital asset other than Bitcoin were affected by similar circumstances, any reduction in confidence in the source code or cryptography underlying digital asset networks and related protocols generally could negatively affect the demand for digital assets and therefore adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, because digital assets, including Bitcoin, have existed for a short period of time and are continuing to be developed, there may be additional risks to digital asset networks and related protocols that are impossible to predict as of the date of this Annual Report. 45 Digital assets represent a relatively new and rapidly evolving industry, and the value of the Shares depends on the acceptance of Bitcoin . The Bitcoin Network was first launched in 2009 and was the first cryptographic digital asset created to gain global adoption and critical mass. Although the Bitcoin Network is the most established digital asset network, the Bitcoin Network and related protocols represent a relatively new and rapidly evolving industry that is subject to a variety of factors that are difficult to evaluate. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares: • Bitcoin is only selectively accepted as a means of payment by retail and commercial outlets, and use of Bitcoin by consumers remains limited. Banks and other established financial institutions, whether voluntarily or in response to regulatory feedback, may refuse to process funds for Bitcoin transactions; process wire transfers to or from Digital Asset Trading Platforms, Bitcoin-related companies or service providers; or maintain accounts for persons or entities transacting in Bitcoin. As a result, the prices of Bitcoin are largely determined by speculators and miners, thus contributing to price volatility that makes retailers less likely to accept it as a form of payment in the future. • Banks may not provide banking services, or may cut off banking services, to businesses that provide digital asset-related services or that accept digital assets as payment, which could dampen liquidity in the market and damage the public perception of digital assets generally or any one digital asset in particular, such as Bitcoin, and their or its utility as a payment system, which could decrease the price of digital assets generally or individually. • The prices of digital assets may be determined on a relatively small number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms by a relatively small number of market participants, many of whom are speculators or those intimately involved with the issuance of such digital assets, such as miners or developers, which could contribute to price volatility that makes retailers less likely to accept digital assets in the future. • Certain privacy-preserving features have been or are expected to be introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If any such features are introduced to the Bitcoin Network, any trading platforms or businesses that facilitate transactions in Bitcoin may be at an increased risk of criminal or civil lawsuits, or of having banking services cut off if there is a concern that these features interfere with the performance of anti-money laundering duties and economic sanctions checks. • Users, developers and miners may switch to or adopt certain digital asset networks or protocols at the expense of their engagement with other digital asset networks and protocols, which may negatively impact those networks and protocols, including the Bitcoin Network. The Trust is not actively managed and will not have any formal strategy relating to the development of the Bitcoin Network. Changes in the governance of a digital asset network or protocol may not receive sufficient support from users and miners, which may negatively affect that digital asset network’s or protocol’s ability to grow and respond to challenges. The governance of some digital asset networks and protocols, such as the Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, is generally by voluntary consensus and open competition. For such networks and protocols, there may be a lack of consensus or clarity on that network’s or protocol’s governance, which may stymie such network’s or protocol’s utility, adaptability and ability to grow and face challenges. The foregoing notwithstanding, the underlying software for some digital asset networks and protocols, such as the Bitcoin Network, is informally or formally managed or developed by a group of core developers that propose amendments to the relevant network’s or protocol’s source code. Core developers’ roles may evolve over time, generally based on self-determined participation. If a significant majority of users and miners were to adopt amendments to a decentralized network based on the proposals of such core developers, such network would be subject to new source code that may adversely affect the value of the relevant digital asset. As a result of the foregoing, it may be difficult to find solutions or marshal sufficient effort to overcome any future problems, especially long-term problems, on digital asset networks. Digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges and efforts to increase the volume and speed of transactions may not be successful. Many digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges due to the fact that public, permissionless blockchains generally face a tradeoff between security and scalability. One means through which digital asset networks that utilize public, permissionless blockchains achieve security is decentralization, meaning that no intermediary is responsible for securing and maintaining these systems. For example, a greater degree of decentralization of a public, permissionless blockchain generally means a given digital asset network is less susceptible to manipulation or capture. In practice, this typically means that every single node on a given digital asset network is responsible for securing the system by processing every transaction and maintaining a copy of the entire state of the network. As a result, a digital asset network that utilizes a public, permissionless blockchain may be limited in the number of transactions it can process by the computing capabilities of each single fully participating node. Many developers are actively researching and testing scalability solutions for public blockchains that do not necessarily result in lower levels of security or decentralization, such as off-chain payment channels and Layer 2 networks. Off-chain payment channels would allow parties to transact without requiring the full processing power 46 of a blockchain. Layer 2 networks can increase the scalability of a blockchain by allowing users to transact on a second blockchain deployed on top of a “Layer 1” network. As of December 31, 2025, the Bitcoin Network handled approximately five transactions per second. In an effort to increase the volume of transactions that can be processed on a given digital asset network, many digital asset networks are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. For example, in August 2017, the Bitcoin Network was upgraded with a technical feature known as “Segregated Witness” that was designed to double the transactions per second that can be handled on-chain and enable so-called second layer solutions, such as the Lightning Network, or payment channels that greatly increase transaction throughput (i.e., millions of transactions per second). However, wallets and “intermediaries,” or connecting nodes that facilitate payment channels that support Segregated Witness or Lightning Network-like technologies have not seen wide-scale use as of December 31, 2025, and there is no guarantee that they will be successful in increasing the transaction throughput of the Bitcoin Network. Additionally, questions remain regarding Lightning Network services, such as its cost and who will serve as intermediaries. As corresponding increases in throughput lag behind growth in the use of digital asset networks, average transaction fees and settlement times may increase considerably. For example, the Bitcoin Network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees. Since January 1, 2023, Bitcoin average daily transaction fees have ranged from $0.31 per transaction on December 7, 2025, to as high as $124.17 per transaction, on April 20, 2024. As of December 31, 2025, Bitcoin average daily transaction fees stood at $0.65 per transaction. Increased transaction fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for Bitcoin (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, Bitcoin, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares. There is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the scale of settlement or throughput of Bitcoin Network transactions will be effective, or how long these mechanisms will take to become effective, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares. Digital asset networks are developed by a diverse set of contributors and the perception that certain high-profile contributors will no longer contribute to the network could have an adverse effect on the market price of the related digital asset. Digital asset networks and related protocols are often developed by a diverse set of contributors, but are also often developed by identifiable and high-profile contributors. The perception that certain high-profile contributors may no longer contribute to the applicable digital asset network or protocol may have an adverse effect on the market price of any related digital assets. For example, in June 2017, an unfounded rumor circulated that Ethereum protocol developer Vitalik Buterin had died. Following the rumor, the price of Ether decreased approximately 20% before recovering after Buterin himself dispelled the rumor. Some have speculated that the rumor led to the decrease in the price of Ether. In the event a high-profile contributor to the Bitcoin Network, or closely associated supporting infrastructure and applications such as Layer 2 networks or other scaling solutions, is perceived as no longer contributing to such networks due to death, retirement, withdrawal, incapacity, or otherwise, whether or not such perception is valid, it could negatively affect the price of Bitcoin, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares. Digital assets may have concentrated ownership and large sales or distributions by holders of such digital assets, or any ability to participate in or otherwise influence a digital asset’s underlying network, could have an adverse effect on the market price of such digital asset. As of December 31, 2025, the largest 100 Bitcoin wallets held approximately 15% of the Bitcoin in circulation. Moreover, it is possible that other persons or entities control multiple wallets that collectively hold a significant amount of Bitcoin, even if they individually only hold a small amount, and it is possible that some of these wallets are controlled by the same person or entity. Further, holders with substantial Bitcoin positions may directly or indirectly exert influence over other ecosystem participants such as miners, developers, or major wallet and infrastructure providers. For example, these large holders may signal large potential sales or otherwise affect the stability of the market price of Bitcoin, which could influence protocol development, governance dynamics, or market conditions. As a result of this concentration of ownership, large sales or distributions by such holders could have an adverse effect on the market price of Bitcoin. If the digital asset reward for mining blocks and transaction fees for recording transactions on the Bitcoin Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize miners, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate mining activities, miners may cease expanding processing power or demand high transaction fees, which could negatively impact the value of Bitcoin and the value of the Shares. If the digital asset rewards for mining blocks or the transaction fees for recording transactions on the Bitcoin Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize miners, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate mining activities, miners may cease expending processing power to mine blocks and confirmations of transactions on the Bitcoin Blockchain could be slowed. Currently, the fixed reward for solving a new block is 3.125 Bitcoin per block. The amount of Bitcoin rewarded for solving a new block is expected to decrease by half after every 210,000 blocks. The next halving is expected to occur mid-2028 and roughly every four years 47 thereafter, until the amount of Bitcoin in existence reaches the pre-determined 21 million Bitcoin. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares: • Over the past several years, digital asset mining operations have evolved from individual users mining with computer processors, graphics processing units and first-generation application specific integrated circuit machines to “professionalized” mining operations using proprietary hardware or sophisticated machines. If the profit margins of digital asset mining operations are not sufficiently high, including due to an increase in electricity costs, digital asset miners are more likely to immediately sell digital assets earned by mining, resulting in an increase in liquid supply of that digital asset, which would generally tend to reduce that digital asset’s market price. • A reduction in the processing power expended by miners on the Bitcoin Network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor or botnet obtaining control on the Bitcoin Network. See “—If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Bitcoin Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Blockchain to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.” • Miners have historically accepted relatively low transaction confirmation fees on most digital asset networks. If miners demand higher transaction fees for recording transactions in the Bitcoin Blockchain or a software upgrade automatically charges fees for all transactions on the Bitcoin Network, the cost of using Bitcoin may increase and the marketplace may be reluctant to accept Bitcoin as a means of payment. Alternatively, miners could collude in an anti-competitive manner to reject low transaction fees on the Bitcoin Network and force users to pay higher fees, thus reducing the attractiveness of the Bitcoin Network. Higher transaction confirmation fees resulting through collusion or otherwise may adversely affect the attractiveness of the Bitcoin Network, the value of Bitcoin and the value of the Shares. • To the extent that any miners cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in mined blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Bitcoin Blockchain until a block is mined by a miner who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in the digital asset network. • Digital asset mining operations can consume significant amounts of electricity, which may have a negative environmental impact and give rise to public opinion against allowing, or government regulations restricting, the use of electricity for mining operations. Additionally, miners may be forced to cease operations during an electricity shortage or power outage. If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Bitcoin Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Blockchain to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate. If a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains a majority of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network, it may be able to alter the Bitcoin Blockchain on which transactions in Bitcoin rely by constructing fraudulent blocks or preventing certain transactions from completing in a timely manner, or at all. The malicious actor or botnet could also control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions. Although the malicious actor or botnet may not be able to generate new digital assets or transactions using such control, it may be able to “double-spend” its own digital assets (i.e., spend the same tokens in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintained control (over 50%). To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network or the Bitcoin community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the Bitcoin Blockchain may not be possible. Further, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the Bitcoin Network. Although there are no known reports of malicious activity on, or control of, the Bitcoin Network, it is believed that certain mining pools may have exceeded the 50% threshold on the Bitcoin Network. The possible crossing of the 50% threshold indicates a greater risk that a single mining pool or small group of mining pools, for example, could exert authority over the validation of Bitcoin transactions, and this risk is heightened if over 50% of the processing power on the network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority and is significantly heightened if over 66% falls within such a jurisdiction. If network participants, including the core developers and the administrators of mining pools, do not act to ensure greater decentralization of Bitcoin mining processing power, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network will increase, which may adversely affect the value of the Shares. There are also concerns that blockchain “bloat” could also contribute to the conditions leading to a 51% attack. As the size of a blockchain grows larger, it requires higher amounts of resources to initially synchronize and validate the entire blockchain. If some potential miners are excluded because these costs become prohibitive, Bitcoin processing power may become more concentrated in a smaller number of parties, increasing the feasibility of a malicious actor to obtain control of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network, which may adversely affect the value of the Shares. 48 A malicious actor may also obtain control over the Bitcoin Network through its influence over core developers by gaining direct control over a core developer or an otherwise influential programmer. The less that the Bitcoin ecosystem grows, the greater the possibility that a malicious actor may be able to maliciously influence the Bitcoin Network in this manner. Moreover, it is possible that a group of Bitcoin holders that together control more than 50% of the hash power of the Bitcoin Network are influential members of the Bitcoin community. To the extent that the initial or current core developer groups are involved with parties that control more than 50% of hash power, the risk of this particular group of users causing the Bitcoin Network to adopt updates to the core protocol that this particular group wants to be implemented will be even greater, and should this materialize, it may adversely affect the value of the Shares. Further, the Bitcoin Network may also be adversely affected if core developers become aligned with, or culturally or organizationally captured by, particular companies, foundations, interest groups, or other coordinated constituencies whose priorities diverge from those of the broader community, as such influence may shape protocol development, governance outcomes, or upgrade decisions in ways that negatively affect the network or the market price of the related digital asset. For example, historically, perceptions—whether accurate or not—that certain core developers were aligned with or influenced by specific organizations, such as concerns voiced by some regarding Blockstream’s relationship with core developers during the Bitcoin scaling debates, contributed to community division, reduced consensus around protocol direction, and ultimately played a role in the network split that resulted in Bitcoin Cash. Similar perceptions in the future could impede protocol development, fragment the community, or otherwise negatively affect the growth, utility, or market price of Bitcoin, which may adversely affect the value of the Shares. A temporary or permanent “fork” or a “clone” could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The Bitcoin Network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can download the software, modify it and then propose that the users and miners of Bitcoin adopt the modification. When a modification is introduced and a substantial majority of users and miners’ consent to the modification, the change is implemented and the network remains uninterrupted. However, if less than a substantial majority of users and miners’ consent to the proposed modification, and the modification is not compatible with the software prior to its modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Bitcoin Network, with one group running the pre-modified software and the other running the modified software. The effect of such a fork would be the existence of two versions of Bitcoin running in parallel, yet lacking interchangeability. For example, Bitcoin Cash is the result of a hard fork of Bitcoin. Some users of the original network may harbor ill will toward the new network, and vice versa. These users may attempt to negatively impact the use or adoption of the new network. A fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of otherwise compatible software that users run. Such a fork could lead to users and miners abandoning the digital asset with the flawed software. It is possible, however, that a substantial number of users and miners could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains. This could result in a permanent fork. Forks may also occur as a digital asset network community’s response to a significant security breach. For example, in July 2016, Ethereum “forked” into Ethereum and a new digital asset, Ethereum Classic, as a result of the Ethereum network community’s response to a significant security breach. In June 2016, an anonymous hacker exploited a smart contract running on the Ethereum network to syphon approximately $60 million of Ether held by The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization, into a segregated account. In response to the exploit, most participants in the Ethereum community elected to adopt a “fork” that effectively reversed the exploit. However, a minority of users continued to develop the original blockchain, referred to as “Ethereum Classic” with the digital asset on that blockchain now referred to as ETC. ETC now trades on several Digital Asset Trading Platforms. A fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of otherwise compatible software that users run. Such a fork could lead to users and miners abandoning the digital asset with the flawed software. It is possible, however, that a substantial number of users and miners could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains. This could result in a permanent fork, as in the case of Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. In addition, many developers have previously initiated hard forks in the Bitcoin Blockchain to launch new digital assets, such as Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin Gold, Bitcoin Silver and Bitcoin Diamond. To the extent such digital assets compete with Bitcoin, such competition could impact demand for Bitcoin and could adversely impact the value of the Shares. Furthermore, a hard fork can lead to new security concerns. For example, when the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks, two other digital asset networks, split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued Ethereum trading platforms through at least October 2016. An Ethereum trading platform announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ethereum Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of mining power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual miner or mining pool’s hashing power to exceed 50% of the processing power of a digital asset network that retained or attracted less mining power, thereby making digital asset networks that rely on proof-of-work more susceptible to attack. Digital asset networks and related protocols may also be cloned. Unlike a fork of a digital asset network, which modifies an existing blockchain, and results in two competing digital asset networks, each with the same genesis block, a “clone” is a copy of a protocol’s codebase, but results in an entirely new blockchain and new genesis block. Tokens are created solely from the new “clone” 49 network and, in contrast to forks, holders of tokens of the existing network that was cloned do not receive any tokens of the new network. A “clone” results in a competing network that has characteristics substantially similar to the network it was based on, subject to any changes as determined by the developer(s) that initiated the clone. A hard fork may adversely affect the price of Bitcoin at the time of announcement or adoption. For example, the announcement of a hard fork could lead to increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset, in anticipation that ownership of the pre-fork digital asset would entitle holders to a new digital asset following the fork. The increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset may cause the price of the digital asset to rise. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. Furthermore, while the Trust would be entitled to both versions of the digital asset running in parallel, the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which version of the digital asset is generally accepted as the Bitcoin Network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork. Either of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares. As an illustrative example of a digital asset hard fork, on November 15, 2020, certain Bitcoin Cash developers enacted a proposed update to the Bitcoin Cash network requiring 8% of mined tokens to be redistributed to the developer pool, causing a hard fork and created a network with a token named Bitcoin Cash ABC. For the days following the fork, the price of BCH fluctuated from $246.15 on November 15, 2020 to $256.55 on November 20, 2020. A clone may also adversely affect the price of Bitcoin at the time of announcement or adoption. For example, on November 6, 2016, Rhett Creighton, a Zcash developer, cloned the Zcash network to launch Zclassic, a substantially identical version of the Zcash network that eliminated the Founders’ Reward. For the days following the date the first Zclassic block was mined, the price of ZEC fell from $504.57 on November 5, 2016 to $236.01 on November 7, 2016 in the midst of a broader sell off of ZEC beginning immediately after the Zcash network launch on October 28, 2016. A clone may also adversely affect the price of Bitcoin at the time of announcement or adoption. A future fork in or clone of the Bitcoin Network could adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate. In the event of a hard fork of the Bitcoin Network, the Sponsor will, if permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine which network should be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and in doing so may adversely affect the value of the Shares. In the event of a hard fork of the Bitcoin Network, the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine, in good faith, which digital asset network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Bitcoin Network, is generally accepted as the Bitcoin Network and should therefore be considered the appropriate digital asset network for the Trust’s purposes. The Sponsor will base its determination on a variety of then relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the Sponsor’s beliefs regarding expectations of the core developers of Bitcoin, users, services, businesses, miners and other constituencies, as well as the actual continued acceptance of, mining power on, and community engagement with, the Bitcoin Network. There is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset network or digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork, and the Sponsor’s decision may adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result. The Sponsor may also disagree with shareholders, security vendors and the Index Provider on what is generally accepted as Bitcoin and should therefore be considered “Bitcoin” for the Trust’s purposes, which may also adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result. Any name change and any associated rebranding initiative by the core developers of Bitcoin may not be favorably received by the digital asset community, which could negatively impact the value of Bitcoin and the value of the Shares. From time to time, digital assets may undergo name changes and associated rebranding initiatives. For example, Bitcoin Cash may sometimes be referred to as Bitcoin ABC in an effort to differentiate itself from any Bitcoin Cash hard forks, such as Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision, and in the third quarter of 2018, the team behind ZEN rebranded and changed the name of ZenCash to “Horizen.” We cannot predict the impact of any name change and any associated rebranding initiative on the Bitcoin Network or Bitcoin. After a name change and an associated rebranding initiative, a digital asset may not be able to achieve or maintain brand name recognition or status that is comparable to the recognition and status previously enjoyed by such digital asset. The failure of any name change and any associated rebranding initiative by a digital asset may result in such digital asset not realizing some or all of the anticipated benefits contemplated by the name change and associated rebranding initiative, and could negatively impact the value of Bitcoin and the value of the Shares. If the Bitcoin Network is used to facilitate illicit activities, businesses that facilitate transactions in Bitcoin could be at increased risk of criminal or civil lawsuits, or of having services cut off, which could negatively affect the price of Bitcoin and the value of the Shares. Digital asset networks have in the past been, and may continue to be, used to facilitate illicit activities. If the Bitcoin Network is used to facilitate illicit activities, businesses that facilitate transactions in Bitcoin could be at increased risk of potential criminal or civil lawsuits, or of having banking or other services cut off, and Bitcoin could be removed from Digital Asset Trading Platforms as a result of these concerns. Other service providers of such businesses may also cut off services if there is a concern that the Bitcoin Network is being used to facilitate crime. Any of the aforementioned occurrences could increase regulatory scrutiny of the Bitcoin Network and/or adversely affect the price of Bitcoin, the attractiveness of the Bitcoin Network and an investment in the Shares of the Trust. 50 When the Trust and the Sponsor, acting on behalf of the Trust, sell or deliver, as applicable, Bitcoin or, subject to NYSE Arca obtaining regulatory approval from the SEC, Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency, they generally do not transact directly with counterparties other than the Authorized Participant, a Liquidity Provider, or other similarly eligible financial institutions that are subject to federal and state licensing requirements and maintain practices and policies designed to comply with AML and KYC regulations. When an Authorized Participant or a Liquidity Provider sources Bitcoin in connection with the creation of the Shares or facilitates transactions in Bitcoin at the direction of the Trust or the Sponsor, it directly faces its counterparty and, in all instances, the Authorized Participant or the Liquidity Provider, as applicable, follow policies and procedures designed to ensure that it knows the identity of its counterparty. The Authorized Participant is a registered broker-dealer and therefore subject to AML and countering the financing of terrorism obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act as administered by FinCEN and further overseen by the SEC and FINRA. In accordance with its regulatory obligations, the Authorized Participant, or the Liquidity Provider, conducts customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence on its counterparties, which enables it to determine each counterparty’s AML and other risks and assign an appropriate risk rating. As part of its counterparty onboarding process, each of the Authorized Participant and the Liquidity Provider uses third-party services to screen prospective counterparties against various watch lists, including the Specially Designated Nationals List of the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and countries and territories identified as non-cooperative by the Financial Action Task Force. If the Sponsor, the Trust, the Authorized Participant or the Liquidity Provider were nevertheless to transact with such a sanctioned entity, the Sponsor, the Trust, the Authorized Participant and the Liquidity Provider would be at increased risk of potential criminal or civil lawsuits. Risk Factors Related to the Digital Asset Markets Recent developments in the digital asset economy have led to extreme volatility and disruption in digital asset markets, a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem, significant negative publicity surrounding digital assets broadly and market-wide declines in liquidity. In the past and through to the date of this Annual Report, digital asset prices have experienced significant fluctuations, leading to volatility and disruption in the digital asset markets and financial difficulties for several prominent industry participants, including Digital Asset Trading Platforms, hedge funds and lending platforms. For example, in the first half of 2022, digital asset lenders Celsius Network LLC and Voyager Digital Ltd. and digital asset hedge fund Three Arrows Capital each entered into insolvency proceedings. This resulted in a loss of confidence in participants in the digital asset ecosystem, negative publicity surrounding digital assets more broadly and market-wide declines in digital asset trading prices and liquidity. Thereafter, in November 2022, FTX, the third largest Digital Asset Trading Platform by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and several affiliates of FTX filed for bankruptcy. The U.S. Department of Justice subsequently brought criminal charges, including charges of fraud, violations of federal securities laws, money laundering, and campaign finance offenses, against FTX’s former CEO and others. In November 2023, FTX’s former CEO was convicted of fraud and money laundering. Similar charges related to violations of anti-money laundering laws were brought in November 2023 against Binance and its former CEO. In addition, several other entities in the digital asset industry filed for bankruptcy following FTX’s bankruptcy filing, such as BlockFi Inc. and Genesis Global Capital, LLC (“Genesis Capital”), a subsidiary of Genesis Global Holdco, LLC (“Genesis Holdco”). The SEC also brought charges against Genesis Capital and Gemini Trust Company, LLC (“Gemini”) in January 2023 for their alleged unregistered offer and sale of securities to retail investors. In October 2023, the New York Attorney General (“NYAG”) brought charges against Gemini, Genesis Capital, Genesis Asia Pacific PTE. LTD. (“Genesis Asia Pacific”), Genesis Holdco (together with Genesis Capital and Genesis Asia Pacific, the “Genesis Entities”), Genesis Capital’s former CEO, DCG, and DCG’s CEO alleging violations of the New York Penal Law, the New York General Business Law and the New York Executive Law. In February 2024, the NYAG amended its complaint to expand the charges against Gemini, the Genesis Entities, Genesis Capital’s former CEO, DCG, and DCG’s CEO to include harm to additional investors. Also in February 2024, the Genesis Entities entered into a settlement agreement with the NYAG to resolve the NYAG’s allegations against the Genesis Entities, which settlement was subsequently approved by the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York. On January 17, 2025, DCG agreed to entry of a cease-and-desist order and payment of a $38 million civil money penalty arising out of the SEC’s allegations that (i) DCG negligently engaged in conduct that misled investors about the impact of the default on Genesis Capital’s financial condition and (ii) DCG’s failure to exercise reasonable care in connection with certain statements concerning Genesis Capital’s financial condition created a materially false impression to the public regarding Genesis Capital’s financial health. Furthermore, Genesis Holdco, together with certain of its subsidiaries, filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in January 2023. While Genesis Holdco is not a service provider to the Trust, it is a wholly owned subsidiary of DCG, and is an affiliate of the Trust and the Sponsor. 51 These events have led to significant negative publicity around digital asset market participants including DCG, Genesis and DCG’s other affiliated entities. This publicity could negatively impact the reputation of the Sponsor and have an adverse effect on the trading price and/or the value of the Shares. Moreover, sales of a significant number of Shares of the Trust as a result of these events could have a negative impact on the trading price of the Shares. These events have also led to a substantial increase in regulatory and enforcement scrutiny of the industry as a whole and of Digital Asset Trading Platforms in particular, including from the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress. For example, in June 2023, the SEC brought charges against Binance (the “Binance Complaint”) and Coinbase (the “Coinbase Complaint”), alleging that they solicited U.S. investors to buy, sell, and trade “crypto asset securities” through their unregistered trading platforms and operated unregistered securities exchanges, brokerages and clearing agencies. Binance subsequently announced that it would be suspending USD deposits and withdrawals on Binance.US and that it plans to delist its USD trading pairs. In addition, in November 2023, the SEC brought similar charges against Kraken (the “Kraken Complaint”), alleging that it operated as an unregistered securities exchange, brokerage and clearing agency. The Binance Complaint, the Coinbase Complaint and the Kraken Complaint have led, and may in the future lead, to further volatility in digital asset prices. Between February 2025 and May 2025, the SEC entered into court-approved joint stipulations to dismiss each of the Binance Complaint, Coinbase Complaint and the Kraken Complaint. The SEC has terminated its investigation or enforcement action into many other digital asset market participants, as well. In January 2025, the SEC launched a crypto task force dedicated to developing a comprehensive and clear regulatory framework for digital assets led by Commissioner Hester Peirce. Subsequently, Commissioner Peirce announced a list of specific priorities to further that initiative, which included pursuing final rules related to a digital asset’s security status, a revised path to registered offerings and listings for digital asset-based investment vehicles, and clarity regarding digital asset custody, lending and staking. Digital asset markets have also been negatively impacted by the failure of entities perceived to be integral to the digital asset ecosystem. For example, in March 2023, state banking regulators placed Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank into Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) receiverships. Also, in March 2023, Silvergate Bank announced plans to wind down and liquidate its operations. Because these banks were perceived to be the banks most open to providing services for the digital asset ecosystem in the United States, their failures may impact the willingness of banks (based on regulatory pressure or otherwise) to provide banking services to digital asset market participants. In addition, because these banks were perceived to be the banks most open to providing services for the digital asset ecosystem, their failure has caused a number of companies that provide digital asset-related services to be unable to find banks that are willing to provide them with such banking services. The inability to access banking services could negatively impact digital asset market participants and therefore the value of digital assets, including Bitcoin, and thus the Shares. In addition, although these events did not have an impact directly on the Trust or the Sponsor when these bank failures occurred, it is possible that a future closing of a bank with which the Trust or the Sponsor has a financial relationship could subject the Trust or the Sponsor to adverse conditions and pose challenges in finding an alternative suitable bank to provide the Trust or the Sponsor with bank accounts and banking services. Events such as these that impact the wider digital asset ecosystem are continuing to develop and change at a rapid pace and it is not possible to predict at this time all of the risks that they may pose to the Sponsor, the Trust, their affiliates and/or the Trust’s third-party service providers, or on the digital asset industry as a whole. Continued disruption and instability in the digital asset markets as these events develop, including declines in the trading prices and liquidity of Bitcoin, or the failure of service providers to the Trust, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. The value of the Shares relates directly to the value of Bitcoin, the value of which may be highly volatile and subject to fluctuations due to a number of factors. The value of the Shares relates directly to the value of the Bitcoin held by the Trust and fluctuations in the price of Bitcoin could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The market price of Bitcoin may be highly volatile, and subject to a number of factors, including: • an increase in the global Bitcoin supply that is publicly available for trading; • manipulative trading activity on Digital Asset Trading Platforms, which, in many cases, are largely unregulated; • the adoption of Bitcoin as a medium of exchange, store-of-value or other consumptive asset and the maintenance and development of the open-source software protocol of the Bitcoin Network; • forks in the Bitcoin Network; • investors’ expectations with respect to interest rates, the rates of inflation of fiat currencies or Bitcoin, and Digital Asset Trading Platform rates; • consumer preferences and perceptions of Bitcoin specifically and digital assets generally; • fiat currency withdrawal and deposit policies on Digital Asset Trading Platforms; 52 • the liquidity of Digital Asset Markets and any increase or decrease in trading volume on Digital Asset Markets; • investment and trading activities of large investors that invest directly or indirectly in Bitcoin, including trading activity related to so-called digital asset treasury companies or similar vehicles that are intended to provide investors with indirect exposure to Bitcoin; • a “short squeeze” resulting from speculation on the price of Bitcoin, if aggregate short exposure exceeds the number of Shares available for purchase; • an active derivatives market for Bitcoin or for digital assets generally; • a determination that Bitcoin is a security or changes in Bitcoin’s status under the federal securities laws; • monetary policies of governments, trade restrictions, currency devaluations and revaluations and regulatory measures or enforcement actions, if any, that restrict the use of Bitcoin as a form of payment or the purchase of Bitcoin on the Digital Asset Markets; • global or regional political, economic or financial conditions, events and situations, such as the novel coronavirus outbreak; • fees associated with processing a Bitcoin transaction and the speed at which Bitcoin transactions are settled on the Bitcoin Network; • interruptions in service from or closures or failures of major Digital Asset Trading Platforms; • decreased confidence in Digital Asset Trading Platforms due to the largely unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of Digital Asset Trading Platforms; • increased competition from other forms of digital assets or payment services; and • the Trust’s own acquisitions or dispositions of Bitcoin, since there is no limit on the amount of Bitcoin that the Trust may acquire. In addition, there is no assurance that Bitcoin will maintain its value in the long or intermediate term. In the event that the price of Bitcoin declines, the Sponsor expects the value of the Shares to decline proportionately. The value of Bitcoin as represented by the Index Price or by the Trust’s principal market may also be subject to momentum pricing due to speculation regarding future appreciation in value, leading to greater volatility that could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Momentum pricing typically is associated with growth stocks and other assets whose valuation, as determined by the investing public, accounts for future appreciation in value, if any. The Sponsor believes that momentum pricing of Bitcoin has resulted, and may continue to result, in speculation regarding future appreciation in the value of Bitcoin, inflating and making the Index Price more volatile. As a result, Bitcoin may be more likely to fluctuate in value due to changing investor confidence, which could impact future appreciation or depreciation in the Index Price and could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Due to the largely unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of Digital Asset Trading Platforms, they may experience fraud, market manipulation, business failures, security failures or operational problems, which may adversely affect the value of Bitcoin and, consequently, the value of the Shares. Digital Asset Trading Platforms are relatively new and, in many ways, are not subject to, or may not comply with, regulation in relevant jurisdictions in a manner similar to other regulated trading platforms, such as national securities exchanges or designated contract markets. While many prominent Digital Asset Trading Platforms provide the public with significant information regarding their on-chain activities, ownership structure, management teams, corporate practices, cybersecurity practices and regulatory compliance, many other Digital Asset Trading Platforms do not provide this information. Furthermore, while Digital Asset Trading Platforms are and may continue to be subject to federal and state licensing requirements in the United States, Digital Asset Trading Platforms do not currently appear to be subject to regulation in a similar manner as other regulated trading platforms, such as national securities exchanges or designated contract markets. As a result, the marketplace may lose confidence in Digital Asset Trading Platforms, including prominent trading platforms that handle a significant volume of Bitcoin trading. Many Digital Asset Trading Platforms, both in the United States and abroad, are unlicensed, not subject to, or not in compliance with, regulation in relevant jurisdictions, or operate without extensive supervision by governmental authorities. In particular, those located outside the United States may be subject to significantly less stringent regulatory and compliance requirements in their local jurisdictions and may take the position that they are not subject to laws and regulations that would apply to a national securities exchange or designated contract market in the United States, or may, as a practical matter, be beyond the ambit of U.S. regulators. As a result, trading activity on or reported by these Digital Asset Trading Platforms is generally significantly less regulated than trading activity on or reported by regulated U.S. securities and commodities markets, and may reflect behavior that would be prohibited in regulated U.S. trading venues. For example, in 2022 one report claimed that trading volumes on Digital Asset Trading Platforms were inflated by over 53 70% due to false or non-economic trades, with specific focus on unlicensed trading platforms located outside of the United States. Such reports may indicate that the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market is significantly smaller than expected and that the U.S. makes up a significantly larger percentage of the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market than is commonly understood, or that a much larger portion of digital asset market activity takes place on decentralized finance platforms than is commonly understood. Nonetheless, any actual or perceived false trading in the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market, and any other fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, could adversely affect the value of Bitcoin and/or negatively affect the market perception of Bitcoin, which could in turn adversely impact the value of the Shares. The SEC has also identified possible sources of fraud and manipulation in the Digital Asset Markets generally, including, among others (1) “wash-trading”; (2) persons with a dominant position in a digital asset manipulating pricing in such digital asset; (3) hacking of the underlying digital asset network and trading platforms; (4) malicious control of the underlying digital asset network; (5) trading based on material, non-public information (for example, plans of market participants to significantly increase or decrease their holdings in a digital asset, new sources of demand for a digital asset) or based on the dissemination of false and misleading information; (6) manipulative activity involving purported “stablecoins,” including Tether; and (7) fraud and manipulation at Digital Asset Markets. The use or presence of such acts and practices in the Digital Asset Markets could, for example, falsely inflate the volume of Bitcoin present in the Digital Asset Markets or cause distortions in the price of Bitcoin, among other things that could adversely affect the Trust or cause losses to shareholders. Moreover, tools to detect and deter fraudulent or manipulative trading activities, such as market manipulation, front-running of trades, and wash-trading, may not be available to or employed by Digital Asset Markets, or may not exist at all. Many Digital Asset Markets also lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers. As a result, the prices of Bitcoin on Digital Asset Markets may be subject to larger and/or more frequent sudden declines than assets traded on more traditional exchanges. In addition, over the past several years, some Digital Asset Trading Platforms have been closed, been subject to criminal and civil litigation and have entered into bankruptcy proceedings due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure and/or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such Digital Asset Trading Platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such Digital Asset Trading Platforms. In some instances, customers are made whole only in dollar terms as of the Digital Asset Trading Platform ’ s date of failure, rather than on a digital asset basis, meaning customers may still lose out on any price increase in digital assets. While smaller Digital Asset Trading Platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms more stable, larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware. For example, in February 2025, hackers reportedly compromised a transaction from Bybit’s multisignature cold wallets, enabling the hackers to steal over $1.5 billion of Ether from Bybit. Shortcomings or ultimate failures of larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem, including on the price of Bitcoin, and therefore may also be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, in November 2022, FTX, another of the world’s largest Digital Asset Trading Platforms, filed for bankruptcy protection and subsequently halted customer withdrawals as well as trading on its FTX.US platform. Fraud, security failures and operational problems all played a role in FTX’s issues and downfall. Moreover, Digital Asset Trading Platforms have been a subject of enhanced regulatory and enforcement scrutiny, and Digital Asset Markets have experienced continued instability, following the failure of FTX. In particular, in June 2023, the SEC brought the Binance Complaint and Coinbase Complaint, alleging that Binance and Coinbase operated unregistered securities exchanges, brokerages and clearing agencies. In addition, in November 2023, the SEC brought the Kraken Complaint, alleging that Kraken operated as an unregistered securities exchange, brokerage and clearing agency. Between February 2025 and May 2025, the SEC entered into court-approved joint stipulations to dismiss each of the Binance Complaint, Coinbase Complaint and the Kraken Complaint. The SEC has terminated its investigation or enforcement action into many other digital asset market participants as well. Negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the Digital Asset Markets and/or the closure or temporary shutdown of Digital Asset Trading Platforms due to fraud, business failure, security breaches or government mandated regulation, and associated losses by customers, may reduce confidence in the Bitcoin Network and result in greater volatility in the prices of Bitcoin. Furthermore, the closure or temporary shutdown of a Digital Asset Trading Platform used in calculating the Index Price may result in a loss of confidence in the Trust’s ability to determine its NAV on a daily basis. These potential consequences of such a Digital Asset Trading Platform’s failure could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Digital Asset Trading Platforms may be exposed to front-running. Digital Asset Trading Platforms may be susceptible to “front-running,” which refers to the process when someone uses technology or market advantage to get prior knowledge of upcoming transactions. Front-running is a frequent activity on centralized as well as decentralized trading platforms. By using bots functioning on a millisecond-scale timeframe, bad actors are able to take advantage of the forthcoming price movement and make economic gains at the cost of those who had introduced these transactions. The objective of a front runner is to buy tokens at a low price and later sell them at a higher price while simultaneously exiting the position. To the extent that front-running occurs, it may result in investor frustrations and concerns as to the price integrity of Digital Asset Trading Platforms and digital assets more generally. 54 Digital Asset Trading Platforms may be exposed to wash-trading. Digital Asset Trading Platforms may be susceptible to wash-trading. Wash-trading occurs when offsetting trades are entered into for other than bona fide reasons, such as the desire to inflate reported trading volumes. Wash-trading may be motivated by non-economic reasons, such as a desire for increased visibility on popular websites that monitor markets for digital assets so as to improve a trading platform’s attractiveness to investors who look for maximum liquidity, or it may be motivated by the ability to attract listing fees from token issuers who seek the most liquid and high-volume trading platforms on which to list their tokens. Results of wash-trading may include unexpected obstacles to trade and erroneous investment decisions based on false information. Even in the United States, there have been allegations of wash-trading even on regulated venues. Any actual or perceived false trading on Digital Asset Trading Platforms, and any other fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, could adversely affect the value of Bitcoin and/or negatively affect the market perception of Bitcoin. To the extent that wash-trading either occurs or appears to occur in Digital Asset Trading Platforms, investors may develop negative perceptions about Bitcoin and the digital assets industry more broadly, which could adversely impact the price of Bitcoin and, therefore, the price of the Shares. Wash-trading also may place more legitimate Digital Asset Trading Platforms at a relative competitive disadvantage. The Index has a limited history and a failure of the Index Price could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The Index has a limited history and the Index Price is a composite reference rate calculated using trading price data from various Digital Asset Trading Platforms chosen by the Index Provider. The Digital Asset Trading Platforms chosen by the Index Provider have also changed over time. The Index Provider may remove or add Digital Asset Trading Platforms to the Index in the future at its discretion. For more information on the inclusion criteria for Digital Asset Trading Platforms in the Index, see “Item 1. Business—Overview of the Bitcoin Industry and Market—Bitcoin Value—The Index and the Index Price.” Although the Index is designed to accurately capture the market price of Bitcoin, third parties may be able to purchase and sell Bitcoin on public or private markets not included among the Constituent Trading Platforms of the Index, and such transactions may take place at prices materially higher or lower than the Index Price. Moreover, there may be variances in the prices of Bitcoin on the various Digital Asset Trading Platforms, including as a result of differences in fee structures or administrative procedures on different Digital Asset Trading Platforms. For example, based on data provided by the Index Provider, on any given day during the year ended December 31, 2025, the maximum differential between the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot price of any single Digital Asset Trading Platform included in the Index and the Index Price was 0.44% and the average of the maximum differentials of the 4:00 p.m., New York time, spot price of each Digital Asset Trading Platform included in the Index and the Index Price was 0.25%. During this same period, the average differential between the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot prices of all the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index and the Index Price was 0.007%. All Digital Asset Trading Platforms that were included in the Index throughout the period were considered in this analysis. To the extent such prices differ materially from the Index Price, investors may lose confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of Bitcoin, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The Index Price used to calculate the value of the Trust’s Bitcoin may be volatile, and purchasing and selling activity in the Digital Asset Markets associated with Basket creations and redemptions may affect the Index Price and Share trading prices, adversely affecting the value of the Shares. The price of Bitcoin on public Digital Asset Trading Platforms has a limited history, and during this history, Bitcoin prices on the Digital Asset Markets more generally, and on Digital Asset Trading Platforms individually, have been volatile and subject to influence by many factors, including operational interruptions. While the Index is designed to limit exposure to the interruption of individual Digital Asset Trading Platforms, the Index Price, and the price of Bitcoin generally, remains subject to volatility experienced by Digital Asset Trading Platforms, and such volatility could adversely affect the value of the Shares. For example, from January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2025, the Index Price ranged from $15,768.02 to $125,481.71, with the straight average being $54,395.04. In addition, during the twelve months ended December 31, 2025, the Index Price ranged from $76,741.10 to $125,481.71. The Sponsor has not observed a material difference between the Index Price and average prices from the Constituent Trading Platforms individually or as a group. The price of Bitcoin more generally has experienced volatility similar to the Index Price during these periods. For additional information on movement of the Index Price and the price of Bitcoin, see “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Historical NAV and Bitcoin Prices.” Furthermore, because the number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms is limited, the Index will necessarily be comprised of a limited number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms. If a Digital Asset Trading Platform were subjected to regulatory, volatility or other pricing issues, the Index Provider would have limited ability to remove such Digital Asset Trading Platform from the Index, which could skew the price of Bitcoin as represented by the Index. Trading on a limited number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms may result in less favorable prices and decreased liquidity of Bitcoin and, therefore, could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Purchasing activity associated with acquiring Bitcoin required for the creation of Baskets may increase the market price of Bitcoin on the Digital Asset Markets, which will result in higher prices for the Shares. Alternatively, selling activity associated with sales of 55 Bitcoin withdrawn from the Trust in connection with the redemption of Baskets may decrease the market price of Bitcoin on the Digital Asset Markets, which will result in lower prices for the Shares. Increases or decreases in the market price of Bitcoin may also occur as a result of the purchasing or selling activity of other market participants. Other market participants may attempt to benefit from an increase or decrease in the market price of Bitcoin that may result from increased purchasing or selling activity of Bitcoin connected with the creation or redemption of Baskets. Consequently, the market price of Bitcoin may decline immediately after Baskets are created. Decreases in the market price of Bitcoin may also occur as a result of sales in Secondary Markets by other market participants. If the Index Price declines, the value of the Shares will generally also decline. Competition from the emergence or growth of other digital assets could have a negative impact on the price of Bitcoin and adversely affect the value of the Shares. Bitcoin was the first digital asset to gain global adoption and critical mass, and as a result, it has a “first to market” advantage over other digital assets. As of December 31, 2025, Bitcoin was the largest digital asset by market capitalization, as tracked by CoinMarketCap.com and had the largest user base and largest combined mining power. Despite this first to market advantage, as of December 31, 2025, the alternative digital assets tracked by CoinMarketCap.com had a total market-capitalization of approximately $2.7 trillion (including the approximately $1.75 trillion market cap of Bitcoin), as calculated using market prices and total available supply of each digital asset, excluding tokens pegged to other assets. In addition, many consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned blockchain platforms rather than open platforms like the Bitcoin Network. Competition from the emergence or growth of alternative digital assets and smart contracts platforms, such as Ethereum, Solana, Avalanche or Cardano, could have a negative impact on the demand for, and price of, Bitcoin and thereby adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, the growth of tokenized assets and other on-chain financial products that offer yield, stability, or regulatory clarity may also divert capital and user engagement away from the Bitcoin Network, which could negatively impact Bitcoin’s market demand and the value of the Shares. In addition, some digital asset networks, including the Bitcoin Network, may be the target of ill will from users of other digital asset networks. For example, Litecoin is the result of a hard fork of Bitcoin. Some users of the Bitcoin Network may harbor ill will toward the Litecoin Network, and vice versa. These users may attempt to negatively impact the use or adoption of the Bitcoin Network. Investors may also invest in Bitcoin through means other than the Shares, including through direct investments in Bitcoin and other financial vehicles, including securities backed by or linked to Bitcoin and digital asset financial vehicles similar to the Trust. The Trust and the Sponsor face competition with respect to the creation of competing exchange-traded spot Bitcoin products, among other digital asset vehicles. Whether the Trust is successful in maintaining its scale and achieving its intended competitive position may be impacted by a range of factors, including its fee structure relative to those competing products. The Trust’s competitors may also charge a substantially lower fee than the Sponsor’s Fee in an effort to achieve initial market acceptance and scale, which could cause investors to favor such competing products over the Trust. If the Trust fails to continue to maintain or grow sufficient scale due to competition, the Sponsor may have difficulty raising sufficient revenue to cover the costs associated with maintaining the Trust and such shortfalls could impact the Sponsor’s ability to properly invest in robust ongoing operations and controls of the Trust to minimize the risk of operating events, errors, or other forms of losses to the shareholders. Furthermore, the Trust may fail to continue to attract adequate liquidity in the secondary market due to such competition, resulting in a small number of Authorized Participants willing to make a market in the Shares, which in turn could result in the Shares trading at a significant premium or discount for extended periods. Likewise, market and financial conditions, among other conditions outside the Trust’s control, may cause investors to find it more attractive to gain exposure to Bitcoin through other vehicles, rather than the Trust. In addition, to the extent digital asset financial vehicles other than the Trust tracking the price of Bitcoin come to represent a significant proportion of the demand for Bitcoin, large purchases or redemptions of the securities of these digital asset financial vehicles, or private funds holding Bitcoin, could negatively affect the Index Price, the NAV, the NAV per Share, the value of the Shares, the Principal Market NAV and the Principal Market NAV per Share. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that the Trust will be able to maintain its scale and achieve its intended competitive positioning relative to competitors, which could adversely affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares. Congestion or delay on the Bitcoin Network may delay purchases or sales of Bitcoin by the Trust. Increased transaction volume could result in delays in the recording of transactions on the Bitcoin Network. Moreover, unforeseen system failures, disruptions in operations, or poor connectivity may also result in delays in the recording of transactions on the Blockchain. Any delay in the Blockchain could affect an Authorized Participant’s ability to buy or sell Bitcoin at an advantageous price resulting in decreased confidence in the Blockchain. Over the longer term, delays in confirming transactions could reduce the attractiveness to merchants and other commercial parties as a means of payment. As a result, the Bitcoin Network and the value of the Trust would be adversely affected. 56 The SEC has approved generic listing standards for commodity-based trust shares and may approve other applications under Rule 19b-4 of the Exchange Act to list competing digital assets as exchange-traded products, which could reduce demand for, and the price of, Bitcoin and adversely impact the value of the Shares. To date, the SEC has approved applications under Rule 19b-4 of the Exchange Act to list spot digital asset exchange-traded products which hold Bitcoin and Ether, as well as generic listing standards for commodity-based trust shares holding digital assets. To the extent competing digital assets exchange-traded products, other than those which hold Bitcoin, come to represent a significant proportion of the demand for digital assets generally, demand for, and the price of, Bitcoin could be reduced. Such reduced demand could in turn negatively affect the Index Price, the NAV, the NAV per Share, the value of the Shares, the Principal Market NAV and the Principal Market NAV per Share. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that the Trust will be able to maintain its scale and achieve its intended competitive positioning relative to competitors, which could adversely affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares. Competition from central bank digital currencies (“CBDCs”) and emerging payments initiatives involving financial institutions could adversely affect the price of Bitcoin and other digital assets. Central banks in various countries have introduced digital forms of legal tender (“CBDCs”). China’s CBDC project, known as Digital Currency Electronic Payment, has reportedly been tested in a live pilot program conducted in multiple cities in China. Central banks representing at least 130 countries have published retail or wholesale CBDC work ranging from research to pilot projects. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could have an advantage in competing with, or replace, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange or store of value. Central banks and other governmental entities have also announced cooperative initiatives and consortia with private sector entities, with the goal of leveraging blockchain and other technology to reduce friction in cross-border and interbank payments and settlement, and commercial banks and other financial institutions have also recently announced a number of initiatives of their own to incorporate new technologies, including blockchain and similar technologies, into their payments and settlement activities, which could compete with, or reduce the demand for, Bitcoin. As a result of any of the foregoing factors, the price of Bitcoin could decrease, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust. P rices of Bitcoin may be affected due to stablecoins (including Tether and USDC), the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment. While the Trust does not invest in stablecoins, it may nonetheless be exposed to these and other risks that stablecoins pose for the market for Bitcoin and other digital assets. Stablecoins are digital assets designed to have a stable value over time as compared to typically volatile digital assets, and are typically marketed as being pegged to the value of a referenced asset, normally a fiat currency, such as the U.S. dollar. Although the prices of stablecoins are intended to be stable compared to their referenced asset, in many cases their prices fluctuate, sometimes significantly. This volatility has in the past impacted the prices of certain digital assets, and has at times caused certain stablecoins to lose their “peg” to the underlying fiat currency. Stablecoins are a relatively new phenomenon, and it is impossible to know all of the risks that they could pose to participants in the digital asset markets. In addition, some have argued that some stablecoins, particularly Tether, are improperly issued without sufficient backing in a way that could cause artificial rather than genuine demand for digital assets, raising their prices. Regulators have also charged stablecoin issuers with violations of law or otherwise required certain stablecoin issuers to cease certain operations. For example, on February 17, 2021, the New York Attorney General entered into an agreement with Tether’s operators, requiring them to cease any further trading activity with New York persons and pay $18.5 million in penalties for false and misleading statements made regarding the assets backing Tether. On October 15, 2021, the CFTC announced a settlement with Tether’s operators in which they agreed to pay $42.5 million in fines to settle charges that, among others, Tether’s claims that it maintained sufficient U.S. dollar reserves to back every Tether stablecoin in circulation with the “equivalent amount of corresponding fiat currency” held by Tether were untrue. USDC is a reserve-backed stablecoin issued by Circle Internet Financial that is commonly used as a method of payment in digital asset markets, including the Bitcoin market. The issuer of USDC uses the Circle Reserve Fund to hold cash, U.S. Treasury bills, notes and other obligations issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and repurchase agreements secured by such obligations or cash, which serve as reserves backing USDC stablecoins. While USDC is designed to maintain a stable value at 1 U.S. dollar at all times, on March 10, 2023, the value of USDC fell below $1.00 (and remained below for multiple days) after Circle Internet Financial disclosed that $3.3 billion of the USDC reserves were held at Silicon Valley Bank, which had entered FDIC receivership earlier that day. Popular stablecoins are reliant on the U.S. banking system and U.S. treasuries, and the failure of either to function normally could impede the function of stablecoins or lead to outsized redemption requests, and therefore could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Given the role that stablecoins play in global digital asset markets, their fundamental liquidity can have a dramatic impact on the broader digital asset market, including the market for Bitcoin. Because a large portion of the digital asset market still depends on stablecoins such as Tether and USDC, there is a risk that a disorderly de-pegging or a run on Tether or USDC could lead to dramatic market volatility in, and/or materially and adversely affect the prices of, digital assets more broadly. 57 Volatility in stablecoins, operational issues with stablecoins (for example, technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns about the sufficiency of any reserves that support stablecoins, or regulatory concerns about stablecoin issuers or intermediaries that support stablecoins, could impact individuals’ willingness to trade on trading venues that rely on stablecoins and could impact the price of Bitcoin, and in turn, an investment in the Shares. In addition, recent federal legislation establishing a regulatory framework for fully reserved payment stablecoins, such as the GENIUS Act, may increase the adoption of regulated stablecoins as digital payment instruments, which could reduce the use of Bitcoin for transactional purposes and thereby adversely affect the price of Bitcoin and the value of the Shares. Risk Factors Related to the Trust and the Shares The Trust relies on third-party service providers to perform certain functions essential to the affairs of the Trust and the replacement of such service providers could pose challenges to the safekeeping of the Trust’s Bitcoin and to the operations of the Trust. The Trust relies on the Custodial Entities, the Authorized Participants and other third-party service providers to perform certain functions essential to managing the affairs of the Trust. In addition, Liquidity Providers are relied upon to facilitate the purchase and sale of Bitcoin in connection with creations and redemptions of Shares in cash (“Cash Orders”), and the Transfer Agent and Grayscale Investments Sponsors, LLC (in such capacity, the “Liquidity Engager”), are relied upon to facilitate such Cash Orders. Any disruptions to a service provider’s business operations, resulting from business failures, financial instability, security failures, government mandated regulation or operational problems, could have an adverse impact on the Trust’s ability to access critical services and be disruptive to the operations of the Trust and require the Sponsor or the Liquidity Engager, as the case may be, to replace such service provider. Moreover, the Sponsor could decide to replace a service provider to the Trust, or the Liquidity Engager may decide to replace a Liquidity Provider, for other reasons. If the Sponsor decides, or is required, to replace Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC as the custodian of the Trust’s Bitcoin, Anchorage Digital Bank N.A., as the additional custodian of the Trust’s Bitcoin or Coinbase, Inc. as the prime broker controlling and securing the Trust’s Settlement Balance, transfer of the respective maintenance responsibilities of the Vault Balance or the Settlement Balance to another party or parties will likely be complex and could subject the Trust’s Bitcoin to the risk of loss during the transfer, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets. Moreover, the legal rights of customers with respect to digital assets held on their behalf by a third-party custodian, such as the Custodial Entities, in insolvency proceedings are currently uncertain. The Prime Broker Agreement contains an agreement by the parties to treat the digital assets credited to the Trust’s Vault Balance and Settlement Balance as financial assets under Article 8 in addition to stating that the Custodian will serve as fiduciary and custodian on the Trust’s behalf with respect to the Trust’s Bitcoin held in the Vault Balance, and that any Bitcoin credited to the Settlement Balance will be treated as custodial assets. The Custodial Entities’ parent, Coinbase Global, has also stated in its most recent public securities filings that in light of the inclusion of provisions relating to Article 8 in its custody and prime broker client agreements, it believes that a court would not treat custodied digital assets as part of its general estate in the event the Custodial Entities were to experience insolvency. However, due to the novelty of digital asset custodial arrangements courts have not yet considered this type of treatment for custodied digital assets and it is not possible to predict with certainty how they would rule in such a scenario. Moreover, the Custodian and the Prime Broker are potentially subject to different insolvency regimes and there is no assurance that the digital assets credited to the Trust’s Settlement Balance would be treated similarly to those credited to the Trust’s Vault Balance in an insolvency, notwithstanding the rights and obligations conferred under the Prime Broker Agreement or Coinbase Global’s views regarding the treatment of such assets under Article 8. In the event that the Custodian or the Prime Broker and/or Coinbase Global became subject to insolvency proceedings and a court were to rule that the custodied digital assets were part of the Custodian’s, the Prime Broker’s and/or Coinbase Global’s general estate and not the property of the Trust, then the Trust would be treated as a general unsecured creditor in such insolvency proceedings and the Trust would be subject to the loss of all or a significant portion of its assets. In addition, the Custodian is a fiduciary under § 100 of the New York Banking Law and a qualified custodian for purposes of Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6) under the Investment Advisers Act and is licensed to custody the Trust’s Bitcoin in trust on the Trust’s behalf. However, the SEC previously released proposed amendments in February 2023 to Rule 206(4)-2 that, if enacted as proposed, would amend the definition of a “qualified custodian” under Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6). Executive officers of the Custodian’s parent company have made public statements indicating that the Custodian would remain a qualified custodian under the proposed SEC rule, if enacted as proposed. In June 2025, however, the SEC formally withdrew that proposed rulemaking and stated that it does not intend to issue final rules based on the proposal. However, there can be no assurance that the Custodian would continue to qualify as a “qualified custodian” under a final rule that may be proposed or adopted by the SEC in the future. To the extent that the Sponsor is not able to find a suitable party willing to serve as custodian, the Sponsor may be required to terminate the Trust and liquidate the Trust’s Bitcoin. In addition, to the extent that the Sponsor finds a suitable party and must enter into a modified or separate custody agreement that is less favorable for the Trust or Sponsor and/or transfer the Trust’s assets in a relatively short time period, the safekeeping of the Trust’s Bitcoin may be adversely affected, which may in turn adversely affect the value of the Shares. Likewise, if the Sponsor is required to replace any other service provider, they may not be able to find a party willing to serve 58 in such capacity in a timely manner or at all. If the Sponsor decides, or is required, to replace an Authorized Participant and/or if the Liquidity Engager decides, or is required, to replace a Liquidity Provider, this could negatively impact the Trust’s ability to create new Shares, which would impact the Shares’ liquidity and could have a negative impact on the value of the Shares. The liquidity of the Shares may be affected if Authorized Participants cease to perform their obligations under the Participant Agreements or the Liquidity Engager is unable to engage Liquidity Providers. In the event that one or more Authorized Participants having substantial interests in Shares or otherwise responsible for a significant portion of the Shares’ daily trading volume on NYSE Arca terminates its Participant Agreement, the liquidity of the Shares would likely decrease, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares. In addition, if the Liquidity Engager is unable to engage one or more Liquidity Providers to obtain or receive Bitcoin in connection with Cash Orders, the Trust may have difficulty maintaining the participation of certain Authorized Participants or engaging additional Authorized Participants. Under such circumstances, the liquidity of the Shares would likely decrease, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The Shares may trade at a price that is at, above or below the Trust’s NAV per Share as a result of the non-concurrent trading hours between NYSE Arca and the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market. The Trust’s NAV per Share will fluctuate with changes in the market value of Bitcoin, and the Sponsor expects the trading price of the Shares to fluctuate in accordance with changes in the Trust’s NAV per Share, as well as market supply and demand. However, the Shares may trade on NYSE Arca at a price that is at, above or below the Trust’s NAV per Share for a variety of reasons. For example, NYSE Arca is open for trading in the Shares for a limited period each day, but the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market is a 24-hour marketplace. During periods when NYSE Arca is closed but Digital Asset Trading Platforms are open, significant changes in the price of Bitcoin on the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market could result in a difference in performance between the value of Bitcoin as measured by the Index and the most recent NAV per Share or closing trading price. For example, if the price of Bitcoin on the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market, and the value of Bitcoin as measured by the Index, move significantly in a negative direction after the close of NYSE Arca, the trading price of the Shares may “gap” down to the full extent of such negative price shift when NYSE Arca reopens. If the price of Bitcoin on the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market drops significantly during hours NYSE Arca is closed, shareholders may not be able to sell their Shares until after the “gap” down has been fully realized, resulting in an inability to mitigate losses in a negative market. Even during periods when NYSE Arca is open, large Digital Asset Trading Platforms (or a substantial number of smaller Digital Asset Trading Platforms) may be lightly traded or closed for any number of reasons, which could increase trading spreads and widen any premium or discount on the Shares. Any suspension or other unavailability of the Trust’s redemption program may cause the Shares to trade at a discount to the NAV per Share. Prior to their uplisting to NYSE Arca, the Shares traded on OTCQX at both premiums and discounts to the NAV per Share, which at times were substantial. The Sponsor believes that the trading price of the Shares has diverged from the NAV per Share in the past due, in part, to the holding period under Rule 144 for Shares purchased in the private placement and the lack of an ongoing redemption program, as a result of which Authorized Participants had been unable to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities when the market value of the Shares deviated from the NAV per Share. Although the Sponsor has observed that the commencement of the Trust’s redemption program, in conjunction with the listing of the Shares on NYSE Arca, has had the effect of reducing the discount at which the Shares had been trading on the OTCQX immediately prior to the commencement of the redemption program, there can be no assurance that the Trust’s redemption program will not be suspended or become unavailable again in the future. In addition, if the Sponsor decides to limit Cash Orders at a time when the Shares are trading at a premium or a discount to the NAV per Share, and the Trust is still not permitted to create and redeem Shares via in-kind transactions with Authorized Participants as of such time or the in-kind creation or redemption of Shares is otherwise unavailable for any reason, the arbitrage mechanism may fail to effectively function, which could impact the Shares’ liquidity and/or cause the Shares to trade at premiums and discounts to the NAV per Share, and otherwise have a negative impact on the value of the Shares. Shareholders may suffer a loss on their investment if the Shares trade above or below the Trust’s NAV per Share. Historically, the Shares have traded at both premiums and discounts to the NAV per Share, which at times were substantial. If the Shares trade on NYSE Arca in the future at a premium, investors who purchase Shares on NYSE Arca will pay more for their Shares than investors who purchase Shares directly from Authorized Participants. In contrast, if the Shares trade on NYSE Arca in the future at a discount, investors who purchase Shares directly from Authorized Participants will pay more for their Shares than investors who purchase Shares on NYSE Arca. The premium or discount at which the Shares have traded has fluctuated over time. For example, from May 5, 2015 to January 10, 2024, the maximum premium of the closing price of the Shares quoted on OTCQX over the value of the Trust’s NAV per Share was 142%, the average premium was 37%, the maximum discount of the closing price of the Shares quoted on OTCQX below the value of the Trust’s NAV per Share was 49%, and the average discount was 25%. The closing price of the Shares as quoted on OTCQX at 4:00 p.m., New York time, on each business day between May 5, 2015 and January 10, 2024, has been quoted at a discount on 725 days. 59 From January 11, 2024 to December 31, 2025, the maximum premium of the closing price of the Shares listed on NYSE Arca over the value of the Trust’s NAV per Share was 1.68% and the average premium was 0.06%, the maximum discount of the closing price of the Shares listed on NYSE Arca below the value of the Trust’s NAV per Share was 1.56%, and the average discount was 0.08%. As of December 31, 2025 the Trust’s Shares were listed on NYSE Arca at a discount of 0.07% to the Trust’s NAV per Share. As a result, shareholders who purchase Shares on NYSE Arca at a premium may suffer a loss on their investment if they sell their Shares at a time when the premium has decreased from the premium at which they purchased the Shares even if the NAV per Share remains the same. Likewise, shareholders that purchase Shares directly from the Trust may suffer a loss on their investment if they sell their Shares at a time when the Shares are trading at a discount on NYSE Arca. Furthermore, shareholders may suffer a loss on their investment even if the NAV per Share increases because the decrease in any premium or increase in any discount may offset any increase in the NAV per Share. The amount of the Trust’s assets represented by each Share will decline over time as the Trust pays the Sponsor’s Fee and Additional Trust Expenses, and as a result, the value of the Shares may decrease over time. The Sponsor’s Fee accrues daily in U.S. dollars at an annual rate based on the NAV Fee Basis Amount, which is based on the NAV of the Trust, and is paid to the Sponsor in Bitcoin. See “Item 1. Business—Valuation of Bitcoin and Determination of NAV—Disposition of Bitcoin.” As a result, the amount of Trust’s assets represented by each Share declines as the Trust pays the Sponsor’s Fee (or sells Bitcoin in order to raise cash to pay any Additional Trust Expenses), which may cause the Shares to decrease in value over time or dampen any increase in value. The value of the Shares may be influenced by a variety of factors unrelated to the value of Bitcoin. The value of the Shares may be influenced by a variety of factors unrelated to the price of Bitcoin and the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index that may have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. These factors include the following factors: • Unanticipated problems or issues with respect to the mechanics of the Trust’s operations and the trading of the Shares may arise, in particular due to the fact that the mechanisms and procedures governing the creation and offering of the Shares and storage of Bitcoin have been developed specifically for this product; • The Trust could experience difficulties in operating and maintaining its technical infrastructure, including in connection with expansions or updates to such infrastructure, which are likely to be complex and could lead to unanticipated delays, unforeseen expenses and security vulnerabilities; • The Trust could experience unforeseen issues relating to the performance and effectiveness of the security procedures used to protect the Vault Balance, or the security procedures may not protect against all errors, software flaws or other vulnerabilities in the Trust’s technical infrastructure, which could result in theft, loss or damage of its assets; or • Although the Bitcoin Network does not have any privacy enhancing features at this time, if any such features are introduced to the Bitcoin Network in the future, service providers may decide to terminate their relationships with the Trust due to concerns that the introduction of privacy enhancing features to the Bitcoin Network may increase the potential for Bitcoin to be used to facilitate crime, exposing such service providers to potential reputational harm. Any of these factors could affect the value of the Shares, either directly or indirectly through their effect on the Trust’s assets. Shareholders do not have the protections associated with ownership of shares in an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act or the protections afforded by the CEA. The Investment Company Act is designed to protect investors by preventing insiders from managing investment companies to their benefit and to the detriment of public investors, such as: the issuance of securities having inequitable or discriminatory provisions; the management of investment companies by irresponsible persons; the use of unsound or misleading methods of computing earnings and asset value; changes in the character of investment companies without the consent of investors; and investment companies from engaging in excessive leveraging. To accomplish these ends, the Investment Company Act requires the safekeeping and proper valuation of fund assets, restricts greatly transactions with affiliates, limits leveraging, and imposes governance requirements as a check on fund management. The Trust is not a registered investment company under the Investment Company Act, and the Sponsor believes that the Trust is not required to register under such act. Consequently, shareholders do not have the regulatory protections provided to investors in investment companies. The Trust will not hold or trade in commodity interests regulated by the CEA, as administered by the CFTC. Furthermore, the Sponsor believes that the Trust is not a commodity pool for purposes of the CEA, and that neither the Sponsor nor the Trustee is subject to regulation by the CFTC as a commodity pool operator or a commodity trading adviser in connection with the operation of the Trust. Consequently, shareholders will not have the regulatory protections provided to investors in CEA-regulated instruments or commodity pools. 60 There is no guarantee that an active trading market for the Shares will continue to develop. The Shares are trading on NYSE Arca, and an active trading market for the Shares has developed. However, there can be no assurance that such trading market will be maintained or continue to develop on NYSE Arca. In addition, NYSE Arca can halt the trading of the Shares for a variety of reasons. To the extent that NYSE Arca halts trading in the Shares, whether on a temporary or permanent basis, investors may not be able to buy or sell Shares, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares. If an active trading market for the Shares does not continue to exist, the market prices and liquidity of the Shares may be adversely affected. As the Sponsor and its management have limited history of operating investment vehicles like the Trust, their experience may be inadequate or unsuitable to manage the Trust. The past performances of the Sponsor’s management in other investment vehicles, including their experiences in the digital asset and venture capital industries, are no indication of their ability to manage an investment vehicle such as the Trust. If the experience of the Sponsor and its management is inadequate or unsuitable to manage an investment vehicle such as the Trust, the operations of the Trust may be adversely affected. Furthermore, the Sponsor is currently engaged in the management of other investment vehicles which could divert their attention and resources. If the Sponsor were to experience difficulties in the management of such other investment vehicles that damaged the Sponsor or its reputation, it could have an adverse impact on the Sponsor’s ability to continue to serve as Sponsor for the Trust. Security threats to the Trust’s Vault Balance or Settlement Balance could result in the halting of Trust operations, including the creation and redemption of Baskets, and a loss of Trust assets or damage to the reputation of the Trust, each of which could result in a reduction in the value of the Shares. Security breaches, computer malware and computer hacking attacks have been a prevalent concern in relation to digital assets. The Sponsor believes that the Trust’s Bitcoin held in the Vault Balance, as well as the Trust’s Bitcoin held temporarily in the Settlement Balance, will be an appealing target to hackers or malware distributors seeking to destroy, damage or steal the Trust’s Bitcoin and will only become more appealing as the Trust’s assets grow. To the extent that the Trust, the Sponsor or the Custodial Entities are unable to identify and mitigate or stop new security threats or otherwise adapt to technological changes in the digital asset industry, the Trust’s Bitcoin may be subject to theft, loss, destruction or other attack. The Sponsor believes that the security procedures in place for the Trust, including, but not limited to, offline storage, or “cold storage”, for a substantial portion of the Trust’s Bitcoin, multiple encrypted private key “shards”, usernames, passwords and 2-step verification, are reasonably designed to safeguard the Trust’s Bitcoin. Nevertheless, the security procedures cannot guarantee the prevention of any loss due to a security breach, software defect or act of God that may be borne by the Trust. Additionally, because a portion of the Trust’s Bitcoin from time to time will be held in hot storage, such Bitcoin will be more vulnerable to a potential hack or other cyberattack that could lead to a loss of Trust assets. The security procedures and operational infrastructure may be breached due to the actions of outside parties, error or malfeasance of an employee of the Sponsor, a Custodial Entity, or otherwise, and, as a result, an unauthorized party may obtain access to an Account, the relevant private keys (and therefore Bitcoin) or other data of the Trust. Additionally, outside parties may attempt to fraudulently induce employees of the Sponsor or a Custodial Entity to disclose sensitive information in order to gain access to the Trust’s infrastructure. As the techniques used to obtain unauthorized access, disable or degrade service, or sabotage systems change frequently, or may be designed to remain dormant until a predetermined event and often are not recognized until launched against a target, the Sponsor and the Custodial Entities may be unable to anticipate these techniques or implement adequate preventative measures. Moreover, the Custodial Entities will not be liable for any claims or losses arising out of or relating to the acts and/or omissions of any unauthorized third parties, except to the extent such losses are caused by a Custodial Entity’s negligence, fraud or willful misconduct. An actual or perceived breach of the accounts associated with the Trust’s Vault Balance and Settlement Balance (the “Accounts”) could harm the Trust’s operations, result in loss of the Trust’s assets, damage the Trust’s reputation and negatively affect the market perception of the effectiveness of the Trust, all of which could in turn reduce demand for the Shares, resulting in a reduction in the value of the Shares. The Trust may also cease operations, the occurrence of which could similarly result in a reduction in the value of the Shares. Bitcoin transactions are irrevocable and stolen or incorrectly transferred Bitcoin may be irretrievable. As a result, any incorrectly executed Bitcoin transactions could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Bitcoin transactions are typically not reversible without the consent and active participation of the recipient of the transaction. Once a transaction has been verified and recorded in a block that is added to the Blockchain, an incorrect transfer or theft of Bitcoin generally will not be reversible and the Trust may not be capable of seeking compensation for any such transfer or theft. Although the Trust’s transfers of Bitcoin will regularly be made to or from the Vault Balance, it is possible that, through computer or human error, or through theft or criminal action, the Trust’s Bitcoin could be transferred from the Trust’s Vault Balance in incorrect amounts or to unauthorized third parties, or to uncontrolled accounts. 61 Such events have occurred in connection with digital assets in the past. To the extent that the Trust is unable to seek a corrective transaction with such third party or is incapable of identifying the third party which has received the Trust’s Bitcoin through error or theft, the Trust will be unable to revert or otherwise recover incorrectly transferred Bitcoin. The Trust will also be unable to convert or recover its Bitcoin transferred to uncontrolled accounts. To the extent that the Trust is unable to seek redress for such error or theft, such loss could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The lack of full insurance and shareholders’ limited rights of legal recourse against the Trust, Trustee, Sponsor, Transfer Agent and Custodial Entities expose the Trust and its shareholders to the risk of loss of the Trust’s Bitcoin for which no person or entity is liable. The Trust is not a banking institution or otherwise a member of the FDIC or Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) and, therefore, deposits held with or assets held by the Trust are not subject to the protections enjoyed by depositors with FDIC or SIPC member institutions. In addition, neither the Trust nor the Sponsor insure the Trust’s Bitcoin. While the Custodian is required under the Prime Broker Agreement to maintain insurance coverage that is commercially reasonable for the custodial services it provides, and the Custodial Entities have advised the Sponsor that they maintain insurance coverage at commercially reasonable amounts for the digital assets custodied on behalf of clients, including the Trust’s Bitcoin, resulting from theft, shareholders cannot be assured that the Custodian or the Prime Broker will maintain adequate insurance or that such coverage will cover losses with respect to the Trust’s Bitcoin. Moreover, while the Custodian maintains certain capital reserve requirements depending on the assets under custody and to the extent required by applicable law, and such capital reserves may provide additional means to cover client asset losses, the Sponsor does not know the amount of such capital reserves, and neither the Trust nor the Sponsor have access to such information. The Trust cannot be assured that the Custodial Entities will maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover losses with respect to the Trust’s digital assets. Furthermore, Coinbase has represented in securities filings that the total value of crypto assets in its possession and control is significantly greater than the total value of insurance coverage that would compensate Coinbase in the event of theft or other loss of funds. Furthermore, the Custodial Entities’ aggregate maximum liability with respect to breach of their obligations under the Prime Broker Agreement will not exceed the greater of: (i) the value of the Bitcoin or cash involved in the event, including but not limited to transaction(s) or deliveries(s), giving rise to such liability at the time of the event giving rise to such liability; (ii) the aggregate amount of fees paid by the Trust to the Custodial Entities in respect of the Custodial and Prime Broker Services in the 12-month period prior to the event giving rise to such liability; or (iii) five million U.S. dollars. The Custodian’s total liability under the Prime Broker Agreement will not exceed the greater of: (i) the aggregate amount of fees paid by the Trust to the Custodian in respect of the custodial services in the 12-month period prior to the event giving rise to such liability; or (ii) the value of the Bitcoin on deposit in the Vault Balance at the time of the events giving rise to the liability occurred, the value of which will be determined in accordance with the Prime Broker Agreement. In addition, the Custodian’s maximum liability in respect of each cold storage address that holds Bitcoin is limited to the “Cold Storage Threshold” of $100 million. The Sponsor monitors the value of Bitcoin deposited in cold storage addresses for whether the Cold Storage Threshold has been met by determining the U.S. dollar value of Bitcoin deposited in each cold storage address on business days. Although the Cold Storage Threshold has never been met for a given cold storage address, to the extent it is met the Trust would not have a claim against the Custodian with respect to the digital assets held in such address to the extent the value exceeds the Cold Storage Threshold. The Custodial Entities and the Trust are not liable to each other for any special, incidental, indirect, punitive, or consequential damages, whether or not the other party had been advised of such losses or knew or should have known of the possibility of such damages. The shareholders’ recourse against the Sponsor and the Trust’s other service providers for the services they provide to the Trust, including those relating to the provision of instructions relating to the movement of Bitcoin, is limited. Consequently, a loss may be suffered with respect to the Trust’s Bitcoin that is not covered by insurance and for which no person is liable in damages. As a result, the recourse of the Trust or the shareholders, under New York law, is limited. The Trust may be required, or the Sponsor may deem it appropriate, to terminate and liquidate at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders. Pursuant to the terms of the Trust Agreement, the Trust is required to dissolve under certain circumstances. In addition, the Sponsor may, in its sole discretion, dissolve the Trust for a number of reasons, including if the Sponsor determines, in its sole discretion, that it is desirable or advisable for any reason to discontinue the affairs of the Trust. For example, the Sponsor expects that it may be advisable to discontinue the affairs of the Trust if a federal court upholds an allegation that Bitcoin is a security under the federal securities laws, among other reasons. See “Item 1. Business—Description of the Trust Agreement—Termination of the Trust.” If the Trust is required to terminate and liquidate, or the Sponsor determines in accordance with the terms of the Trust Agreement that it is appropriate to terminate and liquidate the Trust, such termination and liquidation could occur at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders, such as when the Actual Exchange Rate of Bitcoin is lower than the Index Price was at the time when shareholders purchased their Shares. In such a case, when the Trust’s Bitcoin are sold as part of its liquidation, the resulting proceeds distributed to 62 shareholders will be less than if the Actual Exchange Rate were higher at the time of sale. See “Item 1. Business—Description of the Trust Agreement—Termination of the Trust” for more information about the termination of the Trust, including when the termination of the Trust may be triggered by events outside the direct control of the Sponsor, the Trustee or the shareholders. The Trust Agreement includes provisions that limit shareholders’ voting rights and restrict shareholders’ right to bring a derivative action. Under the Trust Agreement, shareholders have limited voting rights and the Trust will not have regular shareholder meetings. Shareholders take no part in the management or control of the Trust. Accordingly, shareholders do not have the right to authorize actions, appoint service providers or take other actions as may be taken by shareholders of other trusts or companies where shares carry such rights. The shareholders’ limited voting rights give almost all control under the Trust Agreement to the Sponsor and the Trustee. The Sponsor may take actions in the operation of the Trust that may be adverse to the interests of shareholders and may adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, pursuant to the terms of the Trust Agreement, shareholders’ statutory right under Delaware law to bring a derivative action (i.e., to initiate a lawsuit in the name of the Trust in order to assert a claim belonging to the Trust against a fiduciary of the Trust or against a third party when the Trust’s management has refused to do so) is restricted. Under Delaware law, a shareholder may bring a derivative action if the shareholder is a shareholder at the time the action is brought and either (i) was a shareholder at the time of the transaction at issue or (ii) acquired the status of shareholder by operation of law or the Trust’s governing instrument from a person who was a shareholder at the time of the transaction at issue. Additionally, Section 3816(e) of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act specifically provides that a “beneficial owner’s right to bring a derivative action may be subject to such additional standards and restrictions, if any, as are set forth in the governing instrument of the statutory trust, including, without limitation, the requirement that beneficial owners owning a specified beneficial interest in the statutory trust join in the bringing of the derivative action.” In addition to the requirements of applicable law and in accordance with Section 3816(e), the Trust Agreement provides that no shareholder will have the right, power or authority to bring or maintain a derivative action, suit or other proceeding on behalf of the Trust unless two or more shareholders who (i) are not “Affiliates” (as defined in the Trust Agreement and below) of one another and (ii) collectively hold at least 10.0% of the outstanding Shares join in the bringing or maintaining of such action, suit or other proceeding. This provision applies to any derivative actions brought in the name of the Trust other than claims under the federal securities laws and the rules and regulations thereunder. Due to this additional requirement, a shareholder attempting to bring or maintain a derivative action in the name of the Trust will be required to locate other shareholders with which it is not affiliated and that have sufficient Shares to meet the 10.0% threshold based on the number of Shares outstanding on the date the claim is brought and thereafter throughout the duration of the action, suit or proceeding. This may be difficult and may result in increased costs to a shareholder attempting to seek redress in the name of the Trust in court. Moreover, if shareholders bringing a derivative action, suit or proceeding pursuant to this provision of the Trust Agreement do not hold 10.0% of the outstanding Shares on the date such an action, suit or proceeding is brought, or such shareholders are unable to maintain Share ownership meeting the 10.0% threshold throughout the duration of the action, suit or proceeding, such shareholders’ derivative action may be subject to dismissal. As a result, the Trust Agreement limits the likelihood that a shareholder will be able to successfully assert a derivative action in the name of the Trust, even if such shareholder believes that he or she has a valid derivative action, suit or other proceeding to bring on behalf of the Trust. See “Item 1. Business—Description of the Trust Agreement—The Sponsor—Fiduciary and Regulatory Duties of the Sponsor” for more detail. The Sponsor is solely responsible for determining the value of the NAV and NAV per Share and any errors, discontinuance or changes in such valuation calculations may have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. The Sponsor will determine the Trust’s NAV and NAV per Share on a daily basis as soon as practicable after 4:00 p.m., New York time, on each business day. The Sponsor’s determination is made utilizing data from the operations of the Trust and the Index Price, calculated at 4:00 p.m., New York time, on such day. If the Sponsor determines in good faith that the Index does not reflect an accurate Bitcoin price, then the Sponsor will employ an alternative method to determine the Index Price under the cascading set of rules set forth in “Item 1. Business—Overview of the Bitcoin Industry and Market—Bitcoin Value—The Index and the Index Price—Determination of the Index Price When Index Price is Unavailable.” In the context of applying such rules, the Sponsor may determine in good faith that the alternative method applied does not reflect an accurate Bitcoin price and apply the next alternative method under the cascading set of rules. If the Sponsor determines after employing all of the alternative methods that the Index Price does not reflect an accurate Bitcoin price, the Sponsor will use its best judgment to determine a good faith estimate of the Index Price. There are no predefined criteria to make a good faith assessment in these scenarios and such decisions will be made by the Sponsor in its sole discretion. The Sponsor may calculate the Index Price in a manner that ultimately inaccurately reflects the price of Bitcoin. To the extent that the NAV, NAV per Share or the Index Price are incorrectly calculated, the Sponsor may not be liable for any error and such misreporting of valuation data could adversely affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. Moreover, the terms of the Trust Agreement do not prohibit the Sponsor from changing the Index Price used to calculate the NAV and NAV per Share of the Trust. Any such change in the Index Price could affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. 63 Extraordinary expenses resulting from unanticipated events may become payable by the Trust, adversely affecting the value of the Shares. In consideration for the Sponsor’s Fee, the Sponsor has contractually assumed all ordinary-course operational and periodic expenses of the Trust. See “Item 1. Business—Expenses; Sales of Bitcoin.” Extraordinary expenses incurred by the Trust, such as taxes and governmental charges; expenses and costs of any extraordinary services performed by the Sponsor (or any other service provider) on behalf of the Trust to protect the Trust or the interests of shareholders; or extraordinary legal fees and expenses are not assumed by the Sponsor and are borne by the Trust. The Sponsor will cause the Trust to either (i) sell Bitcoin held by the Trust or (ii) deliver Bitcoin in kind to the Sponsor to pay Trust expenses not assumed by the Sponsor on an as-needed basis. Accordingly, the Trust may be required to sell or otherwise dispose of Bitcoin at a time when the trading prices for those assets are depressed. The sale or other disposition of assets of the Trust in order to pay extraordinary expenses could have a negative impact on the value of the Shares for several reasons. These include the following factors: • The Trust is not actively managed and no attempt will be made to protect against or to take advantage of fluctuations in the prices of Bitcoin. Consequently, if the Trust incurs expenses in U.S. dollars, the Trust’s Bitcoin may be sold at a time when the values of the disposed assets are low, resulting in a negative impact on the value of the Shares. • Because the Trust does not generate any income, every time that the Trust pays expenses, it will deliver Bitcoin to the Sponsor or sell Bitcoin. Any sales of the Trust’s assets in connection with the payment of expenses will decrease the amount of the Trust’s assets represented by each Share each time its assets are sold or transferred to the Sponsor. • Assuming that the Trust is a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, each delivery or sale of Bitcoin by the Trust to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and/or Additional Trust Expenses will be a taxable event to beneficial owners of Shares. Thus, the Trust’s payment of expenses could result in beneficial owners of Shares incurring tax liability without an associated distribution from the Trust. Any such tax liability could adversely affect an investment in the Shares. See “Item 1. Business—Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.” The Trust’s delivery or sale of Bitcoin to pay expenses or other operations of the Trust could result in shareholders’ incurring tax liability without an associated distribution from the Trust. Assuming that the Trust is treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, each delivery of Bitcoin by the Trust to pay the Sponsor’s Fee or other expenses and each sale of Bitcoin by the Trust to pay Additional Trust Expenses will be a taxable event to beneficial owners of Shares. Thus, the Trust’s payment of expenses could result in beneficial owners of Shares incurring tax liability without an associated distribution from the Trust. Any such tax liability could adversely affect an investment in the Shares. See “Item 1. Business—Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.” The value of the Shares will be adversely affected if the Trust is required to indemnify the Sponsor, the Trustee, the Transfer Agent or the Custodian under the Trust Documents. Under the Trust Documents, each of the Sponsor, the Trustee, the Transfer Agent and the Custodian has a right to be indemnified by the Trust for certain liabilities or expenses that it incurs without gross negligence, bad faith or willful misconduct on its part. Therefore, the Sponsor, Trustee, Transfer Agent or the Custodian may require that the assets of the Trust be sold in order to cover losses or liability suffered by it. Any sale of that kind would reduce the NAV of the Trust and the value of the Shares. Intellectual property rights claims may adversely affect the Trust and the value of the Shares. The Sponsor is not aware of any intellectual property rights claims that may prevent the Trust from operating and holding Bitcoin. However, third parties may assert intellectual property rights claims relating to the operation of the Trust and the mechanics instituted for the investment in, holding of and transfer of Bitcoin. Regardless of the merit of an intellectual property or other legal action, any legal expenses to defend or payments to settle such claims would be extraordinary expenses that would be borne by the Trust through the sale or transfer of its Bitcoin. Additionally, a meritorious intellectual property rights claim could prevent the Trust from operating and force the Sponsor to terminate the Trust and liquidate its Bitcoin. As a result, an intellectual property rights claim against the Trust could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Pandemics, epidemics and other natural and man-made disasters could negatively impact the value of the Trust’s holdings and/or significantly disrupt its affairs. Pandemics, epidemics and other natural and man-made disasters could negatively impact demand for digital assets, including Bitcoin, and disrupt the operations of many businesses, including the businesses of the Trust’s service providers. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic had serious adverse effects on the economies and financial markets of many countries, resulting in increased volatility and uncertainty in economies and financial markets of many countries and in the Digital Asset Markets. Moreover, governmental authorities and regulators throughout the world have in the past responded to major economic disruptions, including as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, with a variety of fiscal and monetary policy changes, such as quantitative easing, new monetary 64 programs and lower interest rates. An unexpected or quick reversal of any such policies, or the ineffectiveness of such policies, could increase volatility in economies and financial market generally, and could specifically increase volatility in the Digital Asset Markets, which could adversely affect the value of Bitcoin and the value of the Shares. In addition, pandemics, epidemics and other natural and man-made disasters could disrupt the operations of many businesses. For example, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments imposed travel restrictions and prolonged, closed international borders and enhanced health screenings at ports of entry and elsewhere, which disrupted businesses around the world. While the Sponsor and the Trust were not materially impacted by these events, any disruptions to the Sponsor’s, the Trust’s or the Trust’s service providers’ business operations resulting from business restrictions, quarantines or restrictions on the ability of personnel to perform their jobs as a result of any future pandemic, epidemic or other disaster could have an adverse impact on the Trust’s ability to access critical services and could be disruptive to the affairs of the Trust. The lack of ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions of Shares could have adverse consequences for the Trust. The Trust is currently only able to accept Cash Orders, which means that an Authorized Participant will deposit cash into, or accept cash from, the Cash Account in connection with the creation and redemption of Baskets, and a Liquidity Provider will obtain or receive Bitcoin in exchange for cash in connection with such order. However, the Trust is not at this time able to create and redeem Shares via in-kind transactions with Authorized Participants in exchange for Bitcoin. Authorized participants must be registered broker-dealers. Registered broker-dealers are subject to various requirements of the federal securities laws and rules, including financial responsibility rules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements. Although the SEC recently approved orders to permit in-kind creations and redemptions by authorized participants for certain spot digital asset ETP shares, it is not yet clear whether or how market participants, including registered broker-dealers, will adjust their activities to account for the new orders. In particular, registered broker-dealers participating in the in-kind creation or redemption of Shares for Bitcoin will need to ensure that they can demonstrate compliance with applicable financial responsibility rules. While compliance with these requirements would be the broker-dealer’s responsibility, a national securities exchange is required to enforce compliance by its member broker-dealers with applicable federal securities law and rules. As a result, the SEC is unlikely to permit an exchange to adopt listing rules for a product if it is not clear that the exchange’s members would be able to comply with applicable rules when transacting in the product as designed. In light of the new orders, NYSE Arca may seek the necessary regulatory approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to create and redeem Shares through In-Kind Orders, in which Authorized Participants or their designees would deposit Bitcoin directly with the Trust or receive Bitcoin directly from the Trust. However, there can be no assurance as to when NYSE Arca will seek or obtain this approval, if at all. In particular, the Trust’s inability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions could result in the exchange-traded product arbitrage mechanism failing to function as efficiently as it otherwise would, leading to the potential for the Shares to trade at premiums or discounts to the NAV per Share, and such premiums or discounts could be substantial. Furthermore, if Cash Orders are unavailable, either due to the Sponsor’s decision to reject or suspend such orders or otherwise, it will not be possible for Authorized Participants to redeem or create Shares, in which case the arbitrage mechanism would be unavailable. This could result in impaired liquidity for the Shares, wider bid/ask spreads in secondary trading of the Shares and greater costs to investors and other market participants. In addition, the Trust’s inability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions, and resulting reliance on cash creations and redemptions, could cause the Sponsor to halt or suspend the creation of redemption of Shares during times of market volatility or turmoil, among other consequences. Even if the Trust is permitted to create and redeem Shares via in-kind transactions with Authorized Participants, there can be no assurance that in-kind creations or redemptions of the Shares will be available in the future, or that broker-dealers would be willing to serve as Authorized Participants with respect to the in-kind creation and redemption of Shares. Any of these factors could adversely affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares. Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks or airdrops. The Bitcoin Network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can download the software, modify it and then propose that the users and miners of Bitcoin adopt the modification. When a modification is introduced and a substantial majority of users and miners’ consent to the modification, the change is implemented and the network remains uninterrupted. However, if less than a substantial majority of users and miners’ consent to the proposed modification, and the modification is not compatible with the software prior to its modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Bitcoin Network, with one group running the pre-modified software and the other running the modified software. The effect of such a fork would be the existence of two versions of Bitcoin running in parallel, yet lacking interchangeability. In addition to forks, a digital asset may become subject to a similar occurrence known as an “airdrop.” In an airdrop, the promoters of a new digital asset announce to holders of another digital asset that such holders will be entitled to claim a certain amount of the new digital asset, generally for free, based on the fact that they hold such other digital 65 asset. We refer to the right to receive any benefits arising from a fork, airdrop or similar event as an “Incidental Right” and any such virtual currency acquired through an Incidental Right as “IR Virtual Currency.” With respect to any fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency associated with such event. As such, shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks, and the Trust is not able to participate in any airdrop. In the event the Sponsor seeks to change the Trust’s policy with respect to Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by NYSE Arca seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency in-kind to an agent of the shareholders for resale by such agent. However, there can be no assurance as to whether or when the Sponsor would make such a decision, or when NYSE Arca will seek or obtain this approval, if at all. Even if such regulatory approval is sought and obtained, shareholders may not receive the benefits of any forks, the Trust may not choose, or be able, to participate in an airdrop, and the timing of receiving any benefits from a fork, airdrop or similar event is uncertain. Any inability to recognize the economic benefit of a hard fork or airdrop could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Coinbase Global serves as the Bitcoin custodian and prime execution agent for several competing exchange-traded Bitcoin products, which could adversely affect the Trust’s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares. The Prime Broker and Custodian are both affiliates of Coinbase Global. As of the date hereof, Coinbase Global is the largest publicly traded digital asset company in the world by market capitalization and is also the largest digital asset custodian in the world by assets under custody. By virtue of its leading market position and capabilities, and the relatively limited number of institutionally-capable providers of digital asset brokerage and custody services, Coinbase Global serves as the Bitcoin custodian and prime execution agent for several competing exchange-traded Bitcoin products. Therefore, Coinbase Global plays a critical role in supporting the U.S. spot Bitcoin exchange-traded product ecosystem, and its size and market share create the risk that Coinbase Global may fail to properly resource its operations to adequately support all such products that use its services, which could harm the Trust, the shareholders and the value of the Shares. If Coinbase Global were to favor the interests of certain products over others, it could result in inadequate attention or comparatively unfavorable commercial terms to less favored products, which could adversely affect the Trust’s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares. Certain of the Authorized Participants engaged by the Trust may serve in a similar capacity for competing exchange-traded Bitcoin products, which could adversely affect the arbitrage mechanism, the Trust’s operations, the performance of the Trust and ultimately the value of the Shares. Certain of the Authorized Participants engaged by the Trust may serve in a similar capacity for competing exchange-traded Bitcoin products. As a result, the Authorized Participants may be unable to adequately support all of the exchange-traded Bitcoin products that use their respective services. This risk may also be exacerbated as a consequence of the price and volatility of Bitcoin, as well as the amount of Bitcoin that is required to create or redeem Shares of the Trust. Moreover, the Authorized Participants may choose to facilitate creations and redemptions for competing products rather than for the Trust, including as a result of, among other things, how effectively the arbitrage mechanism of the Trust functions, the liquidity for the Shares, the bid/ask spreads in secondary trading of the Shares and the costs associated with creating and redeeming Shares of the Trust, in each case relative to competing products. In addition, given the relatively limited number of market participants that could serve as Authorized Participants of the Trust, the Trust may not be able to engage other providers to serve as Authorized Participants. If any or all of the Authorized Participants were to cease to act in their capacity as Authorized Participants of the Trust, or if any of the Authorized Participants were to favor creating and redeeming shares of competing products over those of the Trust, the Trust may receive inadequate attention or be subject to comparatively unfavorable commercial terms, which could adversely affect the arbitrage mechanism, the Trust’s operations, the performance of the Trust and ultimately the value of the Shares. See also “—Risk Factors Related to the Trust and the Shares—Competition from the emergence or growth of other digital assets could have a negative impact on the price of Bitcoin and adversely affect the value of the Shares.” Shareholders that are not Authorized Participants may only purchase or sell their Shares in secondary trading markets, and the conditions associated with trading in secondary markets may adversely affect investors’ investment in the Shares. Only Authorized Participants may purchase or redeem Baskets. All other investors that desire to purchase or sell Shares must do so through NYSE Arca or in other markets, if any, in which the Shares may be traded. Shares may trade at a premium or discount to the NAV per Share. 66 Risk Factors Related to the Regulation of Digital Assets, the Trust and the Shares A determination that Bitcoin or any other digital asset is a “security” may adversely affect the value of Bitcoin and the value of the Shares, and result in potentially extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to, or termination of, the Trust. The SEC, at least under the prior administration, has stated that certain digital assets may be considered “securities” under the federal securities laws. The test for determining whether a particular digital asset is a “security” is complex and difficult to apply, and the outcome is difficult to predict. A number of SEC and SEC staff actions with respect to a variety of digital assets demonstrate this difficulty. For example, public though non-binding, statements by senior officials at the SEC have indicated that the SEC did not consider Bitcoin or Ether to be securities, and does not currently consider Bitcoin to be a security. In addition, the SEC, by action through delegated authority approving the exchange rule filings to list shares of trusts holding Ether as commodity-based ETPs, appears to have implicitly taken the view that Ether is not a security. The SEC staff has also provided informal assurances via no-action letter to a handful of promoters that their digital assets are not securities. Moreover, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance has published statements that it does not consider, under certain circumstances, “meme coins” or some stablecoins to be securities. However, such statements may be withdrawn at any time without notice and comment by the Division of Corporation Finance at the SEC or the SEC itself. In addition, the SEC under former SEC Chair Gensler’s leadership brought enforcement actions against the issuers and promoters of several other digital assets on the basis that the digital assets in question are securities. The SEC also under former SEC Chair Gensler’s leadership brought enforcement actions against Digital Asset Trading Platforms for allegedly operating unregistered securities exchanges on the basis that certain of the digital assets traded on their platforms are securities. Whether a digital asset is a security, or offers and sales of a digital asset are securities transactions, under the federal securities laws depends on whether it is included in the lists of instruments making up the definition of “security” in such laws. Digital assets as such do not appear in any of these lists, although each list includes the terms “investment contract” and “note,” and the SEC has typically analyzed whether a particular digital asset, is a security or the offer and sale of a digital asset is a securities transaction by reference to whether it meets the tests developed by the federal courts interpreting these terms, known as the Howey and Reves tests, respectively. For many digital assets, whether or not the Howey or Reves tests are met is difficult to resolve definitively, and substantial legal arguments can often be made both in favor of and against a particular digital asset qualifying as a security or a particular offer and sale of a digital asset qualifying as a securities transaction under one or both of the Howey and Reves tests. Adding to the complexity, the SEC staff has indicated that the security status of a particular digital asset can change over time as the relevant facts evolve, though arguments advanced in some cases may suggest that the SEC no longer believes the status of a digital asset can change over time. These developments demonstrate the difficulty in applying the federal securities laws to digital assets generally. In January 2025, the SEC launched a crypto task force dedicated to developing a comprehensive and clear regulatory framework for digital assets led by Commissioner Hester Peirce. Subsequently, Commissioner Peirce announced a list of specific priorities to further that initiative, which included pursuing final rules related to a digital asset’s security status, a revised path to registered offerings and listings for digital assets-based investment vehicles, and clarity regarding digital asset custody, lending, and staking. On July 31, 2025, Chairman Atkins announced “Project Crypto,” a Commission-wide initiative to modernize securities rules for digital assets, reshore innovation in the United States, and implement the recommendations of the working group report. Chairman Atkins had directed the SEC’s policy divisions to work with the Crypto Task Force to draft “clear and simple rules of the road for crypto asset distributions, custody, and trading,” and the Commission and SEC staff will also consider using interpretive, exemptive, and other authorities with respect to digital asset markets. However, the efforts of the crypto task force and Project Crypto have only just begun, and how or whether the SEC regulates digital asset activity in the future remains to be seen. As part of determining whether Bitcoin is a security or a transaction in Bitcoin by the Sponsor is a securities transaction, for purposes of the federal securities laws, the Sponsor takes into account a number of factors, including the various definitions of “security” under the federal securities laws and federal court decisions interpreting elements of these definitions, such as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the Howey and Reves cases, and their progeny, as well as reports, orders, press releases, public statements and speeches by the SEC, its commissioners and its staff providing guidance on when a digital asset may be a security or when an offer and sale of a digital asset may be a securities transaction for purposes of the federal securities laws. Finally, the Sponsor discusses the security status of Bitcoin and the Sponsor’s transactions in Bitcoin with external counsel. Through this process the Sponsor believes that it is applying the proper legal standards in determining that Bitcoin is not a security in light of the uncertainties inherent in the Howey and Reves tests. However, such policies and procedures are risk-based judgments made by the Sponsor and not a legal standard or determination binding on any regulatory body or court. In light of these uncertainties and the fact-based nature of the analysis, the Sponsor acknowledges that the SEC may take a contrary position; and the Sponsor’s conclusion, even if reasonable under the circumstances, would not preclude legal or regulatory action based on the presence of a security. As is the case with Bitcoin, analyses from counsel typically review the often-complex facts surrounding a particular digital asset’s underlying technology, creation, use case and usage development, distribution and secondary-market trading characteristics as well as contributions of and marketing or promotional efforts by the individuals or organizations who appear to be involved in these activities, among other relevant facts, usually drawing on publicly available information. This information, usually found on the internet, often 67 includes both information that originated with or is attributed to such individuals or organizations, as well as information from third-party sources and databases that may or may not have a connection to such individuals or organizations, and the availability and nature of such information can change over time. The Sponsor and counsel often have no independent means of verifying the accuracy or completeness of such information, and therefore of necessity usually must assume that such information is materially accurate and complete for purposes of the Howey and Reves analyses. After having gathered this information, counsel typically analyzes it in light of the Howey and Reves tests, in order to inform a judgment as to whether or not a federal court would conclude that the digital asset, or transactions in the digital asset, in question is or is not a security, or are or are not securities transactions, respectively, for purposes of the federal securities laws. Often, certain factors appear to support a conclusion that the digital asset in question, or transactions in the digital asset, is a security, or are or are not securities transactions, respectively, while other factors appear to support the opposite conclusion, and in such a case counsel endeavors to weigh the importance and relevance of the competing factors. This analytical process is further complicated by the fact that, at present, federal judicial case law applying the relevant tests to digital assets is limited and in some situations inconsistent, with no federal appellate court having considered the question on the merits, as well as the fact that because each digital asset presents its own unique set of relevant facts, it is not always possible to directly analogize the analysis of one digital asset to another. Because of this factual complexity and the current lack of a well-developed body of federal case law applying the relevant tests to a variety of different fact patterns, the Sponsor has not in the past received, and currently does not expect that it would be able to receive, “opinions” of counsel stating that a particular digital asset, or transactions in the digital asset, is or is not a security, or are or are not securities transactions, respectively, for federal securities law purposes. The Sponsor understands that as a matter of practice, counsel is generally able to render a legal “opinion” only when the relevant facts are substantially ascertainable and the applicable law is both well-developed and settled. As a result, given the relative novelty of digital assets, the challenges inherent in fact-gathering for particular digital assets, and the fact that federal courts have only recently been tasked with adjudicating the applicability of federal securities law to digital assets, the Sponsor understands that at present counsel is generally not in a position to render a legal “opinion” on the securities law status of Bitcoin or any other particular digital asset. If the Sponsor determines that Bitcoin, or transactions in Bitcoin, are a security or securities transactions, respectively, under the federal securities laws, whether that determination is initially made by the Sponsor itself, or because a federal court upholds an allegation that Bitcoin is a security, the Sponsor does not intend to permit the Trust to continue holding Bitcoin in a way that would violate the federal securities laws (and therefore would either dissolve the Trust or potentially seek to operate the Trust in a manner that complies with the federal securities laws, including the Investment Company Act). Because the legal tests for determining whether a digital asset, or transactions in the digital asset, are or are not a security or securities transactions, respectively, often leave room for interpretation, for so long as the Sponsor believes there to be good faith grounds to conclude that the Trust’s Bitcoin is not a security, the Sponsor does not intend to dissolve the Trust on the basis that Bitcoin could at some future point be finally determined to be a security. Any enforcement action by the SEC or a state securities regulator asserting that Bitcoin, or transactions in Bitcoin, are a security, or securities transactions, respectively, or a court decision to that effect, would be expected to have an immediate material adverse impact on the trading value of Bitcoin, as well as the Shares. This is because the market structure behind most digital assets are incompatible with regulations applying to transactions in securities. If a digital asset or transactions in that digital asset, are determined to be a security or securities transactions, respectively, it is likely to become difficult or impossible for the digital asset to be traded, cleared or custodied in the United States through the same channels used by non-security digital assets, which in addition to materially and adversely affecting the trading value of the digital asset is likely to significantly impact its liquidity and market participants’ ability to convert the digital asset into U.S. dollars. Any assertion that a digital asset or transactions in that digital asset are a security or securities transactions, respectively, by the SEC or another regulatory authority may have similar effects. For example, in 2020 the SEC filed a complaint against the issuer of XRP, Ripple Labs, Inc., and two of its executives, alleging that they raised more than $1.3 billion through XRP sales that should have been registered under the federal securities laws, but were not. In the years prior to the SEC’s action, XRP’s market capitalization at times reached over $140 billion. However, in the weeks following the SEC’s complaint, XRP’s market capitalization fell to less than $10 billion, which was less than half of its market capitalization in the days prior to the complaint. Subsequently, in July 2023, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that while XRP is not a security, certain sales of XRP to certain buyers (but not other types of sales to other buyers) amounted to “investment contracts” under the Howey test. The District Court entered a final judgment in the case on August 7, 2024 and the parties each dismissed their appeals to the Second Circuit on August 7, 2025. Likewise, in the days following the announcement of SEC enforcement actions against certain digital asset issuers and trading platforms, the prices of various digital assets have declined significantly and may continue to decline as such cases advance through the federal court system. Furthermore, the decisions in cases involving digital assets have resulted in seemingly inconsistent views of different district court judges, including one that explicitly disagreed with the analysis underlying the decision regarding XRP, which underscore the continuing uncertainty around which digital assets, or transactions in digital assets, are securities and what the correct analysis is to determine each digital asset’s status. For example, the conflicting district court opinions and analyses demonstrate that factors such as how long a digital asset has been in existence, how widely held it is, how large its market capitalization is, the manner 68 in which it is offered, sold or promoted, and whether it has actual use in commercial transactions, ultimately may have limited or no bearing on whether the SEC, a state securities regulator or any particular court will find it to be a security. In addition, if Bitcoin, or transactions in Bitcoin, are in fact a security, or securities transactions, respectively, the Trust could be considered an unregistered “investment company” under the Investment Company Act, which could necessitate the Trust’s liquidation. In this case, the Trust and the Sponsor may be deemed to have participated in an illegal offering of investment company securities and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will be able to register the Trust under the Investment Company Act at such time or take such other actions as may be necessary to ensure the Trust’s activities comply with applicable law, which could force the Sponsor to liquidate the Trust. Moreover, whether or not the Sponsor or the Trust were subject to additional regulatory requirements as a result of any determination that the Trust’s assets include securities or the Trust’s transactions in digital assets constitute securities transactions, the Sponsor may nevertheless decide to terminate the Trust, in order, if possible, to liquidate the Trust’s assets while a liquid market still exists. For example, in response to the SEC’s action against the issuer of the digital asset XRP, certain significant market participants announced they would no longer support XRP and announced measures, including the delisting of XRP from major Digital Asset Trading Platforms, resulting in the Sponsor’s conclusion that it was likely to be increasingly difficult for U.S. investors, including Grayscale XRP Trust (XRP), an affiliate of the Trust, to convert XRP into U.S. dollars. The Sponsor subsequently dissolved Grayscale XRP Trust (XRP) and liquidated its assets. The Sponsor has since established a new investment vehicle that holds XRP, Grayscale XRP Trust ETF. If the SEC or a federal court were to determine that Bitcoin is a security or transactions in Bitcoin are securities transactions, it is likely that the value of the Shares of the Trust would decline significantly. Furthermore, if a federal court upholds an allegation that Bitcoin is a security or transactions in Bitcoin are securities transactions, the Trust itself may be terminated and, if practical, its assets liquidated. Regulatory changes or actions by the U.S. Congress or any U.S. federal or state agencies may affect the value of the Shares or restrict the use of Bitcoin, mining activity or the operation of the Bitcoin Network or the Digital Asset Markets in a manner that adversely affects the value of the Shares. As digital assets have grown in both popularity and market size, the U.S. Congress and a number of U.S. federal and state agencies (including FinCEN, OFAC, SEC, CFTC, FINRA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the IRS, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve and state financial institution and securities regulators) have been examining the operations of digital asset networks, digital asset users and the Digital Asset Markets, with particular focus on the extent to which digital assets can be used to launder the proceeds of illegal activities, evade sanctions, or fund criminal or terrorist enterprises and the safety and soundness of trading platforms and other service providers that hold or custody digital assets for users. Many of these state and federal agencies have issued consumer advisories regarding the risks posed by digital assets to investors. Ongoing and future regulatory actions with respect to digital assets generally or Bitcoin in particular may alter, perhaps to a materially adverse extent, the nature of an investment in the Shares or the ability of the Trust to continue to operate. On January 23, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology” aimed at supporting “the responsible growth and use of digital assets, blockchain technology, and related technologies across all sectors of the economy.” The Executive Order also established an interagency working group that is tasked with “proposing a Federal regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets” in the United States. Pursuant to this Executive Order, the working group released a report in July 2025 outlining the administration's recommendations to Congress and various agencies reflecting the administration’s “pro-innovation mindset toward digital assets and blockchain technologies.” In particular, the report recommends that Congress enact legislation regarding self custody of digital assets, clarifying the applicability of Bank Secrecy Act obligations with respect to digital asset service providers, granting the CFTC authority to regulate spot markets in non-security digital assets, prohibiting the adoption of a CBDC, and clarifying tax laws as relevant to digital assets. In addition, the report recommends that agencies reevaluate existing guidance on digital asset activities, use existing authorities to enable the trading of digital assets at the federal level, embrace DeFi, launch or relaunch crypto innovation efforts, and promote U.S. private sector leadership in the responsible development of cross-border payments and financial markets technologies, among others. There have also been several bills introduced in Congress that propose to establish additional regulation and oversight of the digital asset markets. For example, the CLARITY Act was passed by the House of Representatives in July 2025, which would, if enacted, regulate digital asset markets and digital asset trading platforms in the United States. In addition, also in July 2025, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (the “GENIUS Act”) became the first federal law specifically regulating the issuance, custody and other stablecoin-related matters in the United States. It is difficult to predict whether, or when, the CLARITY Act or another bill that would regulate digital asset markets and digital asset trading platforms may become law or what any such bill may entail. It is also difficult to predict whether, or when, any of these developments will lead to Congress granting additional authorities to the SEC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how additional legislation and/or regulatory oversight might impact the ability of Digital Asset Markets to function or how any new regulations or changes to existing 69 regulations might impact the value of digital assets generally and Bitcoin held by the Trust specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on the Trust and the Shares. Law enforcement agencies have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations. However, certain privacy-enhancing features have been, or are expected to be, introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If the Bitcoin Network were to adopt any of these features, these features may provide law enforcement agencies with less visibility into transaction-level data. Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, released a report in October 2017 noting the increased use of privacy-enhancing digital assets like Zcash and Monero in criminal activity on the internet. In August 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. citizens from using Tornado Cash, a digital asset protocol designed to obfuscate blockchain transactions, by adding certain Ethereum wallet addresses associated with the protocol to its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. A large portion of Ethereum validators globally, as well as notable industry participants such as Centre, the issuer of the USDC stablecoin, have reportedly complied with the sanctions and blacklisted the sanctioned addresses from interacting with their networks. In October 2023, FinCEN issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that identified convertible virtual currency (CVC) mixing as a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern and proposed requiring covered financial institutions to implement certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements on transactions that covered financial institutions know, suspect, or have reason to suspect involve CVC mixing within or involving jurisdictions outside the United States. In April 2024, the DOJ arrested and charged the developers of the Samourai Wallet mixing service with conspiracy to commit money laundering and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business. In May 2024, a co-founder of Tornado Cash was sentenced to more than five years imprisonment in the Netherlands for developing Tornado Cash on the basis that he had helped launder more than $2 billion worth of digital assets through Tornado Cash. In August 2025, a co-founder of Tornado Cash was convicted of conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business, but a mistrial was declared with respect to charges of conspiracy to commit money laundering and conspiracy to violate U.S. sanctions. Future additional regulatory action with respect to privacy-enhancing digital assets is possible. Competing industries may have more influence with policymakers than the digital asset industry, which could lead to the adoption of laws and regulations that are harmful to the digital asset industry. The digital asset industry is relatively new, although its influence over public policy is increasing, and it may not have the same access to policymakers and lobbying organizations in many jurisdictions compared to industries with which digital assets may be seen to compete, such as banking, payments and consumer finance. Competitors from other, more established industries may have greater access to and influence with governmental officials and regulators and may be successful in persuading these policymakers that digital assets require heightened levels of regulation compared to the regulation of traditional financial services. As a result, new laws and regulations may be proposed and adopted in the United States and elsewhere, or existing laws and regulations may be interpreted in new ways, that disfavor or impose compliance burdens on the digital asset industry or digital asset platforms, which could adversely impact the value of Bitcoin and therefore the value of the Shares. Regulatory changes or other events in foreign jurisdictions may affect the value of the Shares or restrict the use of one or more digital assets, mining activity or the operation of their networks or the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market in a manner that adversely affects the value of the Shares. Various foreign jurisdictions have, and may continue to adopt laws, regulations or directives that affect the digital asset network, the Digital Asset Markets, and their users, particularly Digital Asset Trading Platforms and service providers that fall within such jurisdictions’ regulatory scope. For example, if foreign jurisdictions in addition to China were to ban or otherwise restrict mining activity, including by regulating or limiting manufacturers’ ability to produce or sell semiconductors or hard drives in connection with mining, it would have a material adverse effect on digital asset networks (including the Bitcoin Network), the Digital Asset Market, and as a result, impact the value of the Shares. A number of foreign jurisdictions have recently taken regulatory action aimed at digital asset activities. China has made transacting in cryptocurrencies illegal for Chinese citizens in mainland China, and additional restrictions may follow. Both China and South Korea have banned initial coin offerings entirely and regulators in other jurisdictions, including Canada, Singapore and Hong Kong, have opined that initial coin offerings may constitute securities offerings subject to local securities regulations. The United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority published final rules in October 2020 banning the sale of derivatives and exchange-traded notes that reference certain types of digital assets, contending that they are “ill-suited” to retail investors citing extreme volatility, valuation challenges and association with financial crime. A new law, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (“FSMA”), received royal assent in June 2023. The FSMA brings digital asset activities within the scope of existing laws governing financial institutions, markets and assets. In addition, the Parliament of the European Union approved the text of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (“MiCA”) in April 2023, establishing a regulatory framework for digital asset services across the European Union. Certain parts of MiCA became effective as of June 2024 and the remainder became effective as of December 2024. MiCA is intended to serve as a comprehensive regulation of digital asset markets and imposes various obligations on digital asset issuers and service providers. The main aims of MiCA are industry regulation, consumer protection, prevention of market abuse and upholding the integrity of digital asset markets. See “Item 1. Business—Overview of the Bitcoin Industry and Market—Government Oversight.” 70 Foreign laws, regulations or directives may conflict with those of the United States and may negatively impact the acceptance of one or more digital assets by users, merchants and service providers outside the United States and may therefore impede the growth or sustainability of the digital asset economy in the European Union, China, Japan, Russia and the United States and globally, or otherwise negatively affect the value of Bitcoin. Moreover, other events, such as the interruption in telecommunications or internet services, cyber-related terrorist acts, civil disturbances, war or other catastrophes, could also negatively affect the digital asset economy in one or more jurisdictions. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 led to volatility in digital asset prices, with an initial steep decline followed by a sharp rebound in prices. The effect of any future regulatory change or other events on the Trust or Bitcoin is impossible to predict, and such change could be substantial and adverse to the Trust and the value of the Shares. If regulators or public utilities take actions that restrict or otherwise impact mining activities, there may be a significant decline in such activities, which could adversely affect the Bitcoin Network and the value of the Shares. Concerns have been raised about the electricity required to secure and maintain digital asset networks. For example, as of December 31, 2025, over 980 million tera hashes are performed every second in connection with mining on the Bitcoin Network. Although measuring the electricity consumed by this process is difficult because these operations are performed by various machines with varying levels of efficiency, the process consumes a significant amount of energy. The operations of the Bitcoin Network and other digital asset networks may also consume significant amounts of energy. Further, in addition to the direct energy costs of performing calculations on any given digital asset network, there are indirect costs that impact a network’s total energy consumption, including the costs of cooling the machines that perform these calculations. Driven by concerns around energy consumption and the impact on public utility companies, various states and cities have implemented, or are considering implementing, moratoriums on mining activity in their jurisdictions. For example, in November 2022, New York imposed a two-year moratorium on new proof-of-work mining permits at fossil fuel plants in the state. A significant reduction in mining activity as a result of such actions could adversely affect the security of the Bitcoin Network by making it easier for a malicious actor or botnet to manipulate the Blockchain. See “—If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Bitcoin Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Blockchain to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.” If regulators or public utilities take action that restricts or otherwise impacts mining activities, such actions could result in decreased security of a digital asset network, including the Bitcoin Network, and consequently adversely impact the value of the Shares. If regulators subject an Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor to regulation as a money service business or money transmitter, this could result in extraordinary expenses to the Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor and also result in decreased liquidity for the Shares. To the extent that the activities of any Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor cause it to be deemed a “money services business” under the regulations promulgated by FinCEN, such Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor may be required to comply with FinCEN regulations, including those that would mandate the Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor to implement anti-money laundering programs, make certain reports to FinCEN and maintain certain records. Similarly, the activities of an Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor may require it to be licensed as a money transmitter or as a digital asset business, such as under the ‘NYDFS’ BitLicense regulations or California’s Digital Financial Assets Law, once effective. Such additional regulatory obligations may cause the Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor to incur extraordinary expenses. If the Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor decided to seek the required licenses, there is no guarantee that they will timely receive them. An Authorized Participant may instead decide to terminate its role as Authorized Participant of the Trust, or the Sponsor may decide to discontinue and wind up the Trust. An Authorized Participant’s decision to cease acting as such may decrease the liquidity of the Shares, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares, and termination of the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances may be at a time that is disadvantageous to the shareholders. Additionally, to the extent an Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor is found to have operated without appropriate state or federal licenses, or registration, it may be subject to investigation, administrative or court proceedings, and civil or criminal monetary fines and penalties, all of which would harm the reputation of the Trust or the Sponsor, decrease the liquidity, and have a material adverse effect on the price of, the Shares. Statutory or regulatory changes or interpretations could obligate the Trust or the Sponsor to register and comply with new regulations, resulting in potentially extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to the Trust. Current and future legislation, CFTC and SEC rulemaking and other regulatory developments may impact the manner in which Bitcoin is treated. In particular, Bitcoin may be classified by the CFTC as a “commodity interest” under the CEA or may be classified by the SEC as a “security” under U.S. federal securities laws. It is also possible that a new Administration and Congress in the United States creates a new classification for digital assets. For example, the current draft of the CLARITY Act would add “digital commodities” to the list of assets that are commodity interests under the CEA. The Sponsor and the Trust cannot be certain as to how future regulatory developments will impact the treatment of Bitcoin under the law. In the face of such developments, the required registrations and 71 compliance steps may result in extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to the Trust. If the Sponsor decides to terminate the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances, the Trust may be dissolved or liquidated at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders. To the extent that Bitcoin is deemed to fall within the definition of a “commodity interest” under the CEA, due to the passage of the CLARITY Act or otherwise, the Trust and the Sponsor may be subject to additional regulation under the CEA and CFTC regulations. The Sponsor may be required to register as a commodity pool operator or commodity trading adviser with the CFTC and become a member of the National Futures Association and may be subject to additional regulatory requirements with respect to the Trust, including disclosure and reporting requirements. These additional requirements may result in extraordinary, recurring and/or nonrecurring expenses of the Trust, thereby materially and adversely impacting the Shares. If the Sponsor determines not to comply with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, the Sponsor will terminate the Trust. Any such termination could result in the liquidation of the Trust’s Bitcoin at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders. To the extent that Bitcoin is determined to be a security under U.S. federal securities laws, the Trust and the Sponsor may be subject to additional requirements under the Investment Company Act and the Sponsor may be required to register as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act. Such additional registration may result in extraordinary, recurring and/or non-recurring expenses of the Trust, thereby materially and adversely impacting the Shares. If the Sponsor determines not to comply with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, the Sponsor will terminate the Trust. Any such termination could result in the liquidation of the Trust’s Bitcoin at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders. The treatment of the Trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes is uncertain. The Sponsor intends to take the position that the Trust is properly treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Assuming that the Trust is a grantor trust, the Trust will not be subject to U.S. federal income tax. Rather, if the Trust is a grantor trust, each beneficial owner of Shares will be treated as directly owning its pro rata share of the Trust’s assets and a pro rata portion of the Trust’s income, gains, losses and deductions will “flow through” to each beneficial owner of Shares. The Trust has taken certain positions with respect to the tax consequences of Incidental Rights and its receipt of IR Virtual Currency. If the IRS were to disagree with, and successfully challenge, any of these positions the Trust might not qualify as a grantor trust. In addition, the Pre-Creation/Redemption Abandonment Notices (as defined herein) provide that the Trust will irrevocably abandon, effective immediately prior to each Creation Time or Redemption Time, all Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency to which it would otherwise be entitled as of such time and with respect to which it has not taken any Affirmative Action at or prior to such time. The Sponsor has committed to cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency to which the Trust may become entitled in the future, and in the past the Trust has also abandoned Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency through Affirmative Actions. There can be no complete assurance that these abandonments will be treated as effective for U.S. federal income tax purposes. If the Trust were treated as owning any asset other than Bitcoin as of any date on which it creates or redeems Shares, it might cease to qualify as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes. In addition, at this time the Trust is not permitted to create or redeem Shares via in-kind transactions with Authorized Participants. Unless and until the Trust is permitted to create and redeem Shares via in-kind transactions with Authorized Participants, Baskets will be created or redeemed only through Cash Orders. In general, investment vehicles intended to be treated as grantor trusts for U.S. federal income tax purposes historically have created additional trust interests only in kind, and there is no authority directly addressing whether a grantor trust may create or redeem trust interests under procedures similar to those that govern Cash Orders. Accordingly, there can be no complete assurance that the creation or redemption of Shares under the procedures governing Cash Orders will not cause the Trust to fail to qualify as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Moreover, because of the evolving nature of digital assets, it is not possible to predict potential future developments that may arise with respect to digital assets, including forks, airdrops and other similar occurrences. Assuming that the Trust is currently a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, certain future developments could render it impossible, or impracticable, for the Trust to continue to be treated as a grantor trust for such purposes. If the Trust is not properly classified as a grantor trust, the Trust might be classified as a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes. However, due to the uncertain treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes (as discussed in “Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences—Uncertainty Regarding the U.S. Federal Income Tax Treatment of Digital Assets”), there can be no assurance in this regard. If the Trust were classified as a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes, the tax consequences of owning Shares generally would not be materially different from the tax consequences described herein, although there might be certain differences, including with respect to timing of the recognition of taxable income or loss. In addition, tax information reports provided to beneficial owners of Shares would be made in a different form. If the Trust were not classified as either a grantor trust or a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes, it would be classified as a corporation for such purposes. In that event, the Trust would be subject to entity-level U.S. federal income tax (currently at the rate of 21%) on its net taxable income and certain distributions made by the Trust to shareholders would be treated as taxable dividends to the extent of the Trust’s current and accumulated earnings and profits. Any such dividend distributed to a beneficial owner of Shares that is a non-U.S. person for U.S. federal income tax purposes would be 72 subject to U.S. federal withholding tax at a rate of 30% (or such lower rate as provided in an applicable tax treaty). As a result, the taxation of the Trust as a corporation could materially reduce the after-tax return on an investment in Shares, and substantially reduce the value of the Shares, and result in a material divergence between NAV and the value of the Trust’s Bitcoin. The treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes is uncertain. As discussed in the section entitled “Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences—Uncertainty Regarding the U.S. Federal Income Tax Treatment of Digital Assets,” assuming that the Trust is properly treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, each beneficial owner of Shares will be treated for U.S. federal income tax purposes as the owner of an undivided interest in the Bitcoin (and, if applicable, any Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency) held in the Trust. Due to the new and evolving nature of digital assets and the absence of comprehensive guidance with respect to digital assets, many significant aspects of the U.S. federal income tax treatment of digital assets are uncertain. In 2014, the IRS released a notice (the “Notice”) discussing certain aspects of “convertible virtual currency” (that is, digital assets that have an equivalent value in fiat currency or that act as substitutes for fiat currency) for U.S. federal income tax purposes and, in particular, stating that such digital assets (i) are “property” (ii) are not “currency” for purposes of the rules relating to foreign currency gain or loss and (iii) may be held as a capital asset. In 2019, the IRS released a revenue ruling and a set of “Frequently Asked Questions” that has been updated from time to time since (the “Ruling & FAQs”). The Ruling & FAQs provide some additional guidance, including guidance to the effect that, under certain circumstances, hard forks of digital assets are taxable events giving rise to ordinary income and guidance with respect to the determination of the tax basis of digital assets. However, the Notice and the Ruling & FAQs do not address other significant aspects of the U.S. federal income tax treatment of digital assets. Moreover, although the Ruling & FAQs address the treatment of hard forks, there continues to be uncertainty with respect to the timing and amount of the income inclusions. While the Ruling & FAQs do not address most situations in which airdrops occur, it is clear from the reasoning of the Ruling & FAQs that the IRS generally would treat an airdrop as a taxable event giving rise to ordinary income. There can be no assurance that the IRS will not alter its position with respect to digital assets in the future or that a court would uphold the treatment set forth in the Notice and the Ruling & FAQs. It is also unclear what additional guidance on the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes may be issued in the future. Any such alteration of the current IRS positions or additional guidance could result in adverse tax consequences for shareholders and could have an adverse effect on the value of Bitcoin. Future developments that may arise with respect to digital assets may increase the uncertainty with respect to the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes. For example, the Notice addresses only digital assets that are “convertible virtual currency,” and it is conceivable that, as a result of a fork, airdrop or similar occurrence, the Trust could hold certain types of digital assets that are not within the scope of the Notice, in the event the Sponsor seeks to change the Trust’s policy with respect to Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency, subject to NYSE Arca obtaining regulatory approval from the SEC. Shareholders are urged to consult their tax advisers regarding the tax consequences of owning and disposing of Shares and digital assets in general. Future developments regarding the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes could adversely affect the value of the Shares. As discussed above, many significant aspects of the U.S. federal income tax treatment of digital assets, such as Bitcoin, are uncertain, and it is unclear what guidance on the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes may be issued in the future. It is possible that any such guidance would have an adverse effect on the prices of digital assets, including on the price of Bitcoin in the Digital Asset Markets, and therefore may have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Because of the evolving nature of digital assets, it is not possible to predict potential future developments that may arise with respect to digital assets, including forks, airdrops and similar occurrences. Such developments may increase the uncertainty with respect to the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Moreover, certain future developments could render it impossible, or impracticable, for the Trust to continue to be treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Future developments in the treatment of digital assets for tax purposes other than U.S. federal income tax purposes could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The taxing authorities of certain states, including New York, (i) have announced that they will follow the Notice with respect to the treatment of digital assets for state income tax purposes and/or (ii) have issued guidance exempting the purchase and/or sale of digital assets for fiat currency from state sales tax. However, it is unclear what further guidance on the treatment of digital assets for state tax purposes may be issued in the future. The treatment of digital assets for tax purposes by non-U.S. jurisdictions may differ from the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal, state or local tax purposes. It is possible, for example, that a non-U.S. jurisdiction would impose sales tax or value-added tax on purchases and sales of digital assets for fiat currency. If a foreign jurisdiction with a significant share of the market of Bitcoin Network 73 users imposes onerous tax burdens on digital asset users, or imposes sales or value-added tax on purchases and sales of digital assets for fiat currency, such actions could result in decreased demand for Bitcoin in such jurisdiction. Any future guidance on the treatment of digital assets for state, local or non-U.S. tax purposes could increase the expenses of the Trust and could have an adverse effect on the prices of digital assets, including on the price of Bitcoin in the Digital Asset Markets. As a result, any such future guidance could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. The tax treatment of Bitcoin and transactions involving Bitcoin for state and local tax purposes is not settled. Because Bitcoin is a new technological innovation, the tax treatment of Bitcoin for state and local tax purposes, including, without limitation state and local income and sales and use taxes, is not settled. It is uncertain what guidance, if any, on the treatment of Bitcoin for state and local tax purposes may be issued in the future. A state or local government authority’s treatment of Bitcoin may have negative consequences, including the imposition of a greater tax burden on investors in Bitcoin or the imposition of a greater cost on the acquisition and disposition of Bitcoin generally. Any such treatment may have a negative effect on prices of Bitcoin and may adversely affect the value of the Shares. A U.S. tax-exempt shareholder may recognize “unrelated business taxable income” as a consequence of an investment in Shares. Under the guidance provided in the Ruling & FAQs, hard forks, airdrops and similar occurrences with respect to digital assets will under certain circumstances be treated as taxable events giving rise to ordinary income. In the absence of guidance to the contrary, it is possible that any such income recognized by a U.S. tax-exempt shareholder would constitute UBTI. A tax-exempt shareholder should consult its tax adviser regarding whether such shareholder may recognize UBTI as a consequence of an investment in Shares. See “Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.” Shareholders may be subject to withholding tax on income derived from forks, airdrops and similar occurrences. The Ruling & FAQs do not address whether income recognized by a non-U.S. person as a result of a fork, airdrop or similar occurrence could be subject to the 30% withholding tax imposed on U.S.-source “fixed or determinable annual or periodical” income. Non-U.S. Holders (as defined under “Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences—Tax Consequences to Non-U.S. Holders”) should be aware that, in the absence of guidance, a withholding agent (including a broker through which a Non-U.S. Holder holds Shares) may withhold 30% of any such income recognized by a non-U.S. Holder in respect of its Shares, including by deducting such withheld amounts from proceeds that such non-U.S. Holder would otherwise be entitled to receive in connection with a distribution of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. See “Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.” Risk Factors Related to Potential Conflicts of Interest Potential conflicts of interest may arise among the Sponsor or its affiliates and the Trust. The Sponsor and its affiliates have no fiduciary duties to the Trust and its shareholders other than as provided in the Trust Agreement, which may permit them to favor their own interests to the detriment of the Trust and its shareholders. The Sponsor will manage the affairs of the Trust. Conflicts of interest may arise among the Sponsor and its affiliates, on the one hand, and the Trust and its shareholders, on the other hand. As a result of these conflicts, the Sponsor may favor its own interests and the interests of its affiliates over the Trust and its shareholders. These potential conflicts include, among others, the following: • The Sponsor has no fiduciary duties to, and is allowed to take into account the interests of parties other than, the Trust and its shareholders in resolving conflicts of interest, provided the Sponsor does not act in bad faith; • The Trust has agreed to indemnify the Sponsor and its affiliates pursuant to the Trust Agreement; • The Sponsor is responsible for allocating its own limited resources among different clients and potential future business ventures, to each of which it owes fiduciary duties; • The Sponsor and its staff also service affiliates of the Sponsor, including several other digital asset investment vehicles, and their respective clients and cannot devote all of its, or their, respective time or resources to the management of the affairs of the Trust; • The Sponsor, its affiliates and their respective officers and employees are not prohibited from engaging in other businesses or activities, including those that might be in direct competition with the Trust; • Affiliates of the Sponsor have substantial direct investments in Bitcoin that they are permitted to manage taking into account their own interests without regard to the interests of the Trust or its shareholders, and any increases, decreases or other changes in such investments could affect the Index Price and, in turn, the value of the Shares; • There is an absence of arm’s-length negotiation with respect to certain terms of the Trust, and, where applicable, there has been no independent due diligence conducted with respect to the Trust; 74 • The Sponsor’s indirect parent company, DCG, holds less than 1% of the Shares representing ownership in the Trust, as of February 20, 2026. On March 10, 2021, the board of directors of the Sponsor (the “Board”) approved the purchase by DCG, the indirect parent company of the Sponsor, of up to $250 million worth of Shares of the Trust. Subsequently, DCG authorized such purchase. On April 30, 2021, the Board approved the purchase by DCG of up to $750 million worth of Shares of the Trust. This increased DCG’s prior authorization to purchase up to $250 million worth of Shares by $500 million. On October 20, 2021, the Board approved the purchase by DCG of up to $1 billion worth of Shares of the Trust. Subsequently, DCG authorized such purchase. This increased DCG’s prior authorization to purchase up to $750 million worth of Shares by $250 million. On March 2, 2022, the Board of the Sponsor approved the purchase by DCG of up to an aggregate total of $200 million worth of Shares of the Trust and shares of any of the following five investment products the Sponsor also acts as the sponsor and manager of, including Grayscale Bitcoin Cash Trust (BCH) (OTCQX: BCHG), Grayscale CoinDesk Crypto 5 ETF (NYSE Arca: GDLC), Grayscale Ethereum Staking ETF (NYSE Arca: ETHE), Grayscale Ethereum Classic Trust (ETC) (OTCQX: ETCG) and Grayscale Stellar Lumens Trust (XLM) (OTCQX: GXLM). This increased DCG’s prior authorization to purchase up to $1 billion worth of Shares by up to a maximum of $200 million. The Share purchase authorization does not obligate DCG to acquire any specific number of Shares in any period, and may be expanded, extended, modified, or discontinued at any time. As of the date of this Annual Report DCG purchased a total of $771.8 million worth of Shares of the Trust under this authorization. However in the event DCG chooses to purchase additional Shares of the Trust, such purchase would further increase DCG’s ownership interest in the Trust, which, could ultimately result in DCG holding a majority of the Shares representing ownership in the Trust, and its interests as a shareholder may conflict with the interests of the Trust’s other shareholders; • Several employees of the Sponsor and the Sponsor’s indirect parent company, DCG, are FINRA-registered representatives who historically maintained their licenses through Genesis and currently maintain their licenses through Grayscale Securities; • DCG is (i) the indirect parent company of the Sponsor; (ii) the indirect parent company of Grayscale Securities, the Authorized Participant from October 3, 2022 through January 10, 2024; and (iii) a minority interest holder in Kraken, one of the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index, representing less than 1.0% of its equity; • DCG has investments in a large number of digital assets and companies involved in the digital asset ecosystem, including trading platforms and custodians. DCG’s positions on changes that should be adopted in the Bitcoin Network could be adverse to positions that would benefit the Trust or its shareholders. Additionally, before or after a hard fork on the Bitcoin Network, DCG’s position regarding which fork among a group of incompatible forks of the Bitcoin Network should be considered the “true” Bitcoin Network could be adverse to positions that would most benefit the Trust; • DCG has been vocal in the past about its support for digital assets other than Bitcoin. Any investments in, or public positions taken on, digital assets other than Bitcoin by DCG, could have an adverse impact on the price of Bitcoin; • The Sponsor decides whether to retain separate counsel, accountants or others to perform services for the Trust; • While the Index Provider does not currently utilize data from over-the-counter markets or derivatives platforms, it may decide to include pricing from such markets or platforms in the future; • The Sponsor may appoint an agent to act on behalf of the shareholders, and such agent may be the Sponsor or an affiliate of the Sponsor; and • The Sponsor has historically, and may again select an Index Provider that is an affiliate of the Sponsor and the Trust. By purchasing the Shares, shareholders agree and consent to the provisions set forth in the Trust Agreement. See “Item 1. Business—Description of the Trust Agreement.” For a further discussion of the conflicts of interest among the Sponsor, the distributor, the marketer, Authorized Participant, Liquidity Providers, the Trust and others, see “Item 13. Certain Relationships and Related Transactions and Director Independence.” DCG is a minority interest holder in Kraken, which operates one of the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index Price. DCG, the indirect parent company of the Sponsor, holds a minority interest of less than 1.0% in Kraken. The Sponsor values its digital assets by reference to the Index Price. The Index Price is the price in U.S. dollars of a Bitcoin derived from the Digital Asset Trading Platforms that are reflected in the Index developed by CoinDesk Indices, Inc. as of 4:00 p.m., New York time, on each business day. Kraken is one of the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index. Although DCG does not exercise control over Kraken, it is possible that investors could have concerns that DCG could influence market data provided by this Digital Asset Trading Platform in a way that benefits DCG, for example by artificially inflating the values of Bitcoin in order to increase the Sponsor’s fees. This could make the Trust’s Shares less attractive to investors than the shares of similar vehicles that do not present these concerns, adversely affect investor sentiment about the Trust and negatively affect Share trading prices. 75 Shareholders cannot be assured of the Sponsor’s continued services, the discontinuance of which may be detrimental to the Trust. Shareholders cannot be assured that the Sponsor will be willing or able to continue to serve as sponsor to the Trust for any length of time. If the Sponsor discontinues its activities on behalf of the Trust and a substitute sponsor is not appointed, the Trust will terminate and liquidate its Bitcoin. Appointment of a substitute sponsor will not guarantee the Trust’s continued operation, successful or otherwise. Because a substitute sponsor may have no experience managing a digital asset financial vehicle, a substitute sponsor may not have the experience, knowledge or expertise required to ensure that the Trust will operate successfully or continue to operate at all. Therefore, the appointment of a substitute sponsor may not necessarily be beneficial to the Trust and the Trust may terminate. See “Item 13. Certain Relationships and Related Transactions and Director Independence—The Sponsor.” Although the Custodian is a fiduciary with respect to the Trust’s assets, if the Custodian resigns or is removed by the Sponsor or otherwise, without replacement, it would trigger early termination of the Trust. The Custodian is a fiduciary under § 100 of the New York Banking Law and a qualified custodian for purposes of Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6) under the Investment Advisers Act and is licensed to custody the Trust’s Bitcoin in trust on the Trust’s behalf. However, the SEC previously released proposed amendments in February 2023 to Rule 206(4)-2 that, if enacted as proposed, would amend the definition of a “qualified custodian” under Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6). Executive officers of the Custodian’s parent company have made public statements indicating that the Custodian will remain a qualified custodian under the proposed SEC rule, if enacted as proposed. In June 2025, however, the SEC formally withdrew that proposed rulemaking and stated that it does not intend to issue final rules based on the proposal. However, there can be no assurance that the Custodian would continue to qualify as a “qualified custodian” under a final rule that may be proposed or adopted by the SEC in the future. Furthermore, during the initial term, the Custodian may terminate the Prime Broker Agreement for Cause (as defined in “Description of the Prime Broker Agreement—Termination”) at any time, and after the initial term, the Custodian can terminate the Agreement for any reason upon the notice period provided under the Prime Broker Agreement. If the Custodian resigns or is removed by the Sponsor or otherwise, without replacement, the Trust will dissolve in accordance with the terms of the Trust Agreement. Shareholders may be adversely affected by the lack of independent advisers representing investors in the Trust. The Sponsor has consulted with counsel, accountants and other advisers regarding the formation and operation of the Trust. No counsel was appointed to represent investors in connection with the formation of the Trust or the establishment of the terms of the Trust Agreement and the Shares. Moreover, no counsel has been appointed to represent an investor in connection with the offering of the Shares. Accordingly, an investor should consult his, her or its own legal, tax and financial advisers regarding the desirability of the value of the Shares. Lack of such consultation may lead to an undesirable investment decision with respect to investment in the Shares. 76